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RESEARCH ARTICLE

SPILLOVER THROUGH SHARED AGENDAS: UNDERSTANDING HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS SET AGENDAS FOR ONE ANOTHER

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ABSTRACT: Social movement spillover is an internal social movement sector outcome in which movements influence one another. Although research on social movement outcomes has advanced significantly in recent years, there has been less work on consequences that movements have on one another. One reason for this is that research on social movement spillover has been limited by its reliance on a small number of research methods, nearly all of which involve pre-selecting movements that are expected to be at risk of spillover. In this article, we contribute important new findings to the study of spillover in two ways. First, we examine a novel form of spillover: agenda spillover, which occurs when the goals of one movement come to be taken up by another movement in a serious or enduring manner (e.g., when racial justice goals become embedded in environmental goals). Second, using social network and computational methods, validated by significant pre-study testing, and event history analysis, we examine what factors seem to explain agenda spillover. We find that the social movement sector, characteristics of social movements themselves and, to a lesser extent, the political context, affect the propensity for movements to experience agenda spillover.

KEYWORDS: spillover, agenda-setting, social movement outcomes, political opportunities, agenda spillover

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1. Introduction

As Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests grew larger and diffused across the Summer of 2020 in the U.S. (Putnam et al., 2020), the pace and scale of protest shaped the agenda of many other actors. For instance, media coverage of BLM increased in 2020 (Mehta, 2020), reflecting a change in the media agenda. Cities and counties began reconsidering their police budgets (McEvoy, 2020) and the national American political agenda included both systemic racism and criminal justice policy in ways that it had not for years, if decades. Even cultural producers grappled with how to reorient their products in light of BLM protests (Zeitchik, 2020). This is, of course, not the first time that Black activists have shaped American policy and media agendas (Wasow, 2020).

Indeed, such successes illustrate what social movement scholars have recognized as a key capacity of protest: to press items into, and elevate items on, media, policy, and public agendas (Cress and Snow, 2000, King et al., 2007, McCarthy et al., 1996, McAdam and Su, 2002). Getting onto the media, policy, or public agenda is not indicated by a single newspaper article, a one-off mention by an elected official, or a single statement of public concern, but instead occurs when an issue has sustained and notable prominence on the agenda. Movements have been good at getting onto these agendas.

Indeed, out of the wide array of potential consequences of social movements (Bosi and Uba, 2009), Andrews and Edwards (2004) flag agenda setting as amongst the most important and supported: "Many scholars of social movements and public interest groups assume that agenda setting is the arena where advocacy organizations will have their greatest influence" (492). However, scholarship on agenda setting has never investigated these dynamics *within* the social movement sector; research asks how social movements influence institutional actors agendas but without asking how social movements may influence the agendas of other extra-institutional actors, including other social movements.

In this article, we argue for the importance of this hitherto unacknowledged impact—the ability of movements to change each other's goals/agenda—and situate it within a larger class of social movement spillover outcomes (Meyer and Whittier, 1994). Our study of "agenda spillover" argues that serious or durable shifts in movement goals and claims represent agenda setting within extra-institutional politics and are both likely and important potential impacts of movements. In order to explain this new kind of spillover, we synthesize extant research on the multiple ways that movements can influence one another and test whether factors that have affected other intra-movement influences also influence agenda spillover. We draw on data from the Dynamics of Collective Action (DoCA) dataset and find that political context, social movement sector characteristics, and key similarities and differences between movements influence agenda spillover. Our introduction of agenda spillover and analysis of its predictors represents an important contribution to social movements research on outcomes, which while it has advanced significantly over the last two decades (Bosi et al., 2016, Bosi and Uba, 2009), has focused more on the political or personal consequences of activism and less on how movements affect one another.

2. Agenda Setting in Institutional and Non-Institutional Arenas

In the social movements outcome literature, agenda setting can involve setting the so-called public agenda (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), as when social movements achieve wider recognition of their concerns (Rochon, 1998) or can involve the actual policy agenda, which involves institutional political actors raising social movement concerns in hearings, bills, and/or votes as a result of social movement influence. Importantly, agenda setting does not require that positive legislative changes eventually result, but rather simply that the issues make it onto the institutional political agenda (McAdam and Su, 2002).

For instance, Olzak and Soule (2009) find that environmental protest led to more congressional hearings on the environment but not to more legislation. Movement mobilization levels are thought to drive this increase in legislative attention, including hearings and roll call votes (e.g., McAdam and Su, 2002).

Agenda setting appears to be an area in which social movements are quite effective, with existing scholarship finding substantial support for the agenda-setting effects of social movements (e.g., Cress and Snow, 2000, King et al., 2007, see also McCarthy et al., 1996). Positive agenda-setting effects have been observed even when movements exert no eventual influence on legislative outcomes (e.g., Johnson, 2008 on the environmental movement). As noted earlier, Andrews and Edwards (2004) summarize existing research by arguing that agenda setting represents the largest impact that many advocacy organizations can hope to have. In the next section, we draw on this important body of research but direct our investigation towards the agendas of extra-institutional actors, particularly other changemakers.

2.1 Agenda Spillover as a Social Movement Outcome

Scholars have long recognized that social movements can have both external impacts and impacts on one another (Staggenborg, 1986). One key intra-movement outcome (Whittier, 2004, Earl, 2000)—social movement spillover—captures how social movements directly affect one another. Meyer and Whittier (1994) introduced the concept of spillover in their analysis of the effects of the feminist movement on peace activism in the U.S. They argued that four kinds of spillover were observable: (1) spillover in framing; (2) tactical spillover; (3) leadership spillover through specific personnel; and (4) spillover in terms of organizational structures (e.g., feminist collectives).

Subsequent research has developed each of these lines and also elaborated on some dangers associated with spillover (Hadden and Tarrow, 2008). For instance, research has confirmed spillover in framing across a range of movements (Meyer and Boutcher, 2007, Boutcher and McCammon, 2019, Barnartt, 2014). Where tactical spillover is concerned, Olzak and Uhrig (2001) were amongst the first to study this empirically, but they have not been the last (Wang and Soule, 2012, Soule et al., 2008), although not all of this research has classified itself as spillover research. Terriquez (2015) blends these two forms of spillover in her analysis of queer youth in the immigration reform movement, arguing that queer youth's practice of coming out was important to the DREAMers and led to both increased immigration activism and the advancement of LGBTQ activism. Isaac and Christiansen (2002) examined organizational spillover, arguing that the civil rights movement contributed to the revitalization of labor organizations. Researchers such as Minkoff (1997) also added to the range of spillover examined in the literature, suggesting that higher mobilization and/or more organizational capacity in affected movements are spillover effects. Nonetheless, Whittier's (2013) review of spillover research asserts:

> The types of social movement spillover can be broken down into two broad categories. First, movements can lead to new challenges, by changing the overall level of protest or opportunities for protest, sparking "spin-off" movements, or provoking countermovements…or enabl[ing] later waves of the same movement. Second, social movements can alter the form of other protests. Activists define themselves, frame their issues, develop tactics, and establish organizations with reference to what other collective actors have done" (np).

