RESEARCH ARTICLE

WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND IMPACT ON POLICY
The Case of the Bolivian Movement of Domestic Workers

Pablo Castaño
Autonomous University of Barcelona

ABSTRACT: Several authors have analysed how institutionalized women’s movements impact policy, but research has devoted little attention to the differentiated impact of institutionalized movements on the substantive and symbolic dimensions of the same policy. I investigate this issue by focusing on the Bolivian movement of domestic workers, a paradigmatic case of an institutionalized women’s movement that had a sound impact on the symbolic dimension of the policy on domestic workers’ rights but a much weaker impact on its substantive dimension. The research is based on qualitative content analysis of documents produced by the movement and the government, and semi-structured interviews with key actors. I have reached three main findings. First, institutionalization facilitates the achievement of symbolic policy outcomes, but does not necessarily allow the achievement of substantive policy outcomes. Second, the inclusion of movements in deliberative processes that imply the joint elaboration of policy seems to be the form of institutionalization that allows the strongest impact on the substantive dimension of policy, while the appointment of movement members to official positions is less effective. Third, a form of institutionalization that was not included in existent typologies has been identified: the recognition of the importance of a movement by the government.

KEYWORDS: Bolivia, domestic workers, gender, social movements, institutionalization, policy, women’s movements, women’s rights

CORRESPONDING AUTHORS: pablo.castano@uab.cat
Introduction

Alliances between social movements, parties and governments have been frequently analysed by social movement studies and women’s movements scholars through the concept of institutionalization, both in relation to Latin America and other regions. However, the literature has paid little attention to the differentiated impact of institutionalized movements on the substantive and symbolic dimensions of policies. The present research intends to contribute to filling that gap by investigating how institutionalized women’s movements impact different dimensions of the same policy.

This theoretical issue is addressed through a single-case research design focused on the Bolivian social movement of domestic workers. This case has been selected because preliminary analysis of the literature and the Bolivian political context suggested that this is a paradigmatic case of 1) an institutionalized women’s movement which 2) achieved a sound impact on the symbolic dimension of the Bolivian policy on domestic workers’ rights but 3) had a limited impact on the substantive dimension. The article focuses on the 2006-2017 period, during which left-wing indigenist and populist party MAS (Movement for Socialism) and president Evo Morales were in power. The indigenist orientation of the government favoured a close relation with the movement of domestic workers, as shown by the appointment of the movement’s leader as minister of justice in 2006. The empirical analysis is based on qualitative content analysis of two sources: documents produced by the movement and the government, and semi-structured interviews with key actors (movement activists and government officials). The analysis is exclusively focused on the agenda-setting and decision phases of the policy process, for there is not enough available material to carry out a rigorous analysis of the implementation phase. The Bolivian movement of domestic workers is conceptualized in the present research as a women’s movement rather than a labour movement, because in the Bolivian case domestic workers’ struggles are more directly connected to other women’s fights for their rights than to other labour-related struggles, as shown by the fact that for a long time the movement has kept tighter links with women’s organisations than with unions. In addition, there is a tight historical relation between the gendered character of domestic work and the discrimination suffered by domestic workers, which is reflected in the rhetoric used by the Bolivian movement.

1 This work has been realized in the context of the PhD programme in Politics, Policies and international Relations of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. The author would like to express his gratitude to Margarita León, Eva Anduiza, Raffaele Bazurli and Joan Miró for their extremely useful comments to previous drafts of the article.
The present article suggests that the institutionalization of women’s movements facilitates the achievement of symbolic policy outcomes, but it does not necessarily allow the achievement of substantive policy outcomes. Regarding specific forms of institutionalization, in the light of the present research, the inclusion of movements in deliberative processes that imply the joint elaboration of policy seems to be the form of institutionalization that allows the strongest impact on the substantive dimension of policy, while the appointment of movement members to official positions is less effective. In addition, a form of ‘soft’ institutionalization that was not included in existent typologies has been identified: the recognition of the importance of a movement by the government. The article proceeds in three parts. In the first section, I conceptualize the institutionalization of women’s movements and their impact on policy. The second section explains the case selection and methods of the research. The third part is the empirical section, where I analyse the institutionalization of the movement and its impact on policy.

1. Conceptualization of women’s movements institutionalization and movements impact on policy

Institutionalization has been defined as “a process of social movements traversing the official terrain of formal politics and engaging with authoritative institutions such as the legislature, the judiciary, the state, and political parties to enhance their collective ability to achieve the movement’s goals” (Suh 2011, 443). Institutionalization takes very different forms depending on the kind of institution involved (Katzenstein 1998, 211–212), and the factors that determine this process greatly vary depending on the kind of movement, the historical moment and its socio-political environment (Suh 2011, 447).

Institutionalization needs to be differentiated from co-optation, which according to Álvarez (1990) happens when the state accepts the participation of movements in policy-making, but the policy does not match the movements’ demands. Suh (2011) provides an alternative definition of co-optation, which underlines the manipulative intention of the government: co-optation takes place when “the government (the co-opting body) embraces a movement in order to sustain its own legitimacy and authority and to avert threats to its stability” (Suh 2011, 443). For their part, Coy and Hedden (2005) have pointed out that co-opted movements often drop some of its most ambitious demands. Not all forms of movement-government relations can be labelled as co-optation, as highlighted by Hellman (1992). If we want to obtain an accurate view
of movement-government relations, it is necessary to use a restricted notion of co-optation, including the elements pointed out by Álvarez, Suh and Coy and Hedden. Thus, for the purposes of the present research I consider that co-optation takes place when 1) the government allows the participation of a movement in policy-making, 2) the government unilaterally launches this process to sustain its own legitimacy, 3) the movement drops at least some of its most ambitious demands, and 4) the final policy does not reflect the movement’s demands.

