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## RESEARCH ARTICLE

### PRECARIOUS VOICES?

#### Types of “Political Citizens” and Repertoires of Action among European Youth

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**ABSTRACT:** This article’s goal is to explore the existence of ‘political citizens’ profiles across three European cities (Turin, Cologne and Lyon) and to ascertain the role of an unstable occupational status on the repertoires of action deployed. For this purpose, a technique called latent class cluster analysis (LCCA) is applied to a large sample, including young precarious and regular workers (deployed as a reference group). This technique allowed us to derive five descriptive probabilistic profiles of ‘political citizens’ and their repertoires of action in each city. The empirical findings underline the emergence of hybrid repertoires of action together with ‘single-issue’ or ‘cause-oriented’ forms of political participation. This study represents an attempt to encourage the dialogue between two strands of research in social sciences, namely sociology of work and political participation and to foster the formation of an innovative research agenda crossing these two fields.

**KEYWORDS:** Youth; Precarious work; Political participation; Repertoires of action; Urban level.

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## 1. Introduction

The most recent debate regarding young people's relationship with politics highlighted that the rate of institutionalized political participation (e.g. vote and party membership) has dramatically declined in the last two decades, driven by the increasing detachment of young people from the political debate and the civic arenas. Some scholars came forth with the labels "individualization" and "presentification" to express how young people's political engagement is nowadays driven by personal needs and forcefully bounded to a horizon limited to the present (della Porta 2015; Formenti 2011). Through the use of social networks, these individualistic concerns are sometimes channeled into more universalistic and global claims, resulting in what are called "individual collective actions" (Micheletti and McFarland 2011). The Spanish movement Indignados is a good example of how individual concerns about job precariousness can potentially result in a collective – albeit "single-issue" – mobilization.

In our contribution, we aim to shed new light on the emerging profiles of 'political citizens' and on the potential triggering role of job precariousness on individual repertoires of action among young people in three European cities (Lyon in France, Turin in Italy and Cologne in Germany). With the label "political citizens" we intend to describe citizens' sets of behaviors and actions that are put forward in determined communities in defense (or opposition) of specific political causes thanks to, or in spite of, their civil, political and legal rights and duties. As we will describe in the next sections, these sets of actions can range from the most diffuse political actions (i.e. voting at a national or local election) to more unconventional ones that are enacted outside the framework of institutionalized representative democracy (e.g. boycotts, blockades, petitions etc.).

Despite cross-national differences regarding the triggers for collective mobilization in recent years, one of the most relevant concerns for all young European people nowadays is represented by job insecurity. Regarding the effect of the occupational status on political participation, scholarly literature dates back to the 1970s. The topic has been addressed from distinct perspectives: on the one hand, those who believe that an individual – when excluded from social networks built in the workplace – tends to be socially and politically alienated (Lazarsfeld et al. 1981; Gallie and Paugam 2000; Pateman 1970); on the other, those who believe that unemployment might provide a stimulus for collective action and increase political participation (della Porta 2008; Piven and Cloward 1977; Demazière and Pignoni 1998; Maurer and Mayer 2001). Classic literature on political participation has dealt with this issue by focusing mainly on full-time employment or unemployment, without paying much attention to part-time jobs, fixed-term contracts or occasional-seasonal jobs. Only recently, a novel strand of stud-

ies (Corbetta and Colloca 2013; Eichhorst and Marx 2015; Emmenegger et al. 2015; Marx 2014; Marx and Picot 2013) started to explore atypical workers' political preferences in voting, without dwelling on different political activities.

This article provides new insights into the topic of (precarious) youth political participation from both the theoretical and empirical perspectives. Theoretically, we will first address the existing limitations in the literature by proposing a comprehensive framework that includes a broad set of actions covering both institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of political action (i.e. petitions, public demonstrations, illegal and violent actions). In addition, we will display the concepts of "internal" and "external efficacy" (Lane 1959; Balch 1974; Craig et al. 1990; Emmenegger et al. 2015). We will subsequently present our data (section 3) and the case studies (section 4), providing further details about the operationalization and the analytical tools deployed (LCCA – Latent Class Cluster Analysis). In section 5, we will present the empirical findings, concerning cross-national variations of precarious youth preferred political actions and their specific socio-demographic profiles. The final section (section 6) concludes and discusses some of the implications for further scholarly research.

## **2. Precariousness and political participation**

In recent years, little attention has been dedicated to the impact of temporary contracts on political participation. Most of the studies approaching the issue of employment status and political participation fall into two broad categories: those considering the lack of jobs as a boost for collective action and socio-political interest (della Porta e Diani 2006; Piven and Cloward 1977; Demazière and Pignoni 1998; Maurer and Mayer 2001) and those considering the same situation as hindering political participation (Brady et al. 1995; Schlozman et al. 1999; Verba et al. 1978, 1993). Moreover, little attention has been devoted to younger cohorts.

Among the first strand of studies, authors stress the importance of collective action and protest. The focus on precariousness is nowadays well established in the social sciences literature, especially in the field of social movements studies. Scholars have studied precariousness focusing on single countries such as Italy, Greece and Sweden (Choi and Mattoni 2010; della Porta et al. 2015; Mattoni 2012; Murgia and Armano 2012; Murgia and Selmi 2012; Jakonen 2015; Kasimis et al. 2015; Vogiatzoglou 2015), circumscribed waves of mobilizations – such as Occupy Wall-Street or the Indignados movement (Butler 2011; Schram 2013) – or specific labor market segments such as academia (Lempiäinen 2015). Others have described the so-called "precarariat" as an emerging social class, outlining its difficulties in organizing self-representation and self-advocacy

mechanisms (Kalleberg 2011; Standing 2011; Vance 2012). The existing literature on this topic usually considers precarious youth as a protest-prone social group, without disentangling the effects of occupational status, age and context. While the vast qualitative literature has deepened our knowledge about the motivations, attitudes and identities as developed by precarious youth, little (if any) attention has been devoted to the vast array of political behaviors – also known as “political repertoires of action” or “repertoires of contention” (Tilly 2008, 2010; Traugott 1995) that might be considered as “typical” of precarious youth.