Spillover seems to be driven by several key mechanisms, first introduced by Meyer and Whittier (1994): (1) connections from coalitions that served as conduits for spillover; (2) shared communities, including culture and art, where like-minded views could spread; (3) shared personnel; and (4) effects on political opportunities, which shaped the opportunities available to later movements. Subsequent research has echoed these claims (Whittier, 2004, Whittier, 2013), for both left-leaning (Wimberley, 2009) and right-leaning movements (Deerman, 2017). Subsequent empirical research specified additional

mechanisms operating in particular cases (e.g., Isaac and Christiansen, 2002) and/or combined these existing mechanisms as part of larger explanations (Hadden, 2014).

Given the prominence of agenda-setting effects, it is surprising that spillover research has not considered how movements might impact the agendas of other movements.[1] Until now, goals have not been a focus of spillover research, ignoring the potential of spillover through agenda-setting effects where movements come to take on additional issues from other movements. It is unlikely to be the case that movement actors only set agendas for public officials. Just as existing spillover research is not interested in minor or ephemeral effects on other movements, agenda spillover focuses on more than one-off concurrence of otherwise disparate issues at single protest events; agenda spillover is concerned with deeper and more noticeable shifts in agendas and/or goals.[2]

We argue that there are several reasons to believe that movements may in fact influence the concerns of other movements in these deeper ways. First, just as shared personnel have mattered in other forms of spillover, activists moving between movements may bring their concerns into other movements. For example, BLM activists may bring concerns about racial justice into other movements in which they participate, just as environmentalists may bring sustainability concerns into other movements. When the activists serving as couriers for other goals are particularly active or are leaders in SMOs in two or more movements, one would suspect that agenda spillover is a real possibility based on existing research on leadership overlaps across organizations (Mische, 2008).

Even without direct ties between movement leaders, it is possible that sustained or large-scale mobilization places a movement more in the public eye, on the public agenda, and in the media spotlight. All of this should indirectly educate other movements' leaders about the goals of the mobilizing movement. A rise in mobilization or increasing import on the public agenda may also provide incentives to other movements' leaders to try to grab onto the proverbial coattails of a movement that is trending positively. It is also likely that the complexity of social issues themselves mean that social movement goals impact multiple constituencies and are connected to multiple social movements (Elliott et al., 2021).

2.2 Overcoming Methodological Limitations

In our view, methodological limitations are a key reason that research on spillover has been more limited, reflecting the substantial methodological obstacles outcomes researchers face (Earl, 2000). In the case of spillover, the primary issue is the reliance on a very small number of research methods. For example, much of the research on spillover is qualitative, building from case studies (e.g., McKee Hurwitz, 2018), which requires having clear expectations about which movements are likely to influence one another. Even quantitative work tends to limit research to a handful of movements, as Minkoff (1997) does in her examination of whether high protest levels or increasing organizational density in the African American civil rights movement led to increases in women's movement organizing in the U.S. Indeed, a substantial amount of spillover research has justifiably examined the impacts that civil rights organizing had on subsequent movements (Perkins, 2021, Isaac and Christiansen, 2002, Minkoff, 1997, Meyer and Boutcher, 2007).

[1] Work on spillover through framing perhaps comes closest to agenda-setting spillover, but even there the focus is on how existing issues can be framed in ever more culturally resonant ways (Meyer and Boutcher, 2007), not on the adoption of new issues by other movements.

[2] As discussed below, issue bricolage is the study of the overlap between two movements at a single protest event and does not suggest more serious or durable connection between the movements (Jung et al. 2014).

Indeed, virtually all of this work—whether qualitative or quantitative—shares a key characteristic: movements that are expected to be at risk of spillover are pre-selected (Isaac and Christiansen, 2002, Meyer and Boutcher, 2007). This means that researchers cannot identify unexpected instances of spillover across two or more unsuspected movements and scholars risk "selecting on the dependent variable," since often there is already solid empirical reason to believe there is a relationship between movements in many of the cases that have been studied. The only exception we can find is Olzak and Uhrig (2001), who sought to use quantitative methods to examine tactical spillover but without preselecting movements to examine. Their work, however, draws on a very simple understanding of spillover—co-occurrence—which has clear methodological risks as an operationalization (Elliott et al., 2021).

Using computational and social network methods, validated by significant pre-study testing (Elliott et al., 2021), we are able to methodologically distinguish between ephemeral and even one-off overlaps in goals at single protest events—issue bricolage as studied by Jung et al. (2014)—and more durable and notable overlaps in goals that indicate the more substantial connection represented by agenda spillover. We use these new methods to identify years in which agenda spillover has occurred between two different movements. Specifically, our methods, detailed below, allow us to examine all possible pairs of movements in a given year and differentiate between pairs of movements that never overlapped with one another, movement pairs that experienced fleeting issue bricolage, and movement pairs with substantial and/or sustained enough goal overlap to be classified as experiencing agenda spillover. While our introduction of agenda spillover and our measurement strategy is novel, we draw on existing research to derive expectations about how agenda spillover may operate, as discussed in the next section.

3. Explaining Agenda Spillover by Synthesizing Research on Intra-movement Influences

The literatures on agenda-setting and spillover offer important suggestions about factors that may influence agenda spillover. In order to be as comprehensive as possible, though, we also consider factors relevant to other kinds of intra-movement influences. For instance, just as spillover researchers have examined spillover in framing, particularly thinking about the role of master frames, there is a larger literature on master frames that can be considered (Snow and Benford, 1992). Likewise, scholars have examined temporary overlaps in protest goals, referred to as "issue bricolage" by Jung et al. (2014), which are similar to "event coalitions" (Levi and Murphy, 2006) but do not require organizations to be present or collaborating. It may be that some factors that shape temporary overlaps also shape deeper overlaps in goals, although we do not expect the processes in their totality to be similar. Likewise, the literature on coalitions has examined instrumental and/or deeper substantive ties between otherwise distinct movements (Van Dyke and McCammon, 2010), which overlap considerably with predictors of other forms of spillover (Meyer and Whittier, 1994). To create the most comprehensive investigation based on current research, we bring these literatures together, outlined in Figure 1, to generate seven hypotheses.

As shown on the top of Figure 1, both the spillover literature on framing and the broader literature on master frames show that rhetorical relationships between movements are important to consider. Civil rights as a master frame is a quintessential example. Master frames in general, and civil rights as a master frame in particular, have been heavily featured in research on spillover (Perkins, 2021, Isaac and Christiansen, 2002, Minkoff, 1997, Meyer and Boutcher, 2007). Master frames appear early and become modular frames applied to a range of movements within and after that protest cycle (Snow and Benford, 1992). As Benford and Snow (2000) argue, "[o]nly a handful of collective action frames have been

identified as being sufficiently broad in interpretive scope" (619). If agenda spillover operates like frame spillover and/or master framing processes more generally, then agenda spillover should occur earlier in the protest cycle as initially dominant issues are taken up by later risers; we operationalize this as an expectation of a negative linear association between time and agenda spillover (Hypothesis 1).