The issue of institutionalization has been frequently treated by the literature on women’s movements and social movements in general, both in relation to Latin America and other geographical contexts. One priority of researchers has been identifying positive and negative consequences of institutionalization processes. Some alleged positive consequences are the possibility of seizing more political opportunities (Beckwith 2011, 1064), the capacity of a small number of activist to exert significant influence on policy due to their position in the state bureaucracy (Banaszak 2009), a higher likeliness of organizational survival (Ruzza 1997, 117), and, more generally, the higher capacity of obtaining “stable and influential policies that respond to movement goals” (Suh 2011, 444). Some of the negative consequences of movement institutionalization identified by the literature are the risk of depoliticization of demands by their bureaucratic treatment (Bush 1992, 599, Horton 2015, 84, Meyer 2007, 174, Ruzza 1997, 115), the risk of divisions in movements (Horton 2015, 84, Meyer 2007, 131), and economic dependence (Ruzza 1997, 13–14).

Despite the richness of research on movements’ institutionalization, the literature has paid little attention to how women’s movements impact different dimensions of policies, an issue that needs to be analysed if we want to know how important institutionalization is for obtaining substantive policy changes that can really improve the living conditions of the people that social movements intend to defend. Marion and Oliver (2010) sustain that all political acts are to some extent symbolic, a contribution that somehow introduces the symbolic dimension in policy analysis, but they do not establish an explicit distinction between substantive and symbolic policies. For their part, Haussman and Sauer (2007), and McBride and Mazur (2010) have investigated in detail the relation between women’s movements and women’s policy agencies, but none of their respective analysis introduce the symbolic-substantive distinction either.

For the purposes of the present article, I propose an analytical framework for the analysis of women’s movements institutionalization which is based on the typology proposed by Meyer (2007), a series of forms of institutionalization which I use to identify in which specific forms the Bolivian movement of domestic workers was
institutionalized during the studied period: 1) policymakers’ consultation with representatives of movements; 2) offering of platforms to express the movements’ claims; 3) creation of agencies devoted to dealing with the claims of movements; 4) funding services provided by social movements; 5) use of the rhetoric of social movements by officials; and 6) inclusion of movement actors within deliberative processes (Meyer 2007, 126–129). The concept of ‘deliberative process’ implies a tighter relation between social movements and the state than mere ‘negotiations’, because the inclusion of movements in deliberative processes implies the joint elaboration of policies, as it will be further explained in the analysis section. In the present research, Meyer’s typology is complemented with one extra form of institutionalization: the appointing of social movement members to official positions, identified by Ruzza (1997, 113).

The notion of ‘women’s movements institutionalization’ is put into relation in the present article with the concept of ‘social movements policy impacts’ (or outcomes). Research on movements impacts has focused on topics such as impacts on the structure of political opportunities (Kitschelt 1986), on the movement itself (Kriesi et al. 1995), on public opinion (Giugni 1998, Kriesi et al. 1995), on policy (Gamson 1975; Giugni and Yamasaki 2009, Jenkins and Klandermans 1995, Kriesi et al. 1995, Silva 2015), on implementation of policies (Silva 2015), and methods to identify the policy outcomes of movements (Amenta and Young 1999, Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander 1995). In the present article, movements outcomes on policy are assessed by analysing how much of their program is achieved, following the method proposed by Burstein et al. (1995), which allows to focus on the stated demands of the movement.

The analytical framework for the assessment of movements’ impact on policy proposed in the present article is based on the distinction between the substantive, symbolic and mixed dimensions of policies. Before explaining the classification elaborated for this research, it is necessary to specify Thoenig’s concept of public policy, which I follow: “A public policy is a programme of action specific to one or more public or governmental authorities within a sector of society or a given area” (Thoenig 1985, 6). Thus, a policy includes several decisions of the incumbent authority on the same area. My threefold typology of social movements’ impacts on policy is inspired by the work of Kitschelt (1986) and Kriesi et al. (1995) on the typologies of social movement outcomes. Kitschelt has distinguished between “procedural” impacts (which “open new channels of participation to protest actors and involve their recognition as legitimate representatives of demands”) and “substantive” impacts (which are defined as
“changes of policy in response to protest”) (Kitschelt 1986, 67). For their part, Kriesi et al. (1995) introduce a third kind of external outcome: the “sensitizing impacts”, which they define as “the possibility that a movement will provoke a sensitizing of some social actor in the political arena or in the public arena”.

For the purposes of this research, the symbolic dimension of a policy is the ensemble of governmental decisions whose main aim is to improve the social image of domestic workers and domestic work, while the substantive dimension refers to the decisions that directly address the material demands of the social movement of domestic workers regarding social rights. Symbolic and substantive dimensions are often conflated in the same policy, but certain policies focus rather on one dimension than the other, which justifies the distinction. The ‘mixed dimension’ has been included to denominate those decisions where the symbolic and substantive dimensions are so deeply embedded that it is impossible to determine which one predominates. The present research exclusively focuses on the agenda-setting and decision phases of the policy-making process, for the implementation of the Bolivian legislation of domestic workers’ rights is still so limited that there is not enough material to conduct an insightful analysis of that phase.

The symbolic-substantive dichotomy explained above reminds the recognition-redistribution debate on social justice launched in 1995 by Fraser, who affirmed that “cultural recognition [was displacing] socioeconomic redistribution as the remedy for injustice and the goal of political struggle” (Fraser 1995). For the purposes of the present research I have chosen to use the terms ‘symbolic’ and ‘substantive’ because they are more directly connected to the concepts proposed by social movement scholars mentioned above. This terminological choice attempts to emphasise the adscription of this article to the field of social movements and women’s movements studies.