A “repertoire of contention” includes a “whole set of means [a group] has for making claims of different type on different individuals” (Tilly 1986: 2). These sets of means are constrained in time and space and “are rooted in the shared subculture of the activists. [...] Usually forms of action emerge as a by-product of everyday experiences” (della Porta 2013: 1081). In this sense, repertoires of actions change over time, develop new networks, adopt new channels of communication, shift their underlying logic (e.g. from winning to convincing) and reflect different generational tastes (ibidem).

Among the second strand of literature (i.e. occupational disadvantage hindering political participation), scholars studied the nexus existing between individual socio-demographic characteristics and political participation in a more quantitative fashion. The so-called socio-economic status (SES) model – based upon education, income and occupation (Brady et al. 1995) – shows that employed people are more politically engaged than the unemployed (Anderson 2001; Schur 2003; Solt 2008; Schlozman et al. 1999). However, any attempt of quantitative analysis often falls short regarding the conceptualization of political participation, precariousness and youth. In terms of political participation, scholars are usually more focused on its determinants rather than on the repertoires of action *per se*. Thus, authors still adopt cumulative scales (Driskell et al. 2008; Eggert and Giugni 2010; Schur 2003) or repertoires of action derived from the literature without questioning their internal and external validity (Brady et al. 1995; Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; Marien et al. 2010).

Considering the few works on political participation assessing the impact of occupational condition, they sometimes tend to over-simplify the reality using causal linear explanatory models. On the one hand, following the “insider-outsider” theoretical framework, they assess the impact of employment on the rate of participation (Anderson 2001; Brady et al. 1995; Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; Driskell et al. 2008; Schlozman et al. 1999; Van Der Meer and Van Ingen 2009), rarely considering occupational situations located “in between” regular employment and unemployment (Marx and Picot 2013; Schur 2003); while on the other, they fail to critically address the methodological issues behind their approaches (Kim 2013).

Regarding youth, the most insightful research crossing the dimensions of youth and employment status is often comparative. Some scholars have compared unemployed to employed youth, finding predispositions towards disruptive and illegal actions on the part of the former (Breakwell 1986). More recently, some studies have found that youth are generally little interested in politics or even repelled by it (Bay and Blekesaune 2002; Pilkington and Pollock 2015). In terms of political engagement, for many years young unemployed were considered to be either marginalized from political participation or engaged in radical activities (Pacheco and Plutzer 2008). Only in the last decade, scholars started to question these findings, taking into consideration the mediating effect of social capital (Baglioni et al. 2015; Lorenzini and Giugni 2012).

Finally, the few authors interested in the issue of precariousness and the political sphere have produced mixed results, often limited by their approach or by the data adopted. For example, using the American National Election Survey, Schur (2003) tested the impact of several variables concerning work on a composite eight-item index of political participation.<sup>1</sup> She found that both the number of hours worked per week and the type of contract (temporary vs. open-ended) were not significantly associated with political involvement.

Other authors have been working on the issue, limiting their analyses to political attitudes (e.g. interest in politics, voting preferences, self-positioning on the left-right continuum) rather than political actions. They assessed the impact of temporary contracts on political preferences at the European level (Marx 2014) or in Italy (Corbetta and Colloca 2013), on party identification in Germany (Marx and Picot 2013) or on theoretically-driven modes of participation (Bassoli and Monticelli 2011). In the first case, using the European Social Survey on fifteen countries, Marx (2014) shows that “temporary workers neither appear to massively defect from social democracy nor do they support deregulatory parties or show any signs of political disenchantment” (2014: 150). As for Italy, Corbetta and Colloca (2013) found that precarious workers are different from both unemployed and standard workers: “they did not share with unemployed people this feeling of political disillusion; in addition, they appeared ideologically to be the most leftist group - slightly more leftist than regular workers” (Corbetta and Colloca 2013: 16). In respect of Germany, Marx and Picot (2013) suggest that atypical workers tend to prefer small New Left parties rather than traditional Social Democratic ones, given that the former are much better at representing these voters’ pref-

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<sup>1</sup> The index is a scale based upon eight items: contributed money to political party or candidate; wrote or spoke to elected representative or public official; attended political meeting; wrote letter to newspaper; contributed money to organization trying to influence government policy or legislation; otherwise worked with groups or on one’s own to change government laws or policies; worked with others on community problem; and voted.

ferences for redistributive policies and protest claims against the status quo. Finally, Bassoli and Monticelli (2011) underline the presence of a new “centrality model” for precarious Italian youth. In particular, they find that, when it comes to non-institutionalized political participation, the most active citizens are women and migrants with a precarious job, thus prefiguring a sort of “precarious-specific” centrality model displaying opposite characteristics respect to the one theorized by Milbrath and Goel<sup>2</sup> (1977).

### *2.1. Modes of political participation*

Regarding individual engagement in political activities, it is important to clarify the ongoing debate concerning the nature of political behaviors and political participation, in terms of what is and what is not a political action. In this research, we agree with those scholars who consider political participation as encompassing all those activities influencing the political sphere, from diffused and conventional behaviors (voting) to more indirect activities such as participation through politically-conscious consumerism acts (Stolle et al. 2005).