Figure 1: Potential Explanations of Agenda Spillover



Jung et al. (2014) note that there may be more than timing at work with the master frame of civil rights. They argue that social movement frames that are more modular and popular are more likely to be rhetorically connected to other movements, claiming that "many different constituencies can demand human rights, education, or civil rights" (204). To try to parse the difference between being an early riser and being modular and popular, we test Hypothesis 2 that popular and modular claims will spillover more often, net of the timing of their appearance.

Moving from rhetorical connections that are about how issues are framed to instrumental reasons that agenda spillover may occur (see middle band in Figure 1), we suspect that movements may seek to raise their status by incorporating concerns from higher status movements (Hypothesis 3). Jung et al. (2014) found this to be true in explaining more ephemeral, one-off overlaps that they call issue bricolage (i.e., the co-occurrence of claims, issues, or goals at a single protest event).[3] They argue that issue bricolage is an instrumental enterprise in which lower status movements seek to benefit from the higher status of other movements by including some of the higher status movement's goals into their own protest events. When movements have similar statuses, they have nothing to gain from connecting with each other's core concerns.

[3] Much like studies of tactics being used across movements (Olzak and Uhrig, 2001), the idea of issue bricolage is that movements from different areas take an issue on for at least a single protest event. If one were to make an analogy to the coalitions literature, one could say that where issue bricolage is concerned with ephemeral or event coalitions, our concept of agenda spillover is interested in larger and deeper patterns of spillover that look more like enduring coalitions but without necessarily happening under the auspices of SMOs through coalitions.

However, movements still need to have some commonalities for even instrumental, ephemeral ties to develop through shared goals. Research on issue bricolage points to tactical similarities as being that important shared tied such that movements that are more tactically similar are expected to have enough in common to experience these instrumental overlaps; we expect the same for agenda spillover (Hypothesis 4).[4] This expectation is also supported by work on coalitions,[5] whether one considers more ephemeral event-specific coalitions (Levi and Murphy, 2006)[6] or enduring coalitions that involve collaboration across years (McCammon and Moon, 2015).[7]

Turning to the bottom portion of Figure 1, the literature on coalitions points to additional factors that may impact agenda spillover. McCammon and Moon's (2015) and Van Dyke and Amos's (2017) reviews of the coalitions literature create strikingly similar portraits of factors that increase the likelihood of coalition formation, including: (1) a history of social interaction and ties between participants, leaders, or SMOs; (2) SMO characteristics such as being a generalist organization or a more formal SMO; (3) shared collective identities and/or communities; (4) significant threats and/or favorable political opportunities; and (5) ample and relatively even resources between potential SMO collaborators. While each of these factors may be important, there is no singular recipe that drives coalition formation. According to a meta-analysis of 24 studies on coalitions, there are several different combinations of causal factors that can lead to coalition formation (McCammon and Van Dyke, 2010).

In thinking about agenda spillover, we argue that just as with coalitions, histories of interaction between SMOs are important (Hypothesis 5). This is consistent with research on other forms of spillover, which shows shared communities and personnel drive those other forms of spillover (Meyer and Whittier, 1994), and with research on issue bricolage (Jung et al., 2014).

Similarly, just as coalitions research suggests that shared ideology, collective identities, or communities may aid coalition formation, we suspect they may play a role in agenda spillover. However, unlike coalitions between organizations within the same movement—which may be driven by actual overlaps in collective identity and social movement communities—we think broader kinds of similarity are likely to be impactful for agenda spillover. Echoing claims we made earlier drawing on issue bricolage research, we argue that movements with more similar tactical profiles may be more likely to experience agenda spillover.

[4] Other work examines claim borrowing by SMOs from other movements (Wang et al., 2019), which is like issue bricolage but is seen as something SMOs do. But, unlike coalitions, claim borrowing by SMOs doesn't require a second SMO partner. Findings for claim borrowing point to high cohesion and high focus of SMOs as making claim borrowing more likely (Wang et al., 2019); however, since this work revolves around organizational identity and processes rather than more general social movement agenda setting processes, we focus primarily on the issue bricolage research.

[5] While we are not focused on social movement organizations (SMOs), or constrained to observing agenda spillover to events at which SMOs were present, we think there is much that can be drawn upon from the coalitions literature (Van Dyke, 2014, Van Dyke and McCammon, 2010).

[6] As reflected in Figure 1, some coalitions can be fleeting, which Levi and Murphy (2006) call event coalitions. These temporary coalitions occur in relation to specific events. Some may see such ephemeral coalitions as recent accomplishments, such as Bennett and Segerberg (2013), who argue that digital and social media makes these temporary and ideologically-thin coalitions more possible. Work by Gerhards and Rucht (1992), who studied meso-mobilization, suggests that while the frequency of such coalitions may have grown, they are not entirely new phenomena.

[7] Enduring coalitions occur when two or more SMOs collaborate over long periods (McCammon and Moon, 2015). Sometimes SMOs can actually join a federation or create a new organization that itself embodies the coalition. Such organizations may be seen as similar, in some respects, to Heaney and Rojas's (2014) hybrid organizations.

Several of the literatures we draw on suggest that favorable political opportunities should increase the likelihood of agenda spillover, including the coalitions literature (McCammon and Moon, 2015, Van Dyke and Amos, 2017). The spillover literature also argues that other forms of spillover are more likely when political opportunities are more favorable (Meyer and Whittier, 1994), which is consistent with research on a wider range of other social movement outcomes, too (Uba, 2009). Thus, Hypothesis 6 is that agenda spillover should be more likely when political opportunities become more favorable.

It is important to not lose sight of the fact that we are trying to explain a particular form of spillover—agenda spillover—and thus must also consider factors that have driven agenda setting in the social movements outcomes literature. That literature suggests that public policy agendas are driven by movement mobilization levels (McAdam and Su, 2002), such that more protest leads to a better chance of moving onto the policy, public, and/or media agendas. We think the same will be true as movements consider collaborations and overlaps, leading us to suspect that movements with higher overall mobilization levels are more likely to influence the agendas of other movements (Hypothesis 7).

4. Data and Methods

To investigate social movement agenda spillover, we use the *Dynamics of Collective Action* dataset (DoCA), which records information on over 23,000 protest events in the United States as reported by *The New York Times* (NYT) between 1960 and 1995 (McAdam et al., 2009). A team of coders scanned daily editions of the NYT to identify collective events articulating a claim, and coded a series of variables about the nature of the event and its newspaper coverage. Of particular interest to this project, coders indicated: when and where the event took place; up to 4 claims articulated at the event; up to 4 general forms and 4 specific acts used as tactics at the event; and the paragraph length of the story about the protest event. Like other researchers, due to concerns of geographical bias in newspaper data (Earl et al., 2004), we limit the dataset to events occurring in New York state (Earl et al., 2003, Soule and King, 2008, Ring-Ramirez et al., 2014).

We transform our data from the protest event form of DoCA to an annual time series of movement dyads (which are pairs of different movements, discussed below; e.g., civil rights and the peace movement form a dyad) based on the original protest data. These data essentially code information about protest events associated with each member of the movement dyad and also whether our method, discussed more below, identified agenda spillover as occurring between the movements in that dyad in that year.