The present research also draws on literature on domestic workers’ mobilisations, which has often referred to the links between movements, on the one hand, and parties, governments and international organisations, on the other hand (e.g. Ally 2005, Blofield 2012, 2009, Cabezas Fernández 2013, Chien 2018, Goldsmith 2007, ILO International Training Centre 2014, Peredo Beltrán 2015, Schwenken 2013, 2011, CONLACTRAHO 2003). This article does not discuss in-depth literature on domestic workers’ movements because the theoretical focus of the research is placed on women’s movements in general. However, three inputs of the mentioned literature are particularly relevant for the present article. First, Ally’s (2005) conceptualization of the most frequent organisational models of domestic workers’ movements: union-based and NGO-based movements. Second, Chien’s (2018) research on the elaboration of
policies on care workers’ rights in Taiwan, where she underlines the importance of taking the local context into account when investigating domestic workers’ movements and policies on domestic workers’ rights. Lastly, Peredo Beltrán (2015) has highlighted certain symbolic impacts of the Bolivian movement of domestic workers – such as the adoption by government of the movements’ rhetoric – and has pointed out the weakness of the substantive policies on domestic workers’ rights in Bolivia. Peredo Beltrán has not carried out a systematic analysis of the movements’ demands and their degree of satisfaction as the one performed in the present article, but her work suggests that the Bolivian movement of domestic workers obtained more symbolic than substantive outcomes during the studied period, which is one of the reasons that led me to choose this study case, as further explained below.

2. Case selection and methods

This article investigates the case of the Bolivian social movement of domestic workers between 2006 and 2017, the first years of Evo Morales and left-wing indigenist and populist party MAS in government. The choice of a quite long time framework intends to avoid the bias derived from restricting the analysis to the peak period of a movement, a methodological risk in social movement studies pointed out by Ruzza (1997, 95). As advanced above, the preliminary examination of existing research on the movement (Peredo Beltrán 2015) suggested that the Bolivian domestic workers’ movement achieved a major impact on the symbolic dimension of policy but not on the substantive dimension. In addition, the appointment of former domestic workers’ movement’s leader Casimira Rodríguez as minister of justice in 2006 by president Morales suggests that there was a tight relation between the movement and the government, which will be further explained below. The mentioned particularities make of the Bolivian movement of domestic workers a perfect case to perform a differentiated analysis of the impact of specific forms of institutionalization on different dimensions of policy.

Domestic work has traditionally been the main form of female paid employment in Latin America (Kuznesof 1989, 31). In Bolivia, there are around 137,000 domestic workers, which is a considerable figure if a country with a total population of around 11 million (Peredo Beltrán 2015, 17). 97 per cent of Bolivian domestic workers are women.
Pablo Castaño, Women’s Movements Institutionalization and Impact on Policy

(André 2016), and most of them are indigenous individuals who have migrated from rural areas to cities, come from the lowest social classes and have a lower level of formal education than the national average. Domestic workers’ working and living conditions have traditionally been extremely deficient, even for the standards of Bolivia, one of the poorest countries in Latin America (CONLACTRAHO 2003, Valenzuela and Sjoberg 2012, Wanderley 2014). Despite their subaltern position in the Bolivian society – directly related with the fact that most of them are indigenous women –, domestic workers succeeded in creating their first unions in the eighties, and the union-based National Federation of Bolivian Paid Household Workers (Fenatrahob)\(^2\) was founded in 1993.

At the beginning of the 1990s Fenatrahob presented to Bolivian Parliament a draft law on domestic workers’ rights that intended to overcome the legal discrimination they suffered at that time (for instance, their daily working time was much longer than for the rest of the Bolivian workforce), but the draft was rejected. All throughout the 1990s, Fenatrahob combined the struggle for legal reform with actions that aimed the immediate improvement of its members’ living conditions, such as specialization courses to increase the workers’ wages (Peredo Beltrán 2015, 84). In 1997, a Committee to Promote the Law was created, with the participation of feminist NGOs such as the Women’s Network for Economic Transformation (REMTE), some unions and other progressive organisations\(^3\). The Bolivian organisational model corresponds to the “union” category conceptualized by Ally (2005) – NGOs provide support to Fenatrahob for the drafting of legal proposals but the political decisions of the movement are taken within the union structure\(^4\). However, the support of Bolivian inter-branch unions such as the Bolivian Workers’ Organisation (COB) was uneven. The domestic workers’

---

2 Domestic workers are usually called “household workers” in Bolivia, because the former term has a colonial-racist load.

3 Author’s interviews with the coordinator of one of the NGOs that support Fenatrahob (La Paz, August 17th 2017).

4 The distinction between ‘social movement’ and ‘social movement organisation-SMO’ proposed by Della Porta and Diani (2009, p. 137) is applied to the present research in the following way: the ensemble formed by Fenatrahob and the organisations that support it is considered as ‘the Bolivian movement of domestic workers’, while Fenatrahob is the main organisation of the movement (a social movement organisation).
movement’s repertoire of action included signature collections, petitions to authorities, and street protests such as sittings (Cabezas Fernández 2012).

Despite the mentioned actions, the movements’ demands remained unsatisfied for a long period. Throughout the 1990s, neoliberal politics were hegemonic in Bolivia, where the International Monetary Fund imposed hard structural adjustment plans that included restrictions of social rights and a growing deregulation of the labour market. The political context experienced a U-turn since 2000, when a massive cycle of anti-neoliberal mobilisations began in Bolivia and Fenatrahob’s demands entered the political agenda (Peredo Beltrán 2015, Webber 2011). The pressure of peasant-indigenous and working-class social movements led the Parliament to approve in 2003 the 2450 Law that Regulates Paid Household Work, which attributed to domestic workers similar rights to those of the rest of Bolivian workforce, including the legal minimum salary, yearly holidays, weekly free time from work, access to education, and health insurance coverage. Evo Morales’ MAS, which was the main opposition party at that time, was the main parliamentary supporter of the law. The 2450/2003 Law constituted a major achievement for the movement, but it did not immediately improve the situation of domestic workers, for some of its most important dispositions – such as the articles that guaranteed their right to health insurance and pensions – needed to be developed by supreme decrees (infra-legal regulations issued by the president).