While scholars have engaged in wide debates about the range of political behaviors, a consistent part of the literature focuses on the so-called “modes” of political participation. In the first studies assessing the importance of individual determinants on political participation, the centrality model was developed, suggesting that the more an individual’s social position is central in the social system, the more she will be prone to participate (Milbrath 1965; Milbrath and Goel 1977). Although the working condition was not explicitly addressed, a secure and stable job position might be also considered as a determinant of political participation (Schur 2003). In the centrality model, political behaviors are considered along a continuum of intensity, from “passive” behaviors (e.g. reading a newspaper) to direct engagement in the political arena (e.g. being elected).

This model was challenged in the early-1960s by Pizzorno (1966) and Verba and Nie (1972). While the former (Pizzorno 1966) stress the social limitations of the centrality model, which holds valid only within a given sub-culture, the latter critique (Verba and Nie 1972) re-shapes the concept of political participation along multidimensional lines,

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<sup>2</sup> In their study *Political Participation: How and why Do People Get Involved in Politics?* the authors come forth with a detailed explanation of the factors that might determine a greater involvement in politics, conceptualizing political participation according to a hierarchical and cumulative model (Ruedin 2011). Among these factors, we find an average level of education, an average age, the gender (male), the number of personal contacts, the time spent in the community etc.

i.e. different “centralities” entail different modes of participation. In the words of Teorell et al. (2007: 36), “the question of whether political participation comes in certain bundles, or “modes”, has attracted considerable scholarly interest over the years [...]. The question usually asked, however, is whether there is a systematic pattern underlying people’s choice of actions from such a list [of specific behaviors]. The idea, then, is that specific kinds of activities cluster together to form a distinct dimension of political participation”. In Dalton’s (2008a: 36) words, “a person who performs one act from a particular cluster is likely to perform other acts from the same cluster, but not necessarily activities from another cluster”. These clusters are widely known as “modes of political participation” (Aars and Strømsnes 2007; Baglioni et al. 2015; Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; De Rooij 2012; Van Der Meer and Van Ingen 2009; Hooghe and Marien 2013).

A recent and comprehensive study on modes of participation stresses the importance of two dimensions, namely the channel of expression and the mechanism of influence (Teorell et al. 2007). The first dimension is articulated, in turn, into two broad types: political actions can take place within the framework of representative democracy or can be expressed through extra-representational channels. Regarding the “mechanism of influence” as the second dimension, many authors rely on Hirschman’s (1970) well-known distinction between “exit” and “voice”. In their words (Teorell et al. 2007: 341): “To start with the representational modes, [...] there are two ways of expressing party preferences: one can vote for parties, or one can work for them. Voting is an “exit”-based mechanism for political influence [...]. Once quality deteriorates, [...] voters fail to turn out or vote for another party. Party activity, by contrast, is a “voice”-based mechanism of influence”. We could try to apply the same dual structure to extra-representational modes, whereby the “exit”-based activity would be political consumerism (political consumerism, boycotts, etc.), while the “voice”-based one would be protest and disruptive action (illegal and violent actions). While political consumerism works accordingly to market-like dynamics, protests and disruptive actions are based upon the flow of information and the confrontational activities orchestrated towards (and usually against) the public or the elites (tab.1).

Table 1 - Modes of political participation

Modes of political participation		Channel of Expression	
		Representational	Extra-Representational
Mechanism of Influence	Exit	Voting	Political Consumerism
	Voice	Party Activity	Protest, Disruptive Action

Source: adapted by the authors from Teorell et al. 2007.

## 2.2. ...and the occupational status issue

In scholarly literature, the modes of participation are either tested or used to run analyses on specific data. Scholars have been developing a long stream of research on the individual determinants of participation, often applying a linear approach aimed at measuring the impact of socio-economic features such as education (Verba and Nie 1972), civic involvement (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998), social capital (Putnam et al. 1993), etc. Looking for potential determinants, existing literature has also examined more structured variables, both endogenous – such as the sense of political efficacy (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010) – and exogenous, such as political opportunity structures (Baglioni et al. 2008). However, little attention has been devoted to occupational status, which is often treated as an unproblematic individual variable (Anderson 2001; Brady et al. 1995; Driskell et al. 2008; Schur 2003; Van Der Meer and Van Ingen 2009). In the most refined analyses, the dichotomy “part-time vs. full-time” job is considered (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; Schlozman et al. 1999), although no attention is devoted to the increasing role of the “precariat” as a new emerging social group (Standing 2011).

## 2.3 Looking for ideal-typical “political citizens”

The vast bulk of the literature on politicization of precarious youth comes from the field of social movements studies. Scholars have been discussing the importance of identity and job condition focusing on the most politically active groups or on those with a high self-consciousness. This approach can sometimes prove “reductionist” be-



cause it implies that precarious youth are more prone towards protest-related activities, without allowing for a counterfactual to emerge. Of course, this is plausible given the low degree of satisfaction towards the *status quo* and the deprived situation in which precarious youth live. However, if the salience of the cleavage is sufficiently strong, a further hypothesis could emerge, whereby the relevance of precariousness in contemporary European societies could be a trigger for an overall activation of the youth, not limited to protest, but rather encompassing a larger repertoire of actions. Therefore, we will first run the LCCA analysis across cities to identify ideal-typical profiles of political participation, before trying to compare the different shares of precarious youth in the emerging profiles of participation. Our research questions can be summarized as follows:

- Is it possible to identify some common profiles of “political citizens” across cities? In other words, can we recognize the “modes of political participation” – as they are described by the literature – among the surveyed European youth?
- Are precarious workers over-represented in certain clusters (e.g. contentious forms of political participation such as protest, illegal and violent actions) compared with others?

