NOTES

Notes to chapter 1

2. See E. Husserl, Experience and Judgment, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1973, in part. §7; hereafter EJ.
3. EJ, 91.
4. EJ, 272.
5. Ch. Harvey, J. Hintikka, “Modalization and Modalities”, cit., p.64.
11. Ch. Harvey, J. Hintikka, “Modalization and Modalities”, cit., p.76.
13. EJ, 204.
14. EJ, 204.
15. EJ, 122.
16. EJ, 122.
18. See A. Schuetz, “Type and Eidos in Husserl’s Late Philosophy”, cit., p.150.
20. FLT, 320.
30. ACP, 96.
Notes to chapter 2

2 See *IP*, 33.
3 *TS*, 2.
8 *IPPI*, 361.
9 *IPPI*, 363.
11 *IPPII*, 45.
12 *IPPII*, 46.
13 *IPPII*, 47.
14 *TS*, 257.
15 *TS*, 132.
16 *TS*, 136.
17 *TS*, 137.
18 *TS*, 141.
19 *TS*, 143.
20 *TS*, 149.
21 *TS*, 157.
22 *TS*, 158.
23 *TS*, 169.
24 *TS*, 208.
25 *TS*, 208.
26 *TS*, 210.
27 *TS*, 213.
28 *TS*, 230.
29 *TS*, 238.
30 *TS*, 241.
31 *TS*, 242.
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33 See E.S. Casey, The Fate of Place. A Philosophical History, cit., p.218.
34 E.S. Casey, The Fate of Place. A Philosophical History, cit., p. 219.
37 U. Claesges, Edmund Husserls Theorie der Raumkonstitution, cit., p.129.
39 E.S. Casey, The Fate of Place. A Philosophical History, cit., p.219.
43 E.S. Casey, The Fate of Place. A Philosophical History, cit., p.220.
44 E. Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, cit., p.217.

Notes to chapter 3

48 R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, cit., p.64. Sellars points out that the question concerning the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge depends on a decision rather than on an answer: “What the decision should be, that is, which meaning (if any) should be attached to the term ‘a priori’, it is by no means easy to say. Many factors are involved, by no means the least of which is the sense of belonging to one or other of the two major traditions of Western philosophy.…. If one is tired of philosophical shibboleths, and finds important insights on both sides of the fence, one will content oneself with pointing out that while every conceptual frame involves propositions which, though synthetic, are true ex vi terminorum, every conceptual frame is also but one among many which compete for adoption in the market-place of experience” (ITSA, in SPR, 319-320).
50 According to Sellars, learning to use a language doesn’t amount to learning to obey the rules for the use of its expressions; obeying rules, as a matter of fact, involves using the language in which the rules are formulated leading in this way to a vicious regress. To avoid this, we ought to substitute “the phrase ‘learning to conform to the rules...’ for ‘learning to obey the rules...’” where “conforming to a rule enjoining the doing of A in circumstances C” is to be equated simply with “doing A when the circumstances are C”- regardless of how one comes to do it (SRLG, in SPR, 322). In doing so, learning to use a language (L) doesn’t entail no longer having learned to use the metalanguage (ML), and so on.
51 R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, cit., p.177.
53 R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, cit., p.178. The claim that justification is a practice referred to what we already accept amounts to reject, in Sellars’ point of view, the falsely atomistic conception of belief: individual beliefs, as a matter of fact, are neither meaningful nor justified in isolation from the conceptual framework of which they are part.
54 Sellars writes: “Jones thinks out-loud: Lo! Here is a red apple. Now to say that this visual thinking-out-loud that something is the case is epistemically justified or reasonable or has authority is clearly not to say that Jones has correctly inferred from certain premises, which he has good reason to believe, that there is a red apple in front of him. For we are dealing with a paradigm case of non inferential belief. The authority of the thinking accrues to it in quite a different way. It can be traced to the fact that Jones has learned to use the relevant words in perceptual situations” (SK, 324).
55 Sellars points out: “One of the forms taken by the Myth of the Given is the idea that there is, indeed must be, a structure of particular matter of fact such that (a) each fact can not only be non-inferentially known to be the case, but presupposes no other knowledge either of particular matter
of fact, or of general truth; and (b) such that the non-inferential knowledge of facts belonging to this structure constitutes the ultimate court of appeals for all factual claims—particular and general—about the world. It is important to note that I characterized the knowledge of fact belonging to this stratum as not only non-inferential but as presupposing no knowledge of other matter of fact whether particular or general. It might be thought that this is a redundancy, that knowledge (not belief or conviction, but knowledge) which logically presupposes knowledge of other facts must be inferential. This, however, as I hope to show, is itself an episode in the myth” (EPM, 164).