In December 2005, after five years of anti-neoliberal mobilisations, former coca-growers’ union leader and MAS candidate Evo Morales won the national election and was invested as president, which raised high hopes among domestic workers. He was the first indigenous president in Bolivia’s history and kept tight links with the peasant, working-class and indigenous social movements that had provoked the resignation of neoliberal presidents Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in 2003 and Carlos Mesa in 2005. One of Morales’ first decisions as president was the appointment as minister of justice of Casimira Rodríguez, former executive secretary of Fenatrahob and the Latin American and Caribbean Confederation of Household Workers (CONLACTRAHO). This significant gesture was the first of the several forms of institutionalization experienced by the Bolivian movement of domestic workers between 2006 and 2017, as further explained below.
**Methods**

The research follows a qualitative approach based on two methods: 1) qualitative thematic analysis of documents produced by the Bolivian social movement of domestic workers and the government, and 2) semi-structured interviews with activists and government officials. Documental analysis has been used by researchers who focus on domestic workers’ movements, such as Chien (2018), while interviews have been the main source of data for Peredo Beltrán (2015) andBlofield (2009, 2012). The documents have been selected by intentional sampling (Lindekilde, 2014). Regarding Fenatrahob, two kinds of documents have been selected: 1) the policy proposal *Depatriarchalisation and Decolonisation from the Perspective of Waged Household Workers* (Fenatrahob, 2014a) – a document in which Fenatrahob performed a diagnosis of the working and living conditions of Bolivian domestic workers and exposed its main policy demands –, and 2) all the *Equidad y Justicia* (‘Equity and Justice’) informative bulletins published by the Federation between 2005 and 2017 (the sample is composed by 23 bulletins, as they are usually published two or three times per year). Insofar as Fenatrahob is the main organisation of the Bolivian movement of domestic workers, its documents set the policy priorities of the whole movement. The present research does not have the specific aim of analysing the chronological evolution of the movements’ institutionalization and impact on policy, but the analysis of bulletins published over twelve years introduces a certain diachronic dimension in the analysis. Regarding the government, I have analysed communiqués of the ministry of labour on domestic workers’ rights, and the laws and regulations approved or promoted by the government on this topic.

In addition, semi-structured interviews have been carried out with a sample of 14 individuals belonging to the following categories: Fenatrahob leaders (including two of its former executive secretaries and two leaders of local unions), activists belonging to women’s organisations that support Fenatrahob, and government and MAS representatives (including a former minister, a former senator and a former official of the ministry of labour). The interviews had two central aims: completing the data provided by document analysis on the degree of achievement of policy demands, and obtaining a faithfully view of the relations between the movement and the
government. In the case of Fenatrahob members, their biography was also addressed, in order to complete the contextual information provided by literature on the working and living conditions of domestic workers. By contrast, interviews with members of the NGOs that support Fenatrahob were rather expert interviews, focused on the processes of policy elaboration. Interviewing both activists and government officials allowed to obtain a balanced and comprehensive picture of the analysed issues. The interviews were carried out in La Paz, El Alto and Cochabamba (three of the four biggest cities in Bolivia) during two fieldwork trips that took place in March and April 2016 and August 2017. Conducting interviews in two different years instead of concentrating all of them in the same moment also reinforced the diachronic dimension of the research.

3. The institutionalization of the Bolivian movement of domestic workers and its impacts on the policy on domestic workers’ rights

The empirical analysis of the study case proceeds in three parts. First, I analyse to what extent and in which forms the movement of domestic workers was institutionalized during the 2006-2017 period. Second, I explore how the movement impacted the substantive, symbolic and mixed dimensions of the policy on domestic workers’ rights. In the third subsection, I investigate the connection between the specific forms of movement’s institutionalization and its policy impacts.

3.1. The institutionalization of the Bolivian movement of domestic workers

The analysis of the movement’s institutionalization is based on Meyer’s (2007) typology, which has been complemented with an input by Ruzza (1997) — the appointment of social movement members to official positions — and an extra form of institutionalization that I have deduced from empirical analysis: the symbolic recognition of the importance of the social movement by the government.

The following table explains the forms of institutionalization that the Bolivian movement of domestic workers experienced between 2006 and 2017 and when they took place. The different forms of institutionalization are organized following a criterion
of graduation — the less intense forms are presented in the first part of the table, while the more intense ones are at the end of the table.

Table 1 - Forms of institutionalization of the Bolivian social movement of domestic workers (2006-2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of institutionalization</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic recognition of the</td>
<td>Celebration of a ceremony at the ministry of labour to recognise the work of Fenatrarahob during its 20 years of existence (Ministerio de Trabajo 2013)</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>importance of the social</td>
<td>Use of the rhetoric of Fenatrarahob in the 28655/2006 Decree that created the National Day of Household Workers. The decree states: “The work of household workers, often rendered invisible by everyday life, must be recognised. […] Their struggle against discrimination is the same struggle to get a country with more justice”.</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>movement (conceptualized by</td>
<td>By contrast, this kind of rhetoric is completely absent from the 2450 Law, approved before left-wing indigenist and populist Morales’ arrival to state power in 2006.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the author)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of the rhetoric of social</td>
<td>Participation of Fenatrarahob to the Constituent Assembly (Fenatrarahob 2006)</td>
<td>2006-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>movements by officials (Meyer</td>
<td>Appointment of Casimira Rodriguez as minister of justice</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007)</td>
<td>Appointment of several Fenatrarahob activists to subnational official parliamentary and executive positions</td>
<td>2006-2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>express movements’ claims</td>
<td>Participation of Fenatrarahob in the elaboration of a programme for the access of domestic workers to secondary education (Fenatrarahob 2014b)</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Meyer 2007)</td>
<td>Participation of Fenatrarahob in the elaboration of a ministerial resolution on written contracts and ‘salaries books’ (Fenatrarahob 2014c)</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: prepared by the author