### **3. Data, methodology and operationalization**

#### *3.1. Sample*

The dataset comprises 2,591 individuals belonging to age bracket 18-34, interviewed with CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interview) methodology in autumn and winter 2009/2010 in Turin (Italy), Cologne (Germany) and Lyon (France)<sup>3</sup>. This dataset is part of the EU-funded research project YOUNEX<sup>3</sup>. The subsample we use is equally divided into two groups of individuals: temporary workers (holding temporary, seasonal or project-based contracts) and a control group comprising workers with permanent contracts who have worked in the last twelve months and for at least twelve months in the same work place<sup>4</sup>. Some scholars (Murgia 2010) consider precariousness as a subjectively perceived condition rather than an objectively measurable condition. However, it is very difficult to operationalize subjectively perceived conditions in a quantita-

<sup>3</sup> See Acknowledgments.

<sup>4</sup> Employees working in their family business have been excluded from the control group.

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tive analysis like the one presented in this paper and many authors prefer to use the temporariness of job contracts as a proxy for precariousness (Corbetta and Colloca 2013, De Witte and Näswall 2003)<sup>5</sup>. In the same way, given the information available in the dataset of YOUNEX project and given the age range of the interviewees (18-34 years old), we assume that having a temporary contract is a reliable proxy for a perceived precarious job condition. While the differences in socio-demographic composition across cities are relevant, some insightful information emerges looking specifically at the subsample of people with a temporary job contract (tab. 2). Only a few variables show substantial differences between precarious and regular workers across cities, namely education, age and internal efficacy.

**Table 2 - Sample socio-demographic characteristics**

	Lyon		Cologne		Turin	
	Precari-ous	Regu-lar	Precari-ous	Regu-lar	Precari-ous	Regu-lar
Gender (female)	44,6%	39,5%	53,3%	57,0%	61,9%	59,1%
Citizenship	97,6%	97,7%	89,8%	92,4%	97,9%	96,6%
Lower secondary education	19,4%	21,3%	23,5%	23,9%	*	11,8% 19,5%
Upper secondary education	60,1%	54,7%	32,1%	39,4%		68,0% 60,4%
Tertiary education	20,5%	24,0%	44,4%	36,7%	**	20,2% 20,1%
Young (18-24 y.o)	25,0%	27,9%	28,7%	8,6%	*	61,0% 50,8%
Satisfied with policies about precariousness	76,4%	74,9%	61,9%	60,6%		42,5% 39,5%
High external efficacy	59,0%	52,4%	† 57,2%	51,4%		32,4% 30,8%
High internal efficacy	30,7%	38,1%	* 44,0%	37,8%	†	27,7% 34,7%
Trust in national government	51,3%	49,6%	56,0%	56,8%		42,2% 39,2%
N.	410	395	411	407		484 484

† significant at 10%; \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%; \*\*\* significant at 0,1%.

Source: authors' calculations.

<sup>5</sup> We ran a consistency test between the temporary working condition and salary. There is a positive correlation between holding temporary contract and having lower income (BQ11 in the questionnaire), between holding temporary contract not being satisfied with job conditions (SD1 in the questionnaire) and between holding temporary contract finding difficult to cope with present income (BQ13 in the questionnaire). As in most articles, the decision to opt for the contract type rather than wage has to be traced back to the lack of consistent and trustworthy information on the latter variable.

### 3.2. Methodology

The use of regression methods has proven valuable to test the socio-economic status (SES) model across time and space, allowing the literature to grow in comparative terms. The closing gender gap, the relevance of social capital, the importance of educational attainment, etc. are research topics based upon studies deploying linear modeling. However, the so-called “linear thinking” falls short when assessing specific targets such as migrants (Kim 2012), Roma (Dowley and Silver 2002) or precarious youth (Basoli and Monticelli 2011). A relational approach based upon Bourdieu (1979) is better equipped to assess the specific features of political participation of social strata (Kim 2012) because it allows identifying the relationship between different social classes. Moreover, social class can hardly be measured by just one single variable, in this case occupational disadvantage; rather, the true nature of a social class lies in the relationship with other classes and the related social practices. Therefore, to understand the political participation of precarious youth, it becomes sensitive to compare it with that of regular workers. As Kim (2012:6-7) underlined, “researchers [...] often try to fit the reality into the specific methodological tools they feel comfortable with, such as linear equations, rather than coming up with a proper new model. Much of this criticism, originally formulated against conventional sociological practice, applies to political participation literature as well. In the literature, for example, researchers exclusively relied on linear regression and its variants to identify and compare the effects of independent factors on dependent variable – whether respondents vote or not”.

Thus, we did not rely on cluster analysis (which yields different results for different sub-groups), but rather on latent class cluster analysis (LCCA). Assuming that the research population is heterogeneous, LCCA divides the population into homogenous clusters based upon a given set of variables. Despite resembling factor analysis, LCCA presents some relevant differences. While factor analysis constrains the underlying factors to be orthogonal (and thus uncorrelated – using either the Varimax method or to a lesser extent, the Oblimin one), LCCA allows each single item to be associated with more than one underlying latent dimension. Accordingly, LCCA enables examining precarious workers’ identity across a long list of political acts, deriving different and complementary probabilistic profiles according to a pre-established number of clusters<sup>6</sup>.

In our analysis, we consider 25 covariates (18 related to the political repertoire of action and 7 socio-demographic controls) that are subsequently used to shape different

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<sup>6</sup> The number of clusters is usually set according to the existent literature or based upon research hypotheses to be tested by the researcher.

ideal-typical profiles through LCCA. We opted to run LCCA enforcing the hypothesis of five clusters adapting Teorell's modes of participation model (four modes of political participation, plus the cluster including the inactive citizens). Finally, each mode of participation was linked to the relative contribution – in probabilistic terms – of each socio-demographic covariate.

