BEYOND ESSENTIALIST AND FUNCTIONALIST ANALYSES OF THE “POLITICISATION OF RELIGION”
The evolution of religious parties in political Catholicism and political Islam

Joerg Baudner
University of Osnabrueck

ABSTRACT: The debate about “politics and religion” has already rejected essentialist claims of fundamental differences in the impact of religion on politics in different cultures. This article will argue that political Islam in Turkey and political Catholicism in Italy and Germany adopted remarkably similar patterns of cross-class coalitions and policies for a “reconciliation of capitalism and democracy”. First, religious parties developed as mass integration parties which already encompassed cross-class coalitions. Second, in the aftermath of political and economic crises these parties transformed into catch-all parties with a pronounced neo-liberal agenda which was given a religious justification. Third, at the same time these parties continued to sponsor policies and organizations which cushioned and supplemented an uneven economic development. Fourth, the parties kept traditional family policies which helped attracting a significant female electorate. “Organized religion” provided religious parties with a potential electorate, ancillary organizations and ideological concepts; however, their role in this political evolution changed. The conclusion will discuss whether these findings can be generalized.

KEYWORDS: Christian democracy, “Muslim democracy”, AKP, politics and religion, party politics.

CORRESPONDING AUTHOR: Joerg Baudner, email: jbaudner@uni-osnabrueck.de
1. Introduction

Diversity has been for some time a paradigm for comparing religions and cultures, and led to a focus on their differences even if linked to a call for tolerance and the appreciation of diversity. An essentialist view on “politics and religion” has even argued that due to the divergent conceptions of the relationship between politics and religion, Christianity and democracy were as closely linked as Islam and authoritarianism (Huntington 1993). This essentialist analysis of the relationship between politics and religion has been comprehensively criticized in recent years. Empirical comparative research on contemporary societies has concluded that there are only minor differences in the population’s democratic values between the different denominations and cultures whereas values differ significantly in regard to gender relations (Gerhards 2007; Inglehart and Norris 2000). In addition, the separation of state and church is rather an idealized self-conception of western democracies than an adequate analysis of the actual relationship between state and church (Stepan 2001).

Moreover, historical analyses have concluded that, contrary to today’s public perception, the Catholic Church was for a significant time in the past “the historical antagonist to liberal democracy” (Minkenberg 2007, 804; see also Stepan 2001; Warner 2002). Whereas Protestantism tended to bolster democracy and civil liberties as the unintended consequence of its historical struggle against the theocratic aspirations of the Catholic Church, the Catholic Church only fully reconciled itself with democracy in the Second Vatican Council (1962-65). “The ultramontane and anti-liberal origins of much of the social Catholicism and Christian Democracy of the late-nineteenth century are now widely accepted by historians” (Conway 2001, 308). Several authors have also highlighted anti-democratic and authoritarian tendencies in the policies and politics of the Vatican and of Catholic parties in the Western Europe of the 1930s. The popes Pius XI (1922-1939) and Pius XII (1939-1958) held at least for some time a benevolent view of the authoritarian regimes of Portugal and Spain and actively supported the Vichy regime in France and the proto-fascist Dollfus regime in Austria because of their authoritarian corporatism and despite their openly undemocratic character (Warner 2002). In fact, countries with fascist regimes were almost all Catholic whereas those countries that avoided dictatorship were all Protestant (Minkenberg 2007, 895).

On the other hand, several authors have pointed out that the contemporary “democratic underdevelopment” of Islamic countries has a number of non-religious motives, in particular in Arab countries. The politics of Islamic countries are complicated by geopolitical factors; “regional factors outweigh religious ones in the Arab world” (Minkenberg 2007, 903). Finally, there is a consensus on the “multivocality” of religion (Stepan 2001, 223): Religious tenets can be used to justify both democratic and autocratic policies; “religious doctrine is a contested field of meaning amenable to a multiplicity of meaning” (Kalyvas 2003). Thus, it seems fair to say that the ac-

1 In addition, it has been claimed that much of the Islamic tradition entailed a “de facto separation of religion and state” (Driessen 2013, 13).
Academic debate has so far concluded that differences in the “political impact of religions”, in particular between Christianity and Islam, have been vastly overestimated and essentialist claims of principal differences have been falsified.