To produce these movement dyads, we aggregate the claim data so that the claim code represents one of 27 broad social movements[8] rather than a more specific claim. That is, we group narrow, specific claims such as "Anti-Vietnam War," "Anti-Draft," "Anti-ROTC, Military/CIA recruitment on campus," and "Anti-Korean War" into an umbrella "Peace Movement." The primary reason for this aggregation is

[8] The included movements are: anti-nuclear movement; anti-immigrant, anti-foreigner, and anti-asylum movement; small or family farms and organic movement; anti-transnational union movement; women's movement; peace movement; international human and civil rights movement; environmental movement; economic issues; poverty and welfare; alcohol and drugs; civil liberties; criminal justice; African American civil rights; LGBT civil rights; Native American civil rights; Asian American civil rights; Pan-Latino civil rights; non-Mexican Latino civil rights; disabled civil rights; civil rights of farm workers and migrants; civil rights for minority groups not elsewhere classified; abortion; anti-ethnic attacks and hate or bias crimes; animal rights; and senior citizen civil rights.

to set a stricter threshold for what constitutes agenda spillover: it is not simply embracing other specialized claims from within a movement; it is combining claims that *span* broad movements in an enduring or substantial way. We also exclude some catch-all claims coded in the original DoCA because they are too general to be informative for our purposes.[9] To be clear, our data on goals/claims comes from the claims made at protest events, not from data on the missions of SMOs that may or may not have been present at specific events. We use these data to generate a series of variables that describe the social movement sector,[10] each movement in a dyad, and the dyad itself.

4.1 Supplementary Data

We supplement the DoCA data with data from the official websites of the Senate, House, and White House on partisan control of the presidency and Congress, as well as a number of datasets from the *Policy Agendas Project* (PAP), including: Congressional Hearings (The Policy Agendas Project at the University of Texas at Austin, 2017a), U.S. Bills (Adler and Wilkerson, 2017), State of the Union Address (SOTU) (The Policy Agendas Project at the University of Texas at Austin, 2017c), Executive Orders (The Policy Agendas Project at the University of Texas at Austin, 2017b), and TV News Policy Agenda Data (Uscinski, 2009). PAP collects and archives public policy data from numerous sources, and assigns each observation a policy area code that we map onto our social movements (see Appendix Table A1 for details). We use these data to indicate how much attention each movement, or policy issue, received in various fora at each point in time.

The PAP topics and social movements link neatly with one exception: abortion. PAP typically treats abortion as part of Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties, whereas DoCA treats it as a separate and unique claim, which we think is also more consistent with how social movements organized around abortion during this time period. In order to record counts related to abortion in PAP databases, we did a search in text fields and reclassified the PAP code so that it would map onto our abortion classification if the field included at least one of the following terms: hyde amend; abortion; pro choice; pro life; pro-choice; pro-life; embryo; fetus; gestation; reproductive; birth control; contracept; unborn child; protect the unborn; protect unborn; trimester; family planning; womb; uterus; ru-486; fetal; partial birth; or partial-birth.

4.2 Dependent Variable: Agenda Spillover

Our purpose is to move towards a better understanding of agenda spillover, and the conditions that make it more or less likely. Prior research employed computational and social network methods to develop, test, and compare different methodological approaches to identifying agenda spillover with no *a priori* assumptions about which movements may experience agenda spillover and when (Elliott et al.,

[9] Excluded claims are: other claims not elsewhere classified; social welfare claims not elsewhere classified, including political figures, government policy not elsewhere classified, education, and not in my backyard (NIMBY) claims; miscellaneous religious claims; anti-pornography; and miscellaneous social issues.

[10] We try a specification of models where we keep the claims we excluded (discussed in footnote 9) for calculation of social movement sector variables such as status and then drop them, and an alternative specification where we drop these claims before computing any measures or models. The effects are robust to both specifications; therefore, we keep the first specification that only includes these claims for the purposes of sector calculations because we feel it is more representative of each movement's position in the full social movement sector.

2021). That research showed that an ensemble approach using a variety of techniques to analyze DoCA protest data could identify agenda spillover with a high degree of accuracy and comprehensiveness.

Specifically, the ensemble method we use draws on four methods to identify instances of agenda spillover such that if any one of the four methods indicates agenda spillover, then the dyad pair is coded as experiencing agenda spillover in that year.[11] Importantly, all of these techniques were designed to focus on statistically noticeable (for computational techniques) or formally identifiable (for social network techniques) shifts in overlap that mark the distinction between fleeting or minimal issue bricolage versus more palpable agenda spillover. First, the ensemble method looked for statistically significant increases in claim co-occurrence from one year to the next, which raises the bar from any co-occurrence (as studied in research on issue bricolage) to significant rises in co-occurrence that are not likely attributable to random chance or error in the data.[12] Second, the ensemble method examined asymmetric co-occurrences by evaluating the extent to which two movements frequently protest together but infrequently protest separately, referred to formally as the Whitehead method from ecology. Specifically, agenda spillover was marked as occurring when association rates between movement dyads were above 90% of other association rates using a random graph method. Third, the ensemble method drew on social network clique analysis, which examines if three or more claims all have ties to one another through their co-deployment at protest events. A stable clique had to be identified between the same movements for at least two years to indicate agenda spillover. Finally, the ensemble method used correspondence analysis to identify movements that related to other movements similarly, as judged by statistically smaller chi-square distances from other movement dyads. Substantively, this means that claims that became increasingly intertwined with one another were identified, again indicating a much deeper connection than issue bricolage.

We use this ensemble method to code the dependent variable in our movement-dyad-year dataset. For every year between 1960 and 1995, our dataset contains one row for every possible combination of the 27 social movements, assuming either or both of the movements in the dyad were coded as participating in at least one protest event for that year. Each dyad is assigned a 0 if it did not experience spillover in that year, and a 1 if it did experience agenda spillover according to the ensemble method discussed above.

4.3 Movement and Movement Dyad Independent Variables

In order to test for effects specific to the individual movements in a dyad, and the movement dyad itself, we include the number of events each movement in a dyad participated in during a year as well as a squared term for each of these counts as prior research on issue bricolage found nonlinear effects (Jung et al., 2014). A dummy variable records whether either movement in a dyad belonged to one of three

[11] Individual methods identified between 30 and 390 instances of spillover in our dataset. When one of the four methods in our ensemble method identified a case of spillover, between 37% and roughly 58% of the time at least one of the other methods also identified the same case of spillover. This indicates that these methods frequently identify the same cases of spillover, but are not redundant. Indeed, the primary motivation for using an ensemble rather than single-method approach to identify spillover is that each method on its own has strengths, weaknesses, and unique operationalizations of spillover, while the combination is less sensitive to these peculiarities. For more details, see Elliott et al. (2021).

[12] Here the goal is to understand whether a broad range of factors that have predicted different kinds of connections between movements, including issue bricolage, also explain agenda spillover. It is beyond the scope of this paper to compare the predictors of differences between bricolage and spillover more narrowly, although future work should consider this.

especially active and prominent social movements: peace; African American civil rights; or anti-ethnic attacks, hate, or bias crimes, also based on prior research on issue bricolage (Jung et al., 2014).