### 3.3. Operationalization

Information on the political activities was gathered using four different questions<sup>7</sup>: two regarding voting<sup>8</sup>, one listing a wide range of political activities<sup>9</sup> and one regarding party membership<sup>10</sup>. We subsequently created as many categorical dummy variables valued 1 for those who enacted each specific action, and zero otherwise. Regarding occupational status, we created a categorical dummy variable coded 1 for those holding a fix term contract and zero otherwise. Finally, we included a number of socio-demographic control variables in the LCCA. Specifically, we control for gender, citizenship, educational attainment (below secondary education, secondary education, tertiary education) and age (below 24 years old, or above). Moreover, we control for subjectively perceived variables such as internal and external efficacies to indirectly assess the presence of group-consciousness led activation. In this case, we also transformed the answers provided following a Likert scale 1 to 4 (from “strongly disagree” to “totally agree”) into as many dummy variables with value 1 in case of high sense of efficacy and zero otherwise. The first one – internal efficacy – scores zero if respondents agreed with the statement “there are times in which politics is so complicated that people like me don't understand what's going on” (low sense of internal efficacy), and 1 other-

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<sup>7</sup> The full questionnaire can be downloaded from the link <http://www.younex.unige.ch/>.

<sup>8</sup> “Did you vote in the last national election?” and “Did you vote in the last local election?”

<sup>9</sup> “There are different ways of trying to improve things in society or to help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you for such reasons done any of the following?”. 15 items then followed: contacted a politician; contacted a government or local government official; worked in a political party; worked in a political action group; worn or displayed a badge, sticker or poster; signed a petition; taken part in a public demonstration; boycotted certain products; deliberately bought certain products for political reasons; donated money to a political organization or group; taken part in a strike; contacted the media; contacted a solicitor or a judicial body for non-personal reasons; participated in an illegal action (e.g. blockade, building occupation); and participated in a violent action (e.g. violent demonstration, physical attack).

<sup>10</sup> “There are different ways of participating in social and political life, therefore we would like to ask some questions about your personal involvement. In the following, we name some different types of organizations, for each of them could you please tell me: if you are (or were) a member?” Different items – including the political party – followed the question.

wise. The second one – external efficacy – is coded 1 if respondents disagreed with the statement “parties are interested only in our votes, not in our opinions” or agreed with the second item, namely “people like me have for sure an influence on government politics”. Political trust is measured considering the level of trust in the national government. An eleven-point scale was dichotomized, scoring 1 for those holding a trust level higher than 6 and zero otherwise.

#### **4. Case studies**

Before displaying the results of our analysis, it is important to describe the three urban case studies, their specificities and their socio-economic environment. Turin, Lyon and Cologne have shared the same path of economic development since the end of the II World War, characterized by the expansion of heavy industry and the creation of large communities of blue-collar workers. In the last two decades, all three cities have been subject to a severe process de-industrialization, entailing mass dismissals and rising unemployment rates amongst low-medium skilled workers. Parallel to the decline of the heavy industries, the service sector has expanded and developed quickly together with the demand for young, highly-educated and skilled professional workers.

The three cities have a distinctive political background and feature specific levels of political activism. In particular, Turin has a long history of conflictual relationship between the Catholic and Communist traditions (Bassoli and Theiss 2014; Bassoli 2016), which provides the context for higher level of political participation on average (Baglioni et al. 2015) compared to Lyon and Cologne. As for these two cities, their size and prominence in the national context directly influence the public discourse on precariousness, although Lyon displays a limited activation on the precarious issue. A recent study (Baglioni and Giugni 2014a) allows us to assess the level of politicization around the topic, taking into consideration the existence of “single-issue” social movements and associational networks among civil society. Regarding the presence of social movements organizations (SMOs) mobilizing on the topic of precarious work, Baglioni and Giugni (2014b: 6) identify relevant ongoing activities in Turin (seven groups) and Cologne (three groups). By contrast, Lyon features only one organization that works on social justice and trade agreements. In terms of the rest of civil society, the cities portrayed (in 2008) display a vast range of organizations (24 in Lyon and 50 in Cologne and Turin). Notably, the majority of these organizations is not focused on the issue of precarious work, rather more broadly on (un)employment. Nonetheless, the issue of precarious work has come powerfully to the fore in the last decade in Turin (Baglioni and

Bassoli 2009; Giorgi and Caruso 2015) and Cologne (Lahusen and Grimmer 2009: 42), with different organizations working, albeit not exclusively, on the issue.

## 5. Empirical findings

The LCCA conducted on the sample led to insightful empirical results.

The most striking is that Teorell's modes of political participation model previously described is only mildly reflected by the data. In all three cities under study, the emerging clusters are much more nuanced and the items included do not match Teorell's model. In the German city of Cologne, the largest profiling cluster comprises what we have labeled – following Verba and Nie (1972) – as “ceremonial” citizens (tab.3).

The main political activity in which these citizens engage is voting at national elections. People belonging to this cluster are (in probabilistic terms) young adults, mostly women (59%), with tertiary education and a medium-high level of trust in national government. The probability of belonging to this cluster and having a temporary job is the lowest among the five clusters, yet still quite high (38%). The second cluster (by size) – labeled “political consumers” – includes citizens who participate mainly through petitions, boycotting and “boycotting” activities (Copeland 2014; Yates 2011; Winchester et al. 2015). They are mostly women (62%), with a temporary job (63%) and a tertiary education (50%). Internal and external efficacies display average percentages at 43% and 56%, respectively. These findings are in line with the bulk of literature on political consumerism stating that the average “political consumer” tends to be a highly-educated woman in her thirties (Forno and Ceccarini 2006; Graziano and Forno 2012; Forno and Graziano 2014; Micheletti 2003; Stolle et al. 2005). Moreover, the fact that a relatively high share of these citizens holds a temporary job tells us that these forms of political activism attract “that fraction of the middle class that possesses high amounts of cultural capital but relatively less economic capital” (Graziano and Forno 2012: 128). Even if this finding might sound counter-intuitive, recent research has extensively illustrated that political consumerism assumes organizational characteristics and participatory features that are more similar to “collective” social and political movements rather than individualistic or atomized political practices, thus being able to include less wealthy categories such as students, temporary workers, unemployed and elderly people (Bosi and Zamponi 2015; Forno 2006; Graziano and Forno 2012; Micheletti 2003). The third cluster incorporates the “disruptive activists” (22%), with these citizens displaying the highest percentages of the item “violent action”. The people belonging to this group have lower trust in national governments and low internal and external efficacies relative to the previous clusters. These characteristics are usually interpreted by

the literature on social movements as triggers for collective action (see for example della Porta and Diani 2006; McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 1998).