In contrast, a new strand of literature has taken the opposite approach and focused on similarities in the comparison of today’s religious parties with Europe’s religious parties in the late 19th and early 20th century (see Kalyvas 2000) in the “politicization of religion” (Altinordu 2010). Stathis Kalyvas (2003) has compared religious mobilization in Catholic, Islamist and Hindu parties and highlighted the communalities of an anti-system critique, the reconstruction of a religious identity, mass mobilization through selective incentives and the establishment of a cross-class alliance. “Muslim democracy” has become a prominent concept in this regard (Nasr 2005; Hale 2005). It presumes that political Islam could transform into Muslim democracy just as political Catholicism has transformed into Christian democracy; “the imperative of competition inherent in democracy will transform the unsecular tendencies of Muslim Democracy” (Nasr 2005, 15).

However, whereas essentialist approaches have “invested religious ideas and traditions with an over-determinate force on political outcome”, there is a tendency towards “stripping religious ideas and traditions of any particular effect” (Driessen 2013, 3) in a functionalist analysis of the role of religion in the development of political parties. Religion has been portrayed as providing the cement for a cross-class platform (Nasr 2005). Ates Altinordu has analyzed religious revivalism as a trigger for a revival-reaction-politicization process; it provoked social counter-mobilization and state pressure, which in turn bolstered the political organization of religious parties and produced successful religious parties (Altinordu 2010). Kalyvas’ much debated comparison between the ascent to power of the Algerian Islamist party in the 1990s (aborted by a military coup) and the Catholic party in Belgium in the 1890s concluded that the Catholic Church - in contrast to the “decentralized” Islam in Algeria – could provide the guarantee for incumbents that political Catholicism would moderate (Kalyvas 2000). These influential case studies have dealt with the emergence of religious parties and their ascendance to power; they seem to insinuate that religion provides the resources to establish successful parties whilst, when they come to power, a different “game” starts. Thus, the influence of religion on the content of the political struggle, or to put it differently, on policies and politics beyond the narrow-defined realm of religious activities and symbols has often been neglected (for an exception see Hale 2005).

This article will therefore focus on the evolution of political Catholicism and political Islam, and address the question whether the development of parties, which have originated in the political mobilization of these different religions, reveals common characteristics. Does religion, both in political Islam or political Catholicism, infuse a specific set of policies and politics? For this purpose the article will compare the development of the German CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union – Christian Democratic Union) and the Italian Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democracy) as examples of Christian democrats with the development of the Turkish AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - Justice and Development Party).
The Turkish AKP has been given as the benchmark and possibly “the best picture of what Muslim Democracy might become and what it might stand for” (Nasr 2005:23) because its emergence occurred within the context of decades of democratic development (and authoritarian backlashes) since the establishment of an electoral democracy in Turkey in 1950. In Western Europe, Christian democratic parties have been most influential in Germany and Italy since they, first, dominated the politics of two core member states of the European Union and, second, could enact their policies most “undiluted” as they led coalitions with much smaller liberal parties. Christian democrats had emerged earlier in the Netherlands and Belgium (both defined by the use of the very name or by their full commitment to democracy), however, like Austria, these small states tended to produce consociational systems in which grand coalitions of Christian democrats and socialists would negotiate policies (Morgan 2009).

The article will use classic party theory (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Kirchheimer 1965) to analyze the development of political parties in the context of nation-state building, democratization and industrialization. In addition, the article will link the debate on “Muslim democracy” (Hale 2005; Nasr 2005) to a re-awakened interest in the history of Christian democracy (Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 2010; Misner 2003; Conway 2001, 2003; Warner 2002). The article will argue that Christian democrats and Muslim democrats have – despite differences in detail – found remarkably similar approaches to “reconcile capitalism and democracy”. Independent of each other, both the policies of Christian democrats (Misner 2003) and of the AKP (Önis 2012) have been characterized as “third way thinking” in their rejection of both socialism and liberalism. However, this does not exclude authoritarian tendencies and turns and the later degeneration of parties – as occurred in the case of the DC².

The article will make four propositions about the evolution of political Catholicism and political Islam in the cases examined here. First, it will argue that, due to the conflict with the nation state, political Catholicism in Germany and Italy and political Islam in Turkey organized in the form of mass integration parties (see Kirchheimer 1965). These mass integration parties encompassed a specific cross-class alliance and took their distance to both conservatives and socialists or social democrats. Second, in the aftermath of a political crisis, Catholic and Islamic parties transformed into catch-all parties with a pronounced neo-liberal economic agenda which was given a religious justification. Third, they nevertheless pursued cross-class politics and policies, in particular in Catholic or Islamic socioeconomic milieus, through specific social policies and a general emphasis on intermediary organizations. Fourth, what is given as a major difference between Muslim and Christian states, is in historical analysis a common feature of the Muslim democrat AKP and the early CDU and DC: the emphasis on traditional family politics and the attraction it (from western Europe’s contemporary view counter-intuitively) exerted on a female electorate.