5 Author’s interview with a former MAS senator and one former executive secretary of Fenatrarahob.
As shown in Table 1, the analysis has allowed to identify several specific events of institutionalization that match five categories: symbolic recognition of the importance of the social movement, use of the rhetoric of social movements, offering of platforms to express movements’ claims, appointment of social movement members to official positions, and inclusion of movement actors within deliberative processes. One of the ‘soft’ forms of institutionalization that took place during the studied period was the holding of an official ceremony in the ministry of labour to commemorate the 20th anniversary of Fenatrarahob. This event has been conceptualized as symbolic recognition of the importance of the social movement, a form of ‘soft institutionalization’ that is not included in existing typologies. In addition, the rhetoric of the social movement was used by the government in the 28655/2006 Decree that created the National Day of Household Workers, and the movement participated in the Constituent Assembly. These two institutionalization events took place in 2006, together with the appointment of Casimira Rodríguez as minister.

By contrast, movement’s participation in policy-making processes (the most intense form of institutionalization identified in this case) was more frequent during the second half of the analysed period. Representatives of Fenatrarahob and the NGOs that support the Federation co-elaborated a programme for the access of workers to secondary education, participated in meetings with officials of the ministry of health and proposed draft norms to guarantee the workers’ right to health insurance, and also took part in the drafting of the ministerial resolution on written contracts and ‘salaries books’ – the three issues will be further explored below. The inclusion of movement’s representatives in the mentioned processes was a form of directly integrating domestic workers in policy-making procedures from which lower-class indigenous women are usually excluded.

There seems to be a trend towards the intensification of the movement-government relation throughout the analysed period, which suggests that ‘soft’ forms of institutionalization can be the first step towards more intense ones. For instance, when a government has publicly praised a movement and has adopted its rhetoric (as Morales’ government did), it seems difficult to avoid the inclusion of the movement on subsequent policy-making processes. However, there are also exceptions to this trend in the analysed case: for instance, the ceremony held at the ministry of labour to commemorate the anniversary of Fenatrarahob (a soft form of institutionalization) took place in 2013, while the first government-movement meetings to jointly elaborate a decree of health insurance took place in 2007. Thus, it would be far-fetched to conclude that soft forms of institutionalization generally precede more intense institutionalization forms such as movements’ participation in policy-making. Rather, the analysis suggests that
different kinds of institutionalization can take place simultaneously, and ‘soft’ forms of institutionalization are important, because at least in some cases they can pave the way for stronger government-movement ties.

3.2. The impact of the movement on the symbolic, mixed and substantive dimensions of the policy on domestic workers’ rights

The institutionalization of the movement allowed it to obtain all its symbolic demands during the 2006-2017 period and most of its mixed demands, but only a few of its substantive demands. As explained above, I assess the impact of the movement by analysing how many of its stated demands were met, as suggested by Burstein et al. (1995).

a) Impacts on the symbolic dimension of policy

Two symbolic demands were promoted by the movement between 2006 and 2017: the creation of a National Day of Household Workers, and the constitutional recognition of the economic value of domestic work. Both demands were met by the government.

Fenatrahob called in 2006 for the creation of a National Day of Household Workers on March 30th, to commemorate the anniversary of the foundation of the Latin American and Caribbean Confederation of Household Workers (CONLACTRAHO) in 1988 and the struggle of domestic workers for their rights. The demand was met in 2006, when Casimira Rodriguez was Evo Morales’ minister of justice. The decision was confirmed through the 181/2011 Law. In Bolivia, all occupational sectors have an annual national day. Thus, creating the domestic workers’ one was a way of recognising their work as equal to the rest, which had the intention to improve the social image of domestic workers. That is why the creation of the National Day must be considered as a symbolic measure.

The second symbolic demand of Fenatrahob (2009b) was the constitutional recognition of the economic value of domestic work, a claim that was satisfied through article 338 of the new Constitution approved in 2009. This achievement was highlighted by one former secretary general of Fenatrahob in the following terms:
There is this issue in the Constitution, the recognition that household work must be valued. [...] Article 338 recognises that household work is the contribution of household workers to the country.

Again, the aim of improving the social image of domestic workers through constitutional recognition confirms that this was a symbolic policy.

b) Impacts on the mixed dimension of policy

The balance is slightly less positive regarding mixed policy demands. The movement formulated two demands of this kind: the ratification of Convention 189 on Decent Work for Domestic Workers, approved by the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 2011; and the inclusion of domestic workers’ rights in the General Labour Act, which establishes the general framework of labour relations in Bolivia (Fenatrarahob 2010b, Wanderley 2014). The first demand was met, and the government engaged itself to meet the second one when the general reform of the labour legislation takes place.

Convention 189 is the first international treaty that explicitly recognises basic rights to domestic workers, such as freedom of association and the right to collective bargain, and requires equating of domestic workers’ rights with those of other workers, with some exceptions. When I asked one former secretary general of Fenatrarahob which were the main achievements of the Federation since 2006, she underlined the importance of Convention 189 and the participation of Fenatrarahob in the negotiations that led to the approval of the treaty (Fenatrarahob 2011, 2010c):

We participated in the elaboration of Convention 189 in Geneva. This has been a very important achievement for household workers at the international level, and also in Bolivia, for it allows us to actualise the legislation on domestic work, it allows us to be considered as equal to other workers.