**Table 3 - Political citizens' profiles in Cologne<sup>11</sup>**

COLOGNE	<i>Ceremoni- als</i>	<i>Political Consumers</i>	<i>Disruptive Activists</i>	<i>Claimants</i>	<i>Local Activists</i>
<i>Cluster Size</i>	36%	27%	22%	9%	6%
<i>Political Actions</i>					
Voting national	√				√
Voting local					
Contacted a politician				√	
Contacted a government official				√	
Worked in a political party					√
Worked in a political action group					√
Display a badge					√
Signed a petition		√			
Taken part in a public demonstration					√
Boycotted certain products		√			
Deliberately bought certain products for political reasons		√			
Donated money to a political organization or group					√
Taken part in a strike					√
Contacted the media				√	
Contacted a solicitor or a judicial body for non-personal reasons				√	
Participated in an illegal action					√
Participated in a violent action			√		
Party membership					√
<i>Socio-demographic characteristics</i>					
Gender (female)	59%	62%	59%	37%	20%
Young (18-24 y.o)	13%	10%	17%	10%	10%
Precarious	38%	63%	53%	47%	47%
High trust in government	64%	56%	45%	66%	56%
High external efficacy	56%	54%	40%	66%	77%
High internal efficacy	43%	47%	23%	47%	74%
Educational level					
Lower secondary educ. or lower	20%	13%	43%	16%	14%
Upper secondary education	34%	37%	40%	29%	39%

Source: authors' calculations using Latent Gold.

<sup>11</sup> The selected cells for each profile are those displaying the *highest probabilities*, and thus considered most representative of each profile. The percentages referring to clusters' size and socio-demographic characteristics have been rounded up to ease data interpretation.

The fourth cluster comprehends what we have called the “claimants” (9%), as citizens that act by contacting politicians, government officials, the media and judicial bodies to a greater degree than everyone else in the sample. In probabilistic terms, the citizens of this cluster have a tertiary education degree (55%) and – as one would logically expect – a high sense of external efficacy (66%): in other words, these citizens are confident that they have a sufficiently strong voice and agency to influence the public debate. Finally, despite being the smallest in terms of size (6%), the last cluster is perhaps the most interesting. Looking carefully at the political actions characterizing it, it is possible to outline a profile that contradicts the well-known divide “institutionalized vs. non-institutionalized” political participation (Marien et al. 2010; Stolle and Hooghe 2011). Actions such as voting at the local level, party activity and party membership go in hand with actions pertaining to the “extra-representative” sphere, including taking part in public demonstrations, strikes or engaging in illegal actions. We labeled this profile “local activists” since the range of political actions and the relative outcomes seem to primarily affect the local arena. This cluster sketches a pattern of participation that we could define as “mixed”, combining repertoires of actions that pertain to different areas: on the one hand, the most traditional channel of political engagement, namely political parties; and on the other, a range of disruptive, confrontational and “protest-like” activities (demonstrations, strikes, illegal actions such as blockades and occupations). The socio-demographic characteristics of this cluster are also somehow peculiar, featuring mostly men (80%), older than twenty-four, with secondary or tertiary education degrees and high perceived levels of external and internal efficacy (77% and 74%, respectively). In terms of their occupational status, the average “local activist” has a 47% probability of being a precarious worker.

The cities of Lyon and Turin display similar profiles. In fact, in both cities it is possible to observe the following five clusters: inactive citizens, protesters, ceremonials, party activists and extra-representational activists. Although the clusters “inactives” and “ceremonials” present very similar repertoires of actions (or non-action, in the case of the “inactive”) between the two cities, looking at their size and the socio-demographic probabilistic profiles, it is possible to notice some meaningful differences.



In Lyon (tab.4), the cluster of the “inactive” citizens is the largest in probabilistic terms (43%), while in Turin (tab.5) is the third (12%), preceded by “ceremonials” (59%) and “protesters” (19%). Nonetheless, the most striking difference concerns the occupational status covariate: in the Italian cluster of the “inactive” citizens, the probability of having a temporary contract is 29%, while in the equivalent French cluster it is 51%. In Lyon, the second cluster in terms of size is “protesters” (25%), who are characterized by signing petitions, taking part in public demonstrations or strikes and participating in violent actions. The subsequent cluster by size is the “ceremonials” cluster (17%), in which – interestingly – national and local voting is accompanied by boycotting activities

Moreover, according to our probabilistic analysis, the average “ceremonial” person has an extremely high sense of internal efficacy (100%) and very high trust in the national government (81%). The fourth and fifth clusters (“party activists” and “extra-representational activists”) are smaller in size (9% and 6%, respectively), although again they are the most newsworthy in terms of repertoires of action. The average Lyonaise party activist is a member of a political party in which she is usually working, as well as being active in contacting politicians and donating money to political organizations and groups. She is on average a woman (72%), with a very high sense of external efficacy (97%) and quite high level of internal efficacy (55%).

In terms of “extra-representational” activists, their repertoire of action includes working in political action groups, displaying badges, contacting the media and judicial bodies for non-personal reasons and participating in illegal actions. Looking at the socio-demographic characteristics of the average activist in this cluster, a “centrality model” of its own seems to emerge: the average activist is, in fact, a man, above twenty-four years old, with an upper secondary level of education, a stable job and high trust in the national government.