² It is beyond the scope of the article to analyse these developments which, however, seem to be negatively correlated to “religious influence”: The DC started under the leadership of Amintore Fanfani to use clientelism not least to reduce its dependence on the Catholic Church; the AKP’s current authoritarian and “neopatrimonialist” turn goes along with intense conflicts with the influential religious Gülen movement.
The article will examine the role “religion”\(^3\) played in this evolution of political Catholicism and political Islam by providing (i) a potential electorate among the practicing or devout part of the population, (ii) organizations ranging from churches to religiously based professional organizations and (iii) elements of an ideology, i.e. religious tenets developed by and around organized religion. The conclusion will discuss to which extent these findings can be generalized.

2. Catholic parties as mass integration parties

The classical school of historical sociology has explained the emergence of religious parties as one of the structural consequences of the historical junctures of democratization and nation-state building. Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) have argued that the state-church (or religious-secular) cleavage is one of the basic cleavages in the development of a modern party system because the “development of compulsory education under centralized secular control for all children of the nation came into direct conflict with the established rights of the religious pouvoirs intermedias and triggered waves of mass mobilization into nationwide parties of protest” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 15). Ates Altinordu (2010) pointed out that “religious revivalism” preceded the nation-state’s attack on religious organizations as well as the countermobilization of secular forces in the German (as well as in the Turkish) case. However, Altinordu agrees on the decisive role of state repression in “forcing” Catholic (and Muslim) activists to unite in one single party despite the diverging interests and position of different groups within the movement (see also Driessen 2013).

The conflict between nascent or consolidating nation states and the Catholic Church’s “ultramontane counteroffensive” (Ertman 2009) reached its peak in the 1860s and 1870s in Italy and Germany. The most salient attack on the Catholic Church was the annexation of the largest part of the Vatican state in the making of the Italian nation state in 1862 and 1871. It deprived the Vatican State nearly entirely of its territory, which had covered a large part of central Italy. As a reaction, the Vatican forbade the participation of Catholics in Italian politics (the “non expedite” was fully reversed only after the First World War) and raised “symbolic borders” with the secular nation-state by elaborating on religious dogmas such as the infallibility of the pope. At about the same time, chancellor Otto von Bismarck, architect of the German nation state, waged a “cultural battle” („Kulturkampf“; 1870-1878) against the Catholic Church; hundreds of Catholic bishops and priests were in prison, Jesuit orders were ousted, priests were forbidden political statements and the state supervision of schools was imposed on the formerly responsible churches.

The nation-state’s attack and social counter-mobilization (Altinordu 2010) led to a process, in which “these church movements tended to isolate their supporters from outside influence through the development of a wide variety of parallel organizations and agencies” (Lipset and

\(^3\) Religion can be defined as encompassing “a creed, a cult, a code of conduct and a confessional community” (R. Scott Appleby as quoted in Driessen 2013, 11).
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Rokkan 1967, 15). Political entrepreneurs could use this network of organizations to build mass integration parties which were closely embedded in a social milieu and represented the interests and values of this “counter-society”. Thus, Catholic parties stood in contrast to liberal and conservative parties of notables and resembled in their organizational form socialist worker parties. At the peak of the Kulturkampf, the Catholic Zentrum (Center Party; 1870-1933) gained, in 1874, 27.4 per cent of the votes which then slowly but continuously decreased during the Empire and the Weimar Republic. However, in contrast to socialist parties, the Catholic mass integration parties entailed cross-class coalitions reflecting the geographical and social distribution of the religious part of the population. They brought together the rural nobility, rural and urban middle classes and the religious part of the working class (Conway 2001; 2003).

The Catholic Church turned to support these new mass parties and exerted an “ideational” influence on them which, however, entailed both anti-liberal and anti-capitalist tenets. Pope Pius IX’s encyclical Syllabus Errorum (1864) enumerated what the Pope considered to be the mistakes of liberalism; among others he denounced freedom of speech and the belief that a regime that did not repress the violations of the Catholic religion could be good (Kalyvas 2003, 299; see also Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 2010). In addition, the papal encyclical Rerum Novarum (1890) used anti-capitalist thoughts and led to the development of a “Catholic social doctrine” by clerics such as Bishop von Ketteler and a number of Jesuits (Misner 2003).