The symbolic importance of Convention 189 for the Bolivian movement of domestic workers was also highlighted by a former official of the ministry of labour who was interviewed for this research:

Convention 189 gave them [Bolivian domestic workers] an international legal framework. It was also their need to feel identified and recognised as household workers. There is a very strong identity issue here.
Pablo Castaño, Women’s Movements Institutionalization and Impact on Policy

Indeed, the ratification was a key priority for Fenatrahob for symbolic reasons (it reinforced the legitimacy of the domestic workers’ demands) and legal reasons (the convention only became compulsory in Bolivia when it was ratified by Parliament and the government, reinforcing the workers’ legal protection). Fenatrahob and its supporting organisations wanted Bolivia to be the first state in the world in ratifying the convention. However, the decision was retarded to 2012 due to civil servants’ reluctance, as an activist of the movement told me:

It was very difficult to convince civil servants [of the ministry of labour] of the need of ratifying the convention.

Convention 189 was eventually ratified by Bolivia through the 309/2012 Law. It did not create any new right for Bolivian domestic workers, insofar as the 2450/2003 Law was more advanced that the convention, but the ratification favoured the approval of the 218/2014 Ministerial Resolution on the written contracts and the ‘salary book’, whose contents will be explained below. As May 2014 Equity and Justice bulletin reminded, Convention 189 establishes that “all states must carry out the necessary measures to make sure that its workers are adequately informed about their working conditions through written contracts” (Fenatrahob 2014d). In addition, several interviewees affirmed that the ratification reinforced the movement’s position in further negotiations. ILO conventions include a reporting mechanism that allows unions addressing demands for implementation of labour rights to ILO, a tool that improved Fenatrahob’s correlation of forces vis-à-vis the Bolivian state. That is why the ratification of Convention 189 was a mixed (symbolic-substantive) measure.

The second mixed policy demand promoted by Fenatrahob was the inclusion of domestic workers’ rights in the General Labour Act – they are currently recognised by 2450/2003 Law, a specific norm. The government committed itself to include domestic workers’ rights in the future General Labour Act, but the accomplishment of the promise will not be sure until the approval of the general reform of labour legislation. If the government honours its commitment and the Parliament validates the decision, the inclusion of domestic workers’ rights in the General Labour Act will improve their legal situation (substantive dimension) and will reinforce the idea that domestic workers deserve the same rights than the rest of the workforce, improving their social image (symbolic dimension).

6 Author’s interview with a former MAS senator.
c) Impacts on the substantive dimension of policy

The analysis of the *Equity and Justice* bulletins and the *Decolonisation and Depatriarchalisation* policy proposal published by Fenatrahob allows to identify several substantive policy demands on five issues: 1) minimum wage and working time limits, 2) health coverage, 3) pensions, 4) education, and 5) protection against violence. All the demands analysed here are related with domestic workers’ social rights and working and living conditions, which has led me to classify them as substantive demands. In the following paragraphs, the five mentioned categories of demands are analysed by exploring three dimensions: the legislation that existed before 2006 (the 2450/2003 Law), the demands formulated by the movement, and the new legislation that was approved following the movement’s demands.

Regarding minimum wage and working time limits, the 2450/2003 Law established domestic workers’ right to earn the legal minimum wage and a general limit of eight hours of work per day. As these rights were often violated by employers, in 2014 Fenatrahob demanded the creation of an administrative regulation to allow the labour inspection to supervise domestic workers’ working conditions, the publication of a guide that explains the workers how to legally claim their rights, and a ministerial resolution that makes compulsory for all domestic workers the written contract and a ‘salary book’ – a document where the wages perceived by workers and the effective time of work are registered (Fenatrahob 2014a, 2014b). That same year, the ministry of labour passed the 218/2014 Resolution, which established the compulsory character of written contracts and ‘salaries books’.

As far as health coverage is concerned, the 2450/2003 Law established domestic workers’ right to affiliation to the National Health Insurance but the implementation of this right was conditioned to the approval of a supreme decree. The passing of this decree was a frequent demand in *Equity and Justice* bulletins throughout the analysed period (Fenatrahob 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2010a, 2010b, 2015, 2016). In addition, the executive secretaries of two local unions of domestic workers (in La Paz and Cochabamba) interviewed for this research stated that the passing of a decree on health coverage was “the main priority” of the movement. However, the decree was

---

7 There was an exception for live-in domestic workers (those who live in the house where they work), whose daily working time was set in ten hours. This difference was justified during the debate of the 2450/2003 Law by the need to pay back the employers for giving shelter to the worker.
not approved during the studied period, which led some members of the movement to express their exasperation. For instance, one leader of Fenatrahob said:

I told the people in the Social Security: ‘Frankly, comrade, we have been waiting for the health insurance for fourteen years. […] What ‘Good Living’ are they talking about? It is not enough to write it on paper, one needs to enjoy it’.

Regarding pensions, the 2450/2003 Law established domestic workers’ rights to “compensation for years of work”, and Fenatrahob repeatedly called for an effective pension coverage for domestic workers (Fenatrahob 2014d, 2014a), which was not achieved during the analysed period. As an activist of the women’s organisation Colectivo Rebeldía claimed:

No household worker has the right to a pension! And the state has not lifted a finger to guarantee this right. It is not [even] their money, they won’t need to use the money of the state but the money of employers.

The mentioned testimony suggests that the government’s fear of a conflict with employers might have deterred it from meeting the domestic workers’ demand on pensions.