**Table 4 - Political citizens' profiles in Lyon**

LYON	<i>Inactive</i>	<i>Protesters</i>	<i>Ceremonials</i>	<i>Party Activists</i>	<i>Extra-representational Activists</i>
<i>Cluster Size</i>	43%	25%	17%	9%	6%
<i>Political Actions</i>			√		
Voting national			√		
Voting local					
Contacted a politician				√	
Contacted a government official				√	
Worked in a political party				√	
Worked in a political action group					√
Display a badge					√
Signed a petition		√			
Taken part in a public demonstration		√			
Boycotted certain products			√		
Deliberately bought certain products for political reasons				√	
Donated money to a political organization or group				√	
Taken part in a strike		√			
Contacted the media					√
Contacted a solicitor or a judicial body for non-personal reasons					√
Participated in an illegal action					√
Participated in a violent action		√			
Party membership				√	
<i>Socio-demographic characteristics</i>					
Gender (female)	44%	36%	33%	72%	13%
Young (18-24 y.o)	12%	16%	11%	10%	-
Precarious	51%	54%	63%	56%	-
High trust in government	48%	27%	81%	62%	70%
High external efficacy	55%	45%	53%	97%	45%
High internal efficacy	27%	10%	100%	55%	34%
Educational level					
Lower secondary educ. or lower	24%	17%	12%	27%	16%
Upper secondary education	56%	57%	67%	38%	72%
Tertiary education	20%	26%	21%	36%	13%

Source: authors' calculations using Latent Gold.

In the city of Turin (tab.5), the distribution of political actions across the five clusters is slightly different. The largest cluster is represented by 'ceremonial' citizens (59%), who on average display the highest percentages in national and local voting. The second cluster – "protesters" (19%) – includes the items "taking part in a public demonstration" and "participating in violent actions". Following the "inactives" cluster, we find – similarly to Lyon – the "extra-representatives" (9%) and the "party activists" (2%). The "extra-representative" cluster incorporates a very diversified range of political actions, including working in a political action group, displaying badges, signing petitions, boycotting and "boycotting", taking part in strikes, contacting the media and participating in illegal actions. The average activist in this cluster is a woman (65%), with a precarious job (67%), a tertiary level of education (53%), a low level of trust in the national government (19%) and low levels of internal and external efficacies (30% and 31%, respectively). The fifth and final cluster – "party activists" is the "precarious" cluster (84%) in the case of Turin. Interestingly, together with the expected repertoire of actions (party membership, contacting politicians, government officials or judicial bodies, working in a political party), we also find involvement in violent actions. The average party activist is a man, older than twenty-four, with a precarious job and very high trust in the national government.

In the final section, we will try to conclude and discuss our findings in light of the most recent debate on the conceptualization of political participation.

**Table 5 - Political citizens' profiles in Turin**

TURIN	<i>Ceremoni-als</i>	<i>Protesters</i>	<i>Inactive</i>	<i>Extra-repre-sentative Activists</i>	<i>Party Activists</i>
<i>Cluster Size</i>	59%	19%	12%	9%	2%
<i>Political Actions</i>					
Voting national	√				
Voting local	√				
Contacted a politician					√
Contacted a government official					√
Worked in a political party					√
Worked in a political action group				√	
Display a badge				√	
Signed a petition				√	
Taken part in a public demonstration		√			
Boycotted certain products				√	
Deliberately bought certain products for political reasons				√	
Donated money to a political organization or group				√	
Taken part in a strike				√	
Contacted the media				√	
Contacted a solicitor or a judicial body for non-personal reasons					√
Participated in an illegal action				√	
Participated in a violent action		√			
Party Membership					√
<i>Socio-demographic characteristics</i>					
Gender (female)	61%	54%	66%	65%	42%
Young (18-24 y.o)	50%	61%	45%	32%	30%
Precarious	52%	51%	29%	67%	84%
High trust in government	45%	31%	40%	19%	91%
High external efficacy	32%	30%	25%	30%	15%
High internal efficacy	31%	31%	33%	31%	37%
Educational level					
Lower secondary educ. or lower	18%	6%	19%	6%	-
Upper secondary education	67%	70%	65%	41%	100%
Tertiary education	14%	24%	15%	53%	-

Source: authors' calculations using Latent Gold.

## **6. Discussion and conclusion: an evolving and shifting picture**

This article's goal is to explore the existence of "political citizens" profiles across three European cities and to ascertain the role of precarious work on the repertoires of action deployed. For this purpose, we have applied a technique called latent class cluster analysis (LCCA) to a large sample including young precarious and regular workers. This technique allowed us to derive five descriptive probabilistic profiles for each city, as described in the previous section.

The main contribution of this paper relates to the ongoing debate concerning contemporary political participation forms and patterns (Bauman 2007; 2008; Li and Marsh 2008; Marsh et al. 2007; Teorell et al. 2007; Pattie et al. 2004; Putnam 2000; Stolle et al. 2005). In particular, since the 1990s many authors have claimed that political engagement in contemporary Western countries is rapidly and inevitably declining, particularly in its most institutionalized expressions, driven by a growing discontent and mistrust towards national governments and supranational institutions (see for example, Kaase 1999; Putnam 2000). However, a new wave of studies has given new impetus to the ongoing debate in the last decade, underlining the emergence of new, individualized, usually "single-issue" or "cause-oriented" forms of political participation (Dalton 2008a, 2008b; Stolle and Hooghe 2005). These authors stress that "citizens are not apathetic; rather they are alienated from a political system that does not allow them a *real* [...] voice" (Li and Marsh 2008: 248). Dalton raises a similar argumentation in his study on political participation and citizenship norms in the United States, challenging the mainstream discourse on declining political engagement in Western countries: "The new style of citizenship seeks to place more control over political activity in the hands of the citizenry. These changes in participation make greater demands on the participants. At the same time, these activities can increase public pressure on political elites. Citizen participation is becoming more closely linked to citizens' influence. Rather than democracy being at risk, this represents an opportunity to expand and enrich democratic participation" (Dalton 2008a: 94). According to this interpretation, citizens disengage from representational and institutionalized forms of political participation moving towards individualized, personalized and "micro" political actions. The rise of political consumerism in both its individualized (boycotting, "boycotting", sustainable and ethical consumption) and collective expressions (solidarity purchasing groups, sustainable community movements) is probably the most fitting example of this phenomenon. Another noteworthy example of this shift in the modes of political participation is represented by online political participation (Dalisay et al. 2016; Gibson et al. 2013; Hosch-Dayican 2014; Oser et al. 2013; Vesnic-Alujevic 2012).