We measure cultural similarity through similar tactical choices, following Jung et al. (2014), assuming, for instance, that two movements that primarily file lawsuits are likely to have more things in common than a pair of movements in which one movement organizes boycotts while the other engages in civil disobedience. We compute a Jaccard index of similarity to measure how similar each of the two movements in a movement dyad are in their tactical selection. The equation for the Jaccard index is:

$$Tactical\ Overlap = \frac{|A \cap B|}{|A \cup B|}$$

where A represents the set of tactics used by the first movement in a dyad, and B represents the set of tactics used by the second movement. To calculate this value, we sum the number of different tactics *both* movements used in a given year, and divide it by the number of tactics *either* movement used that year. The computed value ranges between 0 and 1, with a mean of .14. Slightly more than half of dyads share 0 tactics, suggesting that there is substantial tactical diversity even when some tactics are exceptionally popular.[13] We also include a squared term for this indicator to test for a nonlinear effect. In classifying tactics, we draw on work by Ring-Ramirez et al. (2014) that analyzed the tactical repertoire using these same DoCA data.

To examine status differences, we draw on Jung et al. (2014), who measured status differences through differences in Freeman's (1978) normalized degree centrality. First, we calculated the status of each movement separately, according to the following formula:

$$Status_{jt} = \frac{\sum_{j=1} PROTEST_{jt}}{(N_t - 1)PROTEST_{MAXt}}$$

The status of movement issue j at time t is equal to the sum of protest events in which the jth claim was articulated, and which at least one other claim was also articulated, in year t, divided by the total number of active movements in a given year, $N_t - 1$, multiplied by the total number of protest events where at least 2 claims were articulated in a given year. For instance, in 1968 African American civil rights was one of 16 active movements. There were 74 total events where at least two claims were articulated that year, including 19 at which African American civil rights was one of the claims. Thus, the status calculation for African American civil rights in 1968 is 19/((16-1)(74))=.017. This computed score has the potential to range between 0 in 1, but is observed to range between 0 and .04. Once this figure is calculated for each movement in a movement dyad, the absolute value of the difference in status is calculated for the dyad level. This is lagged by one year, so the effect of status differences on spillover in year t is predicted by the movement dyad-level status differences in t -1. We also include a squared term for the status difference to capture a potential curvilinear effect.

Last, we include two dichotomous variables to indicate whether each movement dyad has a recent history of collaboration: one which captures whether the two movements in a dyad had any collaboration at a protest event in the previous three years and another which indicates whether the two dyad

[13] Our calculation counts the sharing of a single tactic and doesn't require that all tactics movements use at protest events align. However, the modal number of shared tactics appears low because the dyads include all movement pairs in which at least one of the two movements was active, which means that inactive movements can be included in the pair, driving the values down.

movements were identified as experiencing agenda spillover in the previous three years according to our ensemble method.

4.4 Political Opportunity Variables

We incorporate a number of indicators to capture the political environment. First, we include a dichotomous variable for whether the president of the United States was a Democrat in a given year. Second, we include two variables recording the proportion of the Senate and House that were Democrats in each session of Congress. These three variables are meant to capture general characteristics of the U.S. government that might affect protest and social movement activity.[14]

Second, we include a series of variables, specific to each movement or movement dyad, to measure the policy attention granted each issue. From PAP data, we obtain a count of the number of times each movement was mentioned in a congressional bill or hearing, in a presidential State of the Union address, or in an executive order, in the year preceding a potential occurrence of spillover.[15] We tested for effects both when we summed each of these indicators across both movements in a dyad (results appear in Table 1), when we included separate indicators for the high and low values for the dyad (results appear in Table A2), and when we mix the best fitting measures from these different measures (results appear in Table 2).

Third, we included an indicator measuring the difference in NYT coverage each movement in a dyad received in the preceding year by summing the number of paragraphs written about each movement in a given year and then taking the absolute value of the difference in the number of paragraphs written about each movement in a dyad. This predictor captures whether it is likely that movement spillover is occurring as a result of movements with less media coverage attempting to attract some of the attention of highly-covered movements.[16]

4.5 Model Specification

To identify the factors that make agenda spillover across movements more or less likely, we fit a discrete-time event history analysis (EHA) for repeated events (i.e., spillover can happen repeatedly across time), using the xtlogit command in Stata 14.0, and robust standard errors to account for the fact

[14] In addition, from Jordan and Grossmann (2020) we included the percent of the New York State House and Senate that were Democrats in models not presented. This was done to capture the more proximate political atmosphere since we limited data to events occurring in New York State, and to address concerns that partisan divides at the national level were not clear-cut during our time period and dependent on geographical region. In some models, the coefficient for New York State House Democrats was marginally, positively associated with spillover; however, in most models, neither variable had any effect on the outcome, and postestimation measures preferred the simpler models that did not include these terms.

[15] We also weighted each of these variables, as well as the difference in NYT coverage indicator, by the total number of potential occurrences. For instance, we divided the number of bills mentioning movement *x* in year *y* by the total number of all bills in year *y*. We included this alternative operationalization of variables in some preliminary models and found only minor differences in the significance level of some effects, but not in the direction of coefficients or overall narrative.

[16] We initially included an indicator of the TV coverage granted each movement in a dyad also from the PAP databases. This measure proved problematic, however, because there was missing data for all claims prior to 1968 and there was no text field that would allow us to code for the abortion claim. Because this variable was non-significant in any model we specified, we concluded that TV media coverage did not seem to have a significant impact on agenda spillover and dropped this indicator from further consideration and model inclusion.

that observations observed at repeated time points are not fully independent. This model predicts the risk of dyad *j* experiencing agenda spillover in time *t*, based on a linear time indicator[17] as well as the time-varying covariates discussed in the previous section. Each movement dyad remains in the risk set throughout the study, for every year in which at least one of the two movements in the dyad is recorded as participating in an event, and is marked as experiencing the potentially repeated event of agenda spillover in every year in which spillover occurs.

We ran a model with variables specific to the movements in the dyads, then a model that primarily looks at political context variables, and finally a full model that includes both sets of predictors with the following equation:

$$logit\ h(t_{ij}) = \propto \boldsymbol{t}_t + \mathbf{X}_t\boldsymbol{\gamma} + \mathbf{Z}_t\boldsymbol{\eta}$$

where $logit\ h(t_{ij})$ is an *I* x 1 (*i* = 1, …, *I* where *I* = the number of movement dyads) vector whose *i*-the element is given by the conditional log odds ratio of movement dyad *i* experiencing agenda spillover in year *j*. The linear term is denoted with $\boldsymbol{t}_t$, an *I* x 1 vector of year variables measuring time (*t* = 1960, …, 1995). Coefficient $\propto$ describes the linear effect of time on the probability that a movement dyad will experience agenda spillover. The next term, $\mathbf{X}_t$ is a series of movement dyad variables at time *t*, and coefficients $\boldsymbol{\gamma}$ denote the effect of issue and movement-dyad level variables on agenda spillover. Finally, $\mathbf{Z}_t$ is the series of political opportunity variables at time *t*, and coefficients $\boldsymbol{\eta}$ reflect the impact of policy and media attention on the likelihood of agenda spillover.