Another important category of Fenatrahob’s substantive policy demands is education, an issue on which the 2450/2003 Law does not contain any specific disposition. However, in 2014 Fenatrahob asked the government for measures to facilitate domestic workers’ access to formal education (Fenatrahob 2014a). The demand was met by the ministry of education two years later through the creation of a secondary education program that allows domestic workers to attend classes on a part-time basis (Ministerio de Educación 2016).

The movement also formulated policy demands regarding protection against violence. This is not exactly a social right, but it is a demand that intends to directly improve domestic workers’ living conditions, which justifies its inclusion among substantive demands. In addition, living and working without suffering any violence is a necessary condition to enjoy the social rights demanded by domestic workers. The 2450/2003 Law established the specific duty of the Police and the Public Prosecutor to

8 She refers to the concept of buen vivir (‘Good Living’), an indigenous principle which is supposed to inspire MAS policies.
receive the claims from domestic workers on harassment and violence committed by their employers or their employers’ relatives, and initiate the corresponding investigations. Due to the seriousness of this problem, Fenatrahob called in 2014 for “Massive campaigns of communication with [...] transformative criteria on the culture of discrimination, oriented towards employers, workers and authorities” (Fenatrahob 2014a). Scholars such as Rivera Cusicanqui (2015) have highlighted that violence against domestic workers is often legitimized by the racist and sexist discrimination that they suffer. However, the government did not meet this demand during the studied period.

The analysis has shown that only two of the seven substantive policy demands expressed by the movement were satisfied by the Bolivian government between 2006 and 2017: the 218/2014 Ministerial Resolution that established a compulsory contract and a ‘salaries book’ for domestic workers, and the program elaborated by the ministry of education to promote domestic workers’ access to formal education. By contrast, the movement was highly successful in impacting the symbolic and mixed dimensions of the policy on domestic workers’ rights. Overall, the government conceded the demands that needed less public spending and a did not imply a direct conflict with employers. This, combined with the fact that substantive demands were less successful than symbolic ones, could suggest that the movement was co-opted by the government, but it would be an inaccurate definition of the movement-government relations in this case.

As explained above, co-optation takes place when the government allows the movement’s participation in policy-making with the aim of sustaining the government’s legitimacy, but the policy does not meet the movement’s demands, and the movement drops some of its demands (Álvarez 1990, Coy and Hedden 2005, Suh 2011). The Bolivian movement of domestic workers was included in policy-making processes, its demands were partially met, and it would be inaccurate to affirm that the process was unilaterally initiated by the government – Fenatrahob and its allies took the decision of establishing a close relation with Morales’ government in order to promote its policy demands. In addition, the analysis has shown that the Bolivian movement of domestic workers did not renounce to any of its more ambitious demands (including health and pensions coverage) during the studied period. As Peredo Beltrán (2016, 26) has put it, Bolivian domestic workers “were able to keep their own agenda”. Thus, despite the incomplete satisfaction of the movement’s demands during the studied period, it would be inaccurate to label the relation between Morales’ government and the Bolivian movement of domestic workers as co-optation.
3.3. The relation between the institutionalization of the movement and its impacts on policy

Table 2 presents the impacts achieved by the movement, in connection with the forms of institutionalization that are directly related with those impacts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific case of institutionalization and date</th>
<th>Form of institutionalization</th>
<th>Related policy decision and date</th>
<th>Dimension of the policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation of Fenatrarahob in the elaboration of a ministerial resolution on written contracts and ‘salaries books’ (2014)</td>
<td>Inclusion of movement actors within deliberative processes (Meyer 2007)</td>
<td>218/2014 Resolution of the ministry of labour establishing the compulsory character of written contracts and ‘salaries books’ for all domestic workers (2014)</td>
<td>Substantive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: prepared by the author
Table 2 shows three major findings. First, specific forms of institutionalization are directly related with specific impacts on policy, as I will further explain. Second, the two impacts that the movement had on the substantive dimension of policy were directly related with the same form of institutionalization: the inclusion of movement actors within deliberative processes (Meyer 2007). The third finding is that the appointment of former Fenatrahob leader Casimira Rodríguez as minister of justice did not allow the achievement of any substantive policy impact, only a symbolic impact. The latter finding challenges the idea that a small number of social movement activists can have a major influence on policy because of their position in the state bureaucracy, formulated by women’s movements scholars such as Banaszak (2009). In the same vein, the appointment of other activists of the domestic workers movement to subnational official positions previously identified in Table 1 did not seem to allow any specific policy impact.

The lack of impact of Rodríguez’s appointment on the substantive dimension of policy seems to be related to the permanence of a racist and sexist habitus within the ministry of justice, together with Rodríguez’s difficulties in making her way in the bureaucratic structures of the ministry, as explained by an experienced former minister who was interviewed for the present research:

When she [Casimira Rodríguez] went to meetings, her advisors spoke in her name [...] She was ‘invaded’ by the bureaucratic logic. We were all ‘invaded’ [by that logic] when we arrived to government, no minister had any knowledge in public administration. If this was difficult for ministers who were professionals, it was even harder for a woman who was semi-illiterate.

Racism and sexism in the ministry was also denounced by Rodríguez herself in her memoirs (Rodríguez Romero 2015). Despite these major obstacles, Rodríguez’s appointment as minister allowed the creation of the National Day of Household Workers, a symbolic impact. The direct link between the appointment of the domestic workers’ leader as minister and the creation of the National Day was confirmed by a former secretary general of Fenatrahob:

We presented this proposal, Casimira Rodríguez presented the proposal to make that March 30th becomes the National Day of Household Workers. The Bolivian state accepted our proposal through a supreme decree. Now, household workers enjoy a day of rest to recognise our work. Because a supreme decree can change if the government...
changes, we promoted that the decree becomes a law. Therefore, the 25th October 2011 the decree was turned into a law.