In our paper, we have tested an adjusted version of Teorell's modes of participation model made up by five clusters, comprehending both representational and extra-representational modes, declined – in turn – according to Hirschman's "exit-voice" dichotomy (Hirschman 1970). Despite differing across cities, the resulting clusters reflect the change in political participation patterns described above. Even if the "ceremonial" citizens (those mainly engaging in voting) still represent the great majority among the surveyed sample, it is possible to recognize the appearance of "mixed" and "hybrid" clusters such as the "local activists" in Cologne and the "extra-representative" citizens in Lyon and Turin. The repertoire of action of these clusters includes and mixes contacting activities with more contentious and confrontational actions (violent and illegal actions) or institutionalized activities such as party membership in the case of Cologne. Similarly, in the "party activists" clusters in Lyon and Turin, we found extra-representational and individualized activities such as "boycotting" and violent actions.

These findings recall the recent contribution of the Danish sociologist Henrik Bang, who theorizes the emergence of two new groups of participants, namely "expert citizens" and "everyday makers" (Bang 2011; 2010). The former use their skills and expertise to build networks and cooperate with politicians, elites and interest groups, whereas the latter do not believe in governmental and representative channels, thus engaging in "do-it-yourself" activities at the grassroots and local levels. In sum, the approach of these two groups with respect to political power is very different, if not opposite: expert citizens are active in building networks both horizontally and vertically, while everyday makers are active at the local level and interact with transnational networks of local activists. If we consider our probabilistic profiling results, is it possible to recognize a similar dualism between "party activists" and "extra-representational activists" in Lyon and Turin (tabb. 4 and 5): the former do not shy away from contacting the political and governmental elites and from working in political parties, while the latter engage in political and ethical consumerism activities, strikes, disruptive actions and prefer to contact the media rather than governmental or political groups. The case of Cologne is even more meaningful (tab. 3), given that the "party activists" cluster disappears, and – together with the "ceremonials" and "disruptive activists" clusters – we find the "political consumers", the "claimants" and the "local activists". Interestingly, the "local activists" cluster displays – as stated before – a "hybrid" repertoire of action, including both representative and extra-representative activities. The cluster of "claimants" is characterized by all activities related to contacting and can be likened to Bang's description of expert citizens (Bang 2010; 2011).

Recalling our first research question: *Is it possible to identify some ideal-typical profiles of "political citizens" across cities? In other words, can we recognize the "modes of political participation" – as they are described by the literature – among the surveyed*

*European youth?* The answer would be “yes”, it is possible to recognize distinct clusters, although the groupings described in the literature do not seem to fit appropriately our empirical results; rather, our results seem to recall some new scholarly theoretical advances about the personalization and individualization of political engagement (Bauman 2007, 2008; della Porta 2015; Micheletti and McFarland 2011; Rainie and Welmann 2012).

Reflecting upon the second research question: *Are precarious workers over-represented in certain profiles (e.g. contentious forms of political participation such as protest, illegal and violent actions) compared with others?* No, precarious workers are not over-represented in the traditional “contentious” forms of political participation and it is difficult to identify characterizing clusters. Nonetheless, precarious workers are present in all the clusters in all three cities studied (aside from ‘extra-representational activists’ in Lyon), with percentages not far from the average (see tabb. 3, 4 and 5). Indeed, the percentages of temporary workers across probabilistic profiles vary significantly (despite rarely scoring above 70% or below 30%), thus making it difficult to speak about typically “precarious” repertoires of action (or modes of political participation). Nonetheless, it is noticeable that the highest percentages of temporary workers across cities do not appear in the same clusters, but among “political consumerists” in Cologne (63%), the “ceremonials” in Lyon (63%) and the “party activists” in Turin (84%).

The final set of reflections concerns the external and internal validity of the results issued by this paper. The data that we deployed come from local case studies and despite the relevant size of the sample (N=2,591), caution should be used if attempting to generalize our findings to the overall young population in Germany, France or Italy. On this note, we believe that the context plays an important role in shaping and triggering individual political consciousness and engagement. It is no coincidence that in Cologne and Turin – where it is possible to find large and well-developed networks of organizations and associations working specifically on the issue of precariousness – the percentages of precarious workers amongst the most “politically active” clusters were slightly higher than in Lyon, where civil society “single-issue” networks are much less developed.

To conclude, this paper represents an attempt to encourage the dialogue between two strands of research in social sciences, namely sociology of work and political participation studies. The ongoing debate concerning the changing nature of work, the blurring boundaries between work and leisure time, the emergence of the “precarariat” formed in turn by a multitude of different “precarities” striking crosswise all social groups, presents a vast array of parallelisms with the topics investigated by researchers interested in the changing patterns of political participation in contemporary Western

societies. We believe that observing and analyzing conjointly these phenomena has the potential to lead to new understandings and inspiring perspectives.

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