56 R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, cit., note 12, p.179.
57 ENWW, 646.
58 EPM, 170
59 See W. A. deVries, Wilfrid Sellars, cit., p.273; see also SM, 226.
60 W. A. deVries, Wilfrid Sellars, cit., p.273.
61 CDCM, 285.
63 EPM, 160.
64 R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, cit., p. 184.
67 J. McDowell, Mind and World, cit., p.46.
68 EPM, 127.
69 See EPM, sec.62.
70 EPM, 195.
71 SK, 59.
72 W. A. deVries, Wilfrid Sellars, cit., p.276.
73 J. McDowell, Mind and World, cit., p. xiv.
74 See SK, 295.
75 SK, 2.
76 EPM, 165.
77 EPM, 166.
78 EPM, 167.
79 EPM, 167-168.
80 PSIM in SPR, 27.
81 IAMB in PP, 385.
82 Linguistic expressions, in Sellars’ point of view, can play three important roles which, in some way, determine also their meanings:
1. Language-entry transitions thanks to which a speaker responds to objects (perceptible or introspectible), events or situations with linguistic activity;
2. Intralinguistic moves which concern various transition rules of the language like e.g. valid inference rules;
3. Language-exit transitions which transform linguistic episodes (e.g. ‘I shall now eat a cake’) in appropriate behaviors (in the case above, e.g., going to the kitchen, taking a cake and beginning to eat it).

For Sellars, as for Quine and Davidson, words have meaning only in the context of an entire language. See for this subject of matter LRB, 310; SRLG in SPR, 327-31; NAO, 67,69.
83 IAMB in PP, 385-6.
84 W. A. DeVries, Wilfrid Sellars, cit., p. 227.
86 See SPR, ch.4.
88 EPM, 170. It can be important to note that to dispose of foundation doesn’t amount to refuse the possibility of immediate knowledge; the two questions, as a matter of fact, must be distinguished: “Even if there is something radically wrong with the concept of an immediate experience of a particular or of a fact, there is still the claim that some beliefs are self-warranted, the claim that some beliefs are epistemized by reliable noninferential origin, and so on” (W. P. Alston, “What’s Wrong with Immediate Knowledge?”, Synthese, 55, 1983, p.74.
Notes to chapter 4

1 A preliminary version of this essay appeared with the title “Wittgenstein on colour-issues” in Dialegesthai. Rivista telematica di filosofia, 10, 2008 [on-line: http://mondodomani.org/dialegesthai/].
2 Wittgenstein as a matter of fact states: “Tautology and contradiction are not pictures of the reality. They present no possible state of affairs. For the one allows every possible state of affairs, the other none.” (TLP, prop.4.462)
5 R. Ciuni, “The colour exclusion problem and ‘synthetic a priori’ propositions between Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Some Remarks on Logical Form”, cit., p.126.
6 Proposition 4.221 of TLP states: “It is obvious that in the analysis of propositions we must come to elementary propositions, which consist of names in immediate combination”.
7 E. Husserl, Logical Investigations, vol.II, cit., p.21. Husserl states fully and clearly that a synthetic proposition is a specification (Besonderung) of synthetic a priori laws; empirical specifications are, of course, propositions like “This red is different from this green”.
12 In TLP, prop. 2.0131, Wittgenstein writes: “A speck in the visual field, though it need not be red, must have some colour: it is, so to speak, surrounded by colour-space.” In prop. 2.0251, Wittgenstein clarifies also that “Space, time, and colour (being coloured) are forms of objects”.
15 PR, sec 1.
16 See PR, sec. 219, 220.
17 PR, sec.3.
18 PR, sec.4.
19 See PR, sec. 221.


PR, sec. 1.

L. Waismann, Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, cit., p.45.

PR, sec.11.

See PR, sec. 68; Wittgenstein writes: “Isn’t it clear that this would be the most immediate description we can possibly imagine? That is to say, that anything which tried to be more immediate still would inevitably cease to be a description”.

See the following passage in RC, II, sec. 16: “Phenomenological analysis (as e.g. Goethe would have it) is analysis of concepts and can neither with nor contradict physics”. For this reason Wittgenstein’s researches on colours don’t amount to a psychological investigation, so that all the assertions about them are not assumed as propositions of natural history. See also the following passages in RC, III, sec., 9-10: “If we say that the proposition ‘saturated yellow is lighter than saturated blue’ doesn’t belong to the realm of psychology (for only so could it be natural history)-this means that we are not using it as a proposition of natural history. And the question then is : what is the other, non-temporal use like?” “For this is the only way we can distinguish propositions of ‘the mathematics of colour’ from those of natural history”.

BT, 323e.

BT, 324e.


RLF, 32.

RLF, 32.

RLF, 35.


TLP, prop. 5.5563.

PI, sec. 124.

PI, sec. 125.

PI, sec. 126.


RC, sec.1.

RC, sec.I-63.


RC, sec. I-76.

RC, sec. III-112.

In RC, III-332, Wittgenstein writes: “Couldn’t seeing be the exception? [I.e. rather than blindness being the exception.] But neither the blind nor the sighted could describe it, except as an ability to do this or that. Including e.g. playing certain language-games; but we must be careful how we describe these games”.

RC, III-71.

RC, III-72.


Ibidem.
Wittgenstein writes: “[…] the language-game with colours is characterized by what we are able to do, and what we are not able to do” (Zettel, sec. 345). Another passage contained in Remarks on Colours is considerable in order to understand Wittgenstein’s rejection of inner experiences: “If the psychologist teaches us, “There are people who see”, we can then ask him: “And what do you call ‘people who see’?” The answer to that would have to be: People who behave so-and-so under such-and-such circumstances” (RC, sec. I-88).

56 PI, sec. 56.
57 M.B. Hintikka, J. Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, cit., p. 301.
58 BT, 55e-56e.
59 RC, sec. III-19; see also RC, III-43.