Regarding the economic recognition of the value of domestic work in the 2009 Constitution, the presence of Fenatrabajadores in the Constituent Assembly was key. An activist and scholar explained to me that the general political situation of the country was very tense during the elaboration of the new constitution: “There was an extreme social polarization in Bolivia. There was a situation of almost civil war”. In that strained context, the presence of movement’s representatives in the Assembly allowed the approval of article 338 on the economic value of domestic work.

Lastly, there is a direct connection between the movement’s participation in policy-making processes and the achievement of two substantive impacts: a specific program of secondary education for household workers and the 218/2014 Ministerial Resolution on written contracts and ‘salaries books’. The direct participation of movement’s representatives in the drafting of the mentioned norm and policy program allowed a direct influence on the final outcome. By contrast, the ratification of Convention 189 was not directly linked to a specific form of institutionalization, but seems to be related to the generally tight relations that the movement and the government kept during the 2006-2017 period.

Conclusions

The present article has explored how institutionalized women’s movements impact different dimensions of the same policy, focusing on the substantive, mixed and symbolic dimensions. To address this theoretical issue, I have investigated the case of the Bolivian social movement of domestic workers between 2006 and 2017, a period during which left-wing indigenist and populist party MAS and president Evo Morales were in power. Insofar as Bolivian domestic workers are overwhelmingly indigenous lower-class women and MAS had supported their movement prior to its arrival to power, Morales’ election raised hopes of legal and material progress among domestic workers, who suffered a lasting situation of discrimination and poor working conditions.

In the first part of the analysis, five forms of movement institutionalization have been identified: symbolic recognition of the importance of the social movement by the government, use of the rhetoric of the movement by officials, offering of platforms to express the movement’s claims, appointment of social movement members to official
positions, and inclusion of the movement within deliberative policy-making processes. Thus, the analysis has shown that the movement was highly institutionalized throughout the studied period (2006-2017), and several kinds of institutionalization took place simultaneously. The following step has been investigating the impact of the movement on different dimensions of the Bolivian policy on domestic workers’ rights. I have found that the movement was highly successful in obtaining symbolic and mixed policy demands, but it only obtained two of the seven substantive policy demands that it formulated: a ministerial resolution that established the compulsory character of written contracts and a registry of salaries (‘salary books’) for domestic workers, and a specific program to promote domestic workers’ access to secondary education. Key policy demands such as health coverage, right to pensions and effective protection against violence remained unmet. Therefore, the movement had a much greater impact on the symbolic and mixed dimensions of policy than it had on the substantive dimension. Even though the movement did not obtain all its demands, I have reached the conclusion that this is not a case of co-optation, because the institutionalization process was actively initiated by the movement, the movement did not drop any of its most ambitious demands, and it obtained many of its policy aims.

In the last part of the analysis I have investigated the relation between the previously identified forms of institutionalization and the movement’s impacts on policy. The analysis has shown that the two substantive policy impacts achieved by the movement between 2006 and 2017 were facilitated by the same form of institutionalization: the inclusion of the movement within deliberative processes that implied the joint elaboration of policy. By contrast, the appointment of former leader of the movement Casimira Rodríguez as minister of justice only allowed the achievement of symbolic policy (the creation of the National Day of Household Workers); her appointment did not grant any substantive policy impact.

The mentioned empirical findings allow to formulate three arguments that can enrich research on social movements institutionalization. First, the case study suggests that institutionalization of women’s movements facilitates the achievement of symbolic policy demands but does not necessarily allow the achievement of substantive policy demands. Second, if we look at specific forms of institutionalization, inclusion of social movements in deliberative processes seems to be the form of institutionalization that allows the strongest impact on the substantive dimension of policy, for it implies the joint elaboration of policies by the government and the movement. By contrast, the appointment of social movement activists to official positions in the state seems to be
less effective, which challenges existing assumptions in women’s movements literature about the influence of institutionalized activists. The third finding consists in the conceptualization of a form of institutionalization that is not included in existent typologies: symbolic recognition of the importance of the social movement. This form of ‘soft institutionalization’ does not seem sufficient by itself to achieve policy impact, but could facilitate the establishing of stronger forms of institutionalization. Therefore, this form of institutionalization should be added to existing classifications with the aim of performing more accurate analysis of movements institutionalization.

References


CONLACTRAHO (2003). *Las condiciones de vida de las trabajadoras del hogar en la ciudad de La Paz*. La Paz: OIT.


ILO International Training Centre (2014), Organización de las trabajadoras del hogar en las Américas: buenas prácticas y desafíos en función del Convenio N° 189 de la OIT. Turin, Italy: ILO.


Annex: Analysed Documents


Acronyms

CONLACTRAHO: Confederación Latinoamericana y del Caribe de Trabajadoras del Hogar ("Latin American and Caribbean Confederation of Household Workers")
FENATRAHOB: Federación Nacional de Trabajadoras Asalariadas del Hogar de Bolivia ("National Federation of Bolivian Paid Household Workers")
ILO CONVENTION 189: Convention 189 of the International Labour Organisation
MAS: Movimiento al Socialismo ("Movement for Socialism").
REMTE: Red de Mujeres Transformando la Economía ("Women’s Network for Economic Transformation").

AUTHOR’s INFORMATION:

Pablo Castaño is a PhD candidate in Politics, Policies and International Relations at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (Spain), where he is completing a thesis on women’s movements, gender equality policies and populism focused on the case of Evo Morales’ Bolivia. He holds an MPhil in Sociology from Goldsmiths College (University of London), a Master’s Degree in Constitutional Law from the Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales and a double Bachelor’s Degree in Politics and Law from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. He has published on gender and politics, populism and left-wing parties in Europe and Latin America. He currently holds a PIF grant from UAB and has previously held a Postgraduate Scholarship granted by La Caixa Foundation.