The German Center Party, representing the Catholic minority in Germany, turned after the end of the Kulturkampf towards a moderate political stance. Once it had replaced its anti-liberalism with anti-socialism, it started to support together with conservatives and national liberals the governments of the late German Empire. However, in the following decades, the Center Party’s support for national minorities and its emphasis on social policies brought it nearer to social democrats and it switched its allegiance during the First World War towards the so-called “Weimar coalition” with social democrats and left-liberals. The Center Party’s move and commitment to the new republic was contested within the party and the foundation of the Bavarian CSU (Christlich Soziale Union), united with the CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union) in a parliamentary party. Subsequently, the Center Party as well as the short-lived Italian Partito Popolare (PPI, Italian People’s Party, 1919-1926) strived for organizational independence from the Catholic Church; however, even in the interwar period, the “informal influence of Catholic prelates and priests within the national and particularly the local counsels of Catholic parties was still substantial” (Conway 2001, 300).

The Center Party as well as the Italian Partito Popolare, in which many regarded the Center Party as an example to imitate, positioned themselves in the middle of the political spectrum. However, due to the economic crisis and the radicalization of the political Left and political Right towards the end of the “Weimar Republic”, it proved to be increasingly difficult to bridge their different milieus, in particular after the industrialization had strengthened the Catholic workers’ milieu. Splits between the rural and the urban electorate and the bourgeoisie and the workers’ milieus opened up and led to the Center Party’s authoritarian turn (Conway 2003). The PPI faced after its great electoral success of 1919 similar problems. The Italian fascists were
the beneficiaries of the PPI’s inability to reconcile the interests of their urban supporters with those of a rural population radicalized by economic difficulties and the Socialist unionization of agricultural laborers (Conway 2003, 305). The PPI consented to individuals participating in the first Fascist government but left the parliament after the Matteotti murder in 1922 together with socialists and communists (di Maio 2001).

Thus, whilst Catholic mass integration parties were closely linked to their electorates by religious ancillary organizations and a religiously inspired program as well as the defense of the interests of the Catholic Church, they failed to reach out to a wider electorate and devise a sustainable economic program in the interwar period. Most tragically for West-European history was the Vatican’s withdrawal of support for the German and Italian Catholic parties once the Vatican’s accord with the Italian fascist regime in 1929 (Lateran Treaties) and the German national socialist regime in the Concordat of 1933 had secured the Church’s existence, pastoral freedom and the continuation of religious instruction.

3. Turkish Islamist parties as mass integration parties

Nation-state building in Turkey triggered a confrontation between the liberal nation-state building elite and organized religion which was, like in Italy, particularly intense as the state attacked the organizational center of an entire religious belief. However, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk went even a step further than the Italian nation-state builders in that he abolished the Caliphate as the highest religious authority for Muslims in and outside of Turkey; after the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925 religious orders were suppressed and their property confiscated. Moreover, Atatürk imbued the new state elite with a secular ideology that aimed to ban religion from the public space and established a form of secularism which went beyond that of most western European states (Stepan 2001).

However, “starting in 1950s religious orders carefully expanded their activities and followers and bargained with political parties for favors in return for support in elections” (Altinordu 2010, 528). According to Cinar and Duran, the conservative parties’ “instrumentalization of Islam” continued until the early 1990s (Cinar and Duran 2008, 28). In the 1970s and 1980s, international Islamic revival movements as well as the “Turkish-Islamic synthesis”, which the military endorsed after the military coup of 1980 to promote a “controlled Islamization” of society, paved the way for the Millî Görüs (National Order) movement (Altinordu 2010). The foundation of the National Order Party in 1970 by Necmettin Erbakan, for two decades the dominating political entrepreneur in political Islam in Turkey, was strongly encouraged by Mehmet Zahit Kotku, sheikh of the Naksibendi. Nurcu groups also joined the party but left it already in 1977 due to policy differences (Hale and Özbudun 2010).

Islamist parties represented devout small Anatolian merchants and business people, i.e. the rural petit bourgeoisie in the Turkish periphery, which had kept religious traditions in spite of the secularization by the Kemalist state elite, and their economic interests against the large state-oriented big business in the west of Turkey. The National Order parties’ religious mobiliza-
tion used rhetorical attacks against secularism and capitalism and “the West” and aimed at re-
storing the place of religion in society. Like the National Order Party (1970-71) and the National 
‘just order’ that it conceives as a third way, different from and superior to both capitalism and 
socialism” (Tepe 2008: 89). The National Salvation Party entered a coalition with the Republi-
can’s People Party in the year 1974 only to shift to a right-wing coalition government in 1975.
However, in many respects Islamist parties did not comply with the Kemalist secular state doc-
trine and the National Order Party was closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1971 and the 
National Salvation Party in 1980 by a military coup.