Since we test for the effects of political opportunities in two ways—once by summing each relevant indicator across both movements in a dyad (see Table 1) and once by using high and low indicators for each dyad (see Table A2)—we produce a best fitting model (see Table 2) that includes all political opportunity and movement dyad variables that were significant in other models. Indicators that were non-significant in all three of those models, and for which non-significance is uninformative, are dropped from the final model reported in Table 2.

5. Findings

We find support for most of our hypotheses, as well as evidence for all three types of effects specified in our equation—time, movement and movement dyad covariates, and, to a lesser extent, political opportunities—on the probability that a movement dyad will experience agenda spillover.

5.1 Position in the Protest Cycle through Linear Time

Hypothesis 1 was that there would be a negative linear effect, with spillover being more probable early in a protest cycle, net of shear popularity or modularity of the claim. The best time specification for this model was a linear term for time, and we do find that movement dyads are significantly less likely to experience agenda spillover in later years compared to earlier years in every specification we used.

[17] For the time specification, we tried three alternative forms: the linear specification for the year; a series of dummy variables for each year between 1960 and 1995; and non-linear specifications that included first a squared, and then a quadratic term. We settled on the linear specification for several reasons. First, our data includes many time points and a fairly rare outcome. Second, postestimation tests such as AIC and BIC preferred the linear model over the more complex specifications that included non-linear terms or treated time as a series of dichotomies.

Table 1: EHA Models of Agenda Spillover Using Sums for Dyads*

	Movement Characteristics	Political Context	Full Model	Reduced Model
*Stage in protest cycle (H1: -)***	-0.00302***	-0.00379***	-0.00315***	-0.00284***
Year	(0.000115)	(0.000670)	(0.000747)	(0.000551)
Popular and modular frames (H2: +)	0.285*		0.268+	0.273+
Prominent, either movement	(0.143)		(0.155)	(0.155)
Status differences (H3: +)				
Status difference (t-1)	63.61**		62.97*	69.14**
	(24.28)		(24.50)	(23.45)
Status difference (t-1, sq)	-2415.4**		-2185.4*	-2364.1*
	(902.4)		(922.8)	(920.4)
Tactical similarities (H4: +)				
Tactical overlap (t-1)	3.014**		3.215**	1.593***
	(1.071)		(1.099)	(0.372)
Tactical overlap (t-1, sq)	-2.049		-2.324	
	(1.579)		(1.624)	
Histories of interaction (H5: +)				
History of movement crossover (t-3)	1.054***		1.086***	1.116***
	(0.221)		(0.220)	(0.224)
History of movement spillover (t-3)	-0.00553		-0.0182	-0.0407
	(0.226)		(0.222)	(0.220)
Favorable political opportunity (H6: +)				
Democratic President		-0.368*	0.0329	0.0787
		(0.184)	(0.214)	(0.191)
House Democrats (%)		-0.399	1.154	
		(2.049)	(2.209)	
Senate Democrats (%)		3.968*	-0.576	-0.416
		(1.824)	(2.023)	(1.923)
Bills, dyad sum (#, t-1)		0.000705***	0.000236	0.000211
		(0.000190)	(0.000178)	(0.000177)
Hearings, dyad sum (#, t-1)		0.00104	-0.00224	-0.00149
		(0.00190)	(0.00199)	(0.00160)
SOTU, dyad sum (#, t- 1)		0.00637+	0.00370	
		(0.00328)	(0.00318)	
Exec. orders, dyad sum (#, t-1)		0.0189	-0.0194	
		(0.0196)	(0.0177)	
Difference in NYT coverage (#, t-1)		0.000544**	-0.000184	-0.000184
		(0.000192)	(0.000272)	(0.000277)
Mobilization level (H7: +)				
Less active movement count (#)	0.135***		0.138***	0.142***
	(0.0209)		(0.0212)	(0.0210)
More active movement count (#)	0.0206*		0.0221*	0.0226*
	(0.00972)		(0.0110)	(0.0111)
Less active movement count (sq)	-0.00149***		-0.00152***	-0.00163***
	(0.000437)		(0.000444)	(0.000485)
More active movement count (sq)	-0.0000418		-0.0000467	-0.0000559
	(0.0000798)		(0.0000847)	(0.0000849)
lnsig2u Constant	0.189	1.275***	0.148	0.176
	(0.280)	(0.192)	(0.289)	(0.280)
AIC	2196.3	2452.7	2207.2	2204.7
BIC	2290.7	2525.3	2359.7	2328.1
chi2	1124.7	631.0	1150.3	1143.9
df_m	12	9	20	16
Observations	10511	10511	10511	10511

* All results presented as marginal effects, or changes in probabilities of a movement dyad experiencing spillover.
**Signs following hypotheses (+/-) indicate hypothesized direction of effect

One explanation for this is that spillover is tied to the establishment of master frames. Framing work, which includes diagnosing a social problem and of offering solutions, occurs in early phases of mobilization (Snow and Benford, 1992). Therefore, spillover may be more likely early in the protest cycle as movements seek resonant, inclusive, and energizing messaging, and we find linear evidence congruent with this argument.

It is possible this effect is the result of collinearity with some indicators of political opportunity. Although we discuss political context more below, in robustness tests of this time effect, we ran alternative logit models that excluded time specification. In those models, having a Democratic president in the White House is significantly and positively associated with agenda spillover, whereas having a higher percentage of Democrats in the House and Senate are both predictive of lower levels of spillover in both reduced and full models. Each of these measures are negatively correlated with time, as all branches of the government became, on average, increasingly tied to the Republican Party during the time period under investigation. The strongest negative correlation between political opportunity and time was the percent of the Senate which was Democratic, at 64%. We suspect, although we cannot be certain, that the negative effect of time is also capturing some effects of political climate that changed over the decades we study here.

5.2 Popular Social Movements

Hypothesis 2 anticipated major social movements would more frequently be involved in spillover. In some model specifications, we find a marginally significant positive effect of the prominence of the movement on agenda spillover (see Table 1, columns 1, 3, and 4 and Appendix Table A2, column 1), although this effect disappears in our final and best-fitting model (see Table 2). This indicates mixed support for the possibility that agenda spillover happened more frequently when at least one movement in a dyad belonged to the highly prominent African American Civil Rights, peace, or anti-ethnic attacks, hate, or bias crimes movements. Future research should consider alternative measures for prominence to confirm that being earlier is more relevant than being prominent overall. This suggests that unlike issue bricolage, prominence isn't a clear predictor of agenda spillover.

5.3 Status Differences

Hypothesis 3 expected that agenda spillover is more likely among movements with different status. There are many reasons social movements may choose to adopt the agenda of another movement with a higher or lower status. Higher-status movements may collaborate with lower-status movements to reaffirm their grassroots connections, while lower-status movements may seek to collaborate with higher-status ones to gain experience, network connections, and visibility. Because other researchers find, as with tactical overlap, that status differences have a curvilinear effect on issue bricolage (Jung et al., 2014), we test both the main effect and a squared term for the difference in status between two movements in a movement dyad. Our results show agenda spillover increases as the status difference between two movements in a dyad increases, but only to a certain point and this is true across all models, including our best fitting model (see Table 2). In other words, agenda spillover is more common among movements that are somewhat, but not extremely, different in terms of status as measured by our variation of normalized degree centrality.