With the establishment of the Welfare Party (in 1983; Erbakan returned to lead the party in 
1987); the social composition of the electorate changed significantly (Yavuz 2009; Özbudun 
2000; Tepe 2008). In the 1990s, internal migration brought parts of a rural, religiously tradition-
al population into the city. As a consequence, the Welfare Party (WP) could enlarge its elec-
torate, and had its candidates elected mayors in large cities, most notably Ankara and Istanbul.
Its social base was broadened by inroads in an increasing urban “Muslim bourgeoisie” but also 
in the neighborhoods of the “urban poor”, often migrants from peripheral areas, supported by 
ancillary welfare and other non-governmental organizations. “Organizationally, the WP is the 
only Turkish party that comes close to the model of a mass party or a party of social integration.
The Islamists in Turkey constitute a large number of associations, foundations, newspapers, pe-
riodicals, publishing houses, TV networks, student dormitories, a pro-WP trade union and a pro-
WP businessperson’s association and holding companies, as well as informal groups such as vari-
sous Sufi orders and other religious communities” (Özbudun 2000, 92).

When the Welfare Party, after having obtained with 20.4 per cent of the votes its best elec-
tion result, built a coalition with conservatives in 1996, it was without a socioeconomic program 
which would take account of Turkey’s dependence on the IMF agreements. In contrast, it 
“played to the tribunes” with radical discourses calling for a Muslim equivalent of EU, UN and 
NATO (Özbudun 2000). However, it did not prevent the Kemalist state elite from establishing 
close cooperation with Israel, anathema to the Islamists’ ideology. Representatives of the Wel-
fare Party continued to advocate Shari’a laws for a comprehensive regulation of private life al-
though their exact regulations were not specified and their repercussions in active politics sel-
dom exceeded the banning of alcohol (Toprak 2005).

Although having failed to display a viable economic program, the Welfare Party had already 
“produced” a new generation of an economic and political elite at the local level and (to some 
extent) loosened its ties to religious movements. It is indicative that in 1997 the prominent Nur-
cu leader Fetullah Gülen openly supported the “28 February process” in which the military 
forced the Welfare Party-led coalition government to resign and the Welfare Party was subse-
quently ousted by the Constitutional Court (Hale and Özbudun 2010, 15).
4. The transition from Catholic to Christian democratic parties

The transformation of political Catholicism to Christian democracy in the aftermath of the Second World War was so comprehensive that it is still debated whether Christian Democratic parties can be regarded as a continuation of earlier Catholic parties (Conway 2003; Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 2010). However, leading politicians such as the leaders of the German and Italian Christian democrats after the Second World War, Konrad Adenauer and Alcide De Gasperi, stemmed from its predecessor parties; De Gasperi was the last secretary general of the PPI. More importantly, the difference between the pre- and postwar parties reflects the difference between a mass-integration and a catch-all party; thus, the national catastrophes caused by the Second World War greatly accelerated the party transformation (see also tab. 1). Already in the mid-1960s, Kirchheimer enlisted as the characteristics of the catch-all party (i) the prevalence of short-term tactical considerations over ideological coherence, (ii) the strengthening of the party leadership and its orientation on the social system, (iii) the devaluation of the role of the individual party members, (iv) election campaigns which address all parts of society and (v) the attempt to connect to the various interest organizations (Kirchheimer 1965, 32).

It was only after the Second World War and the devastating consequences of extreme nationalist policies that Christian democratic parties fully endorsed democracy, started to address a non-religious electorate and weakened their ties to the Catholic subculture. Moreover, they were able to pursue a viable interclass socioeconomic program in which the role of religious references changed considerably. In postwar Germany, the CDU opened up to Protestants (although the majority of Protestants in Germany continued voting for social democrats). In fact, in the aftermath of the Second World War Christian democrats attracted an extraordinarily broad cross-class electorate, ranging from big business to Catholic manual workers and advocates of “Christian socialism”. In addition, party leaders Konrad Adenauer and Alcide De Gasperi had an unprecedented dominance in the party because of the difficult re-establishment of the national party organizations (Panebianco 1988).