Table 2: Best Fitting EHA Model of Agenda Spillover*

	Final Model
*Stage in protest cycle (H1: -)***	-0.00281***
Year	(0.000547)
Popular and modular frames (H2: +)	0.233
Prominent, either movement	(0.153)
Status differences (H3: +)	
Status difference (t-1)	73.59**
	(23.06)
Status difference (t-1, sq)	-2485.9**
	(930.9)
Tactical similarities (H4: +)	1.371***
Tactical overlap (t-1)	(0.388)
Histories of interaction (H5: +)	
History of movement crossover (t-3)	1.077***
	(0.220)
History of movement spillover (t-3)	-0.0282
	(0.219)
Favorable political opportunity (H6: +)	
Democratic President	0.0882
	(0.192)
Senate Democrats (%)	-0.217
	(1.889)
Bills, dyad sum (#, t-1)	0.000132
	(0.000177)
Hearings, lower movement (#, t-1)	0.0104**
	(0.00316)
Hearings, higher movement (#, t-1)	-0.00766**
	(0.00268)
Difference in NYT coverage (#, t-1)	-0.000199
	(0.000280)
Mobilization level (H7: +)	
Less active movement count (#)	0.139***
	(0.0208)
More active movement count (#)	0.0235*
	(0.0112)
Less active movement count (sq)	-0.00157***
	(0.000473)
More active movement count (sq)	-0.0000569
	(0.0000853)
lnsig2u Constant	0.112
	(0.281)
AIC	2196.0
BIC	2326.7
chi2	1161.0
df_m	17
Observations	10511

* All results presented as marginal effects, or changes in probabilities of a movement dyad experiencing spillover.
**Signs following hypotheses (+/-) indicate hypothesized direction of effect

5.4 Tactical Overlap

Tactical overlap is thought to be an important indicator of cultural similarity between social movements. Because of this, as stated in Hypothesis 4, we expected to find that when two movements in a movement dyad shared a history of using many of the same tactics, they would be more likely to experience agenda spillover as well. We did find evidence for this, with tactical overlap in a previous year

being positively and significantly associated with agenda spillover in the subsequent year in all models, including our best fitting model. However, we also tested a squared term for tactical overlap based on prior research (Jung et al., 2014), but this squared term was non-significant in all model specifications and was dropped from our best fitting model (see Table 2). This means that unlike issue bricolage, there are no diminishing returns for cultural similarity where agenda spillover is concerned.

5.5 Histories of Interaction

As expected in Hypothesis 5, we find that movement dyads with a recent history of interaction are more likely to experience agenda spillover compared to movement dyads without that connection. We considered two ways of thinking about histories of interaction: a history of collaborating at a protest event within the previous three years, regardless of whether our ensemble method identified this interaction as an instance of spillover; and a stricter specification that defined a history of interaction as recent agenda spillover based on our ensemble method. We find that a history of minimal collaboration (referred to as crossover in results tables) is predictive of agenda spillover, but not a specific history of agenda spillover, in all models, including our best fitting model (see Table 2).

5.6 Political Opportunities

Hypothesis 6 anticipated that agenda spillover should be more likely when political opportunities become more favorable. We found some evidence of political opportunity, as well as the media and policy attention focused on each movement, affecting the probability of a movement dyad experiencing agenda spillover. As discussed previously, part of the reason we did not find strong and consistent effects could be because of collinearity between time and the partisan orientation of the United States during this time period.

Importantly, given that there was no clear *a priori* reason to prefer summing the bills, hearings, and State of the Union mentions across the movements in the dyad versus including the counts of the bills, hearings, and State of the Union mentions for the higher and the lower of the two movements in the dyad, we tested both. Table 1 reports the summed versions and Appendix Table A2 reports the high/low specification. When we modeled the effect of congressional bills, we found that the summed version performed better than the high/low specification, although it was still not significant in the best fitting model (Table 2). For congressional hearings, we found the high/low specification was superior in models; these models showed a positive effect on the movement that received less attention, and a negative effect on the movement that received more attention. Our best fitting model, shown in Table 2, includes the best performing specifications of these variables in a final composite model. Substantively, these models show that agenda spillover may be more likely when both movements in a movement dyad receive a moderate amount of attention in congressional hearings.

The effects of other political opportunity variables were less robust. In some model specifications that included *only* a time specification and political opportunity variables, having a Democratic president was associated with a lower likelihood of agenda spillover, while having a higher percentage of Democrats in the Senate was associated with a higher probability of spillover. In these same models, more attention in congressional bills, more references in the State of the Union Address, and a greater difference in coverage within the NYT between the two movements in a dyad were positively associated with agenda spillover (Table 2 and Appendix Table A2, column 2). In other model specifications, including our final and best-fitting model, these variables are all non-significant (Table 2). Together, these findings suggest that political opportunities have been more impactful on coalitions than we find them to be on agenda

spillover.

5.7 Overall Mobilization Levels

Last, we examined the overall mobilization level of each movement in a movement dyad, as Hypothesis 7 anticipated that higher mobilization levels would correspond to an increased probability of spillover. We test for both main and squared effects, for both the more and less active movement in a dyad. We find a significant, positive effect of overall activity levels for both the more and less active movement in a dyad; however, this effect is nonlinear for the less active movement in a dyad, as the squared term for this movement is significantly and negatively associated with agenda spillover. This suggests that agenda spillover is most likely to happen when one movement in a movement dyad is very active, while the other is moderately active. The high level of activity on the part of at least one of the movements is consistent with institutional agenda setting processes.

6. Conclusion

Prior research has established that social movements are often successful in influencing media, policy, and public agendas, but agenda-setting across movements has been seriously understudied. In other words, scholars understand how movements influences other institutional actors, but not one another, in terms of agenda setting. One probable reason for this is the methodological difficulties in examining social movement outcomes, including agenda spillover. We use a methodological innovation introduced by Elliott et al. (2021) to identify movements experiencing agenda spillover so that we can model factors affecting the probability of agenda spillover. This is an important advance because we use a method that goes beyond simple co-occurrence, which is not a meaningful signal of deeper agenda setting. One would not consider a single news story or ephemeral and minor attention from a public official to be agenda setting. By setting a threshold for inter-movement agenda setting, we are able to focus on more serious and durable shifts in agendas.

Drawing on a wide ranging set of literatures—from agenda setting, spillover, coalitions, and issue bricolage research—we tested seven hypotheses and found support for many: agenda spillover is most likely early in the protest cycle; agenda spillover happens more often when movements have moderately, but not extremely, different levels of status; agenda spillover occurs more frequently among movements with overlapping tactical repertoires; agenda spillover is more common among movements that have a history of interaction; moderate levels of attention at the congressional level increase the likelihood of agenda spillover; and moderate to high levels of movement mobilization increase the probability of agenda spillover. But, unlike issue bricolage, agenda spillover was not explained by issue prominence and did not experience diminishing returns on cultural similarities (measured through tactical similarity). Also, political opportunities appear to play a larger role in coalition formation than we found for agenda spillover.

This research paves the way for future inquiries into agenda spillover—the factors that predict it, and its consequences. We think researchers interested in this topic should prioritize two goals: first, researchers should seek to determine whether the patterns we identify generalize to other protest contexts; and second, now that a method for identifying spillover at a large scale has been developed, it is possible to investigate the consequences of agenda spillover, too. To the first point, we investigate agenda spillover in the context of a specific, historical protest cycle and country. Do the factors that predicted spillover during, and in the immediate aftermath, of the civil rights protest cycle matter in the same way

as social movements increasingly move into digital spaces? Because digital technologies can reduce both organizational and personal costs, perhaps contextual factors such as political opportunities and prior history of collaboration become less important, while status and cultural similarities continue to impact agenda spillover. Does spillover work similarly in other countries and movement cultures? Are there other distinctions that are important in other countries, such as checking for the effect of labor as a claim, as we do with civil rights in an American context? Regarding the second question: does agenda spillover affect other movement outcomes, such as media attention or policy outcomes? If spillover is part of the movement-building and framing process, perhaps movements that experience spillover will also reap benefits in terms of media or policy attention. These are a few of the many agenda spillover-related questions we hope future research will address.

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Appendix Table A 1: Merging PAP to DoCA

PAP Codes	PAP Policy	Example (Specific) DoCA Claims	DoCA (Broad) Social Movements
1	Macroeconomics, Taxes, and the Economy	Increasing prices, tax increases	Economic Issues
2	Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties	Affirmative action, anti-police brutality, anti-discrimination, Equal Rights Amendment	Women's Movement, Civil Liberties, African American Civil Rights, LBGT Rights, Native American Civil Rights, Mexican American Civil Rights, Asian American Civil Rights, Pan Latino Civil Rights, Non-Mexican Latino Civil Rights, General Civil Rights, Anti-Ethnic Attacks/Hate or Bias
4	Agriculture	Restriction on agricultural imports, anti-corporate farming	Small or Family Farmers or Organic Movement
5	Labor, Employment, and Immigration	Anti-political asylum, anti-immigration, improvement of working conditions	Anti-Immigrant/Anti-Asylum Movement, Farm Worker/Migrant Civil Rights
7	Environment	Rainforest preservation, soil protection, anti-fur/leather	Environmental Movement, Animal Rights Movement
8	Energy	Anti-nuclear plant construction, anti-nuclear plant operating procedures	Anti-Nuclear Movement
12	Law, Crime, and Family Issues	Drug control, drunk driving prisoners' rights, gun control	Alcohol and Drug Control, Criminal Justice
13	Social Welfare	Tenants' rights, accessibility, media portrayals, social security	Poverty/Welfare, Disabled Civil Rights, Senior Citizen Civil Rights
16	Defense	Anti-Vietnam War, veteran's issues, disarmament	Peace Movement
18	Foreign Trade	Anti-NAFTA, Anti-UN	Anti-Transnational Union Movement
19	International Affairs and Foreign Aid	Anti-Apartheid	International Human and Civil Rights
32	Ideological, Social Cause, and Political Groups	Abortion	Abortion

Note: Some PAP policy codes were cross-walked to multiple DoCA social movement codes. The 27 movements we included in our analysis correspond to the 27 DoCA social movements in the far right column of this table.

Appendix Table A 2: Alternative EHA Models Using Highs and Lows for Dyads

	Movement Characteristics	Political Context	Full Model	Reduced Model
Stage in protest cycle (H1: -)	-0.00302***	-0.00377***	-0.00318***	-0.00281***
Year	(0.000115)	(0.000680)	(0.000750)	(0.000544)
Popular and modular frames (H2: +)	0.285*		0.237	0.233
Prominent, either movement	(0.143)		(0.153)	(0.152)
Status differences (H3: +)				
Status difference (t-1)	63.61**		65.43**	73.58**
	(24.28)		(24.35)	(23.14)
Status difference (t-1, sq)	-2415.4**		-2261.6*	-2484.3**
	(902.4)		(931.5)	(935.1)
Tactical similarities (H4: +)				
Tactical overlap (t-1)	3.014**		2.394*	1.371***
	(1.071)		(1.150)	(0.383)
Tactical overlap (t-1, sq)	-2.049		-1.456	
	(1.579)		(1.612)	
Histories of interaction (H5: +)				
History of movement crossover (t-3)	1.054***		1.067***	1.077***
	(0.221)		(0.219)	(0.220)
History of movement spillover (t-3)	-0.00553		-0.0168	-0.0283
	(0.226)		(0.222)	(0.218)
Favorable political opportunity (H6: +)				
Democratic President		-0.375*	0.0194	0.0884
		(0.187)	(0.218)	(0.192)
House Democrats (%)		0.323	1.506	
		(2.020)	(2.196)	
Senate Democrats (%)		3.721*	-0.491	-0.216
		(1.792)	(1.971)	(1.886)
Bills, lower movement (#, t-1)		0.000392	0.000160	0.000111
		(0.000809)	(0.000785)	(0.000767)
Bills, higher movement (#, t-1)		0.000619	0.000178	0.000142
		(0.000466)	(0.000403)	(0.000401)
Hearings, lower movement (#, t-1)		0.0194***	0.00905*	0.0104**
		(0.00436)	(0.00431)	(0.00394)
Hearings, higher movement (#, t-1)		-0.0107**	-0.00831*	-0.00769**
		(0.00368)	(0.00325)	(0.00289)
SOTU, lower movement (#, t-1)		0.0142	0.00799	
		(0.00975)	(0.00993)	
SOTU, higher movement (#, t-1)		0.00484	0.00348	
		(0.00416)	(0.00401)	
Exec. orders, lower movement (#, t-1)		-0.0220	-0.0313	
		(0.0441)	(0.0422)	
Exec. orders, higher movement (#, t-1)		0.0476	-0.00479	
		(0.0294)	(0.0282)	
Difference in NYT coverage (#, t-1)		0.000583**	-0.000188	-0.000199
		(0.000188)	(0.000276)	(0.000281)
Mobilization level (H7: +)				
Less active movement count (#)	0.135***		0.137***	0.139***
	(0.0209)		(0.0213)	(0.0209)
More active movement count (#)	0.0206*		0.0224*	0.0235*
	(0.00972)		(0.0111)	(0.0111)
Less active movement count (sq)	-0.00149***		-0.00153***	-0.00157***
	(0.000437)		(0.000443)	(0.000474)
More active movement count (sq)	-0.0000418		-0.0000444	-0.0000568
	(0.0000798)		(0.0000860)	(0.0000852)
lnsig2u Constant	0.189	1.156***	0.0980	0.113
	(0.280)	(0.196)	(0.295)	(0.283)

AIC	2196.3	2430.9	2206.1	2198.0
BIC	2290.7	2532.5	2387.6	2335.9
chi2	1124.7	682.9	1164.2	1160.8
df_m	12	13	24	18
Observations	10511	10511	10511	10511