It was, in particular, the adoption of neoliberal economic thinking which allowed the parties to appeal to an electorate which was “approachable” after the competing parties on the right had been hugely (Italy) or entirely (Germany) discredited. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, both the German CDU and the Italian DC carried out comprehensive programs of privatization, reduced state regulations on prices and rigorously pursued the aim of low inflation. The economic concept of “ordo-liberal” or “neo-liberal” policies in the 1940s and 1950s entailed antitrust policies and state intervention in case of market failure. However, it was only in the late 1950s that major social policies were added, in Italy with a clientelist distortion.

The “remarkable transition from social corporatism to a largely free-market system” (Conway 2003, 55) had repercussions on the inner-party balance. Although Christian democrats represented beyond their core “farmers-middle classes coalition” (Conway 2003, 57) also a “left wing” and worker electorate, the presence of trade unions was reduced (and subsequently trade unions distanced themselves from Christian democratic parties) whereas CDU and DC secured the support of big business. Large companies started to massively support Christian dem-
ocrats with party funding. In addition, the Catholic Church intervened massively to support
Christian democrats, in particular in Italy where it even threatened to excommunicate those
who vote for communist candidates (Warner 2002).

Tab. 1: The evolution in the politicization of religion in Germany, Italy and Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nation-state building</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>1872</td>
<td>1922</td>
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<tr>
<td>completed</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Attack of nation-state</td>
<td>“Cultural battle”</td>
<td>Annexation of most of the</td>
<td>Abolition of the Caliphate</td>
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<tr>
<td>building elite on church</td>
<td>1870-78</td>
<td>Vatican state 1861, 1870</td>
<td>1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political mobilization</td>
<td>Immediate</td>
<td>Delayed by pope’s “non-</td>
<td>Delayed by oppression</td>
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<tr>
<td>of religion</td>
<td>(but minority in Germany</td>
<td>expedite”</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1870-1933)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious or “confessional”</td>
<td>Center Party</td>
<td>PPI</td>
<td>National Order Party,</td>
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<td>parties</td>
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<td>National Salvation Party,</td>
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<td>Welfare Party</td>
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<td>Exogenous conditions for</td>
<td>Second World War, US</td>
<td>Like in Germany</td>
<td>Economic and political crisis</td>
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<td>transformation into catch-</td>
<td>“Marshall fund” and</td>
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<td>1999/2001; IWF loans,</td>
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<td>all party</td>
<td>European integration</td>
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<td>EU accession negotiations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religions and dominant</td>
<td>Catholic - CDU</td>
<td>Catholic - DC</td>
<td>Muslim Sunni - AKP</td>
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<td>political affiliation</td>
<td>Protestant - SPD</td>
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<td>Alevi - CHP</td>
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Moreover, neoliberal policies were justified by “an anti-materialist conception of the economy” which “stressed economic reconstruction as a precondition for the primary goal of re-establishing an organic, Christian society” (Spicka 2007, 13). According to many Catholics, the experience of the war demanded a “categorical return to the teachings of the Catholic faith” and a “re-christianization of the German society” (Conway 2003: 51). In addition, “there was much in the Christian Democrats politics of that era which recalled the rather undemocratic mentalities of the inter-war years” (Conway 2001: 309). In the following decades, mass membership (which was even to grow) and the rhetoric of an already discarded religious ideology continued to provide the cement for the party organizations and the link to their core electorate. Accordingly, church-attendance remained for decades a good predictor of Christian democratic voting. For instance, as late as in 1976, 64 per cent of Catholics and 84 per cent of devout Catholics in Germany voted CDU (Emmert et.al. 2001, 70).

5. The transition from the Welfare Party to the AKP

In Turkey, it was the AKP’s ascent to power in the aftermath of the political crisis of 1997 and the economic crisis of 1999-2001 (Önis 2006) which characterized a clear break in the development of political Islam. The establishment of the AKP in 2001 completed the transformation from an Islamist party into a catch-all party with religious roots (see Toprak 2005; Hale and Özbudun 2010) in neat correspondence with Kirchheimer’s criteria mentioned above. First, the
AKP took its distance from its predecessor parties and replaced the religiously justified call for a Union of Muslim states and of a “just order” (“adil düzen”) with a pragmatic economic and foreign policy program. The AKP even took a pronounced liberal-market and conservative rhetoric on board (see Önis 2006). Second, the AKP mobilized around the charismatic leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan and promised thorough compliance with IMF and World Bank demands as well as with the EU accession conditions. Third, the party leadership gained more independence from the electorate and downplayed grassroots activism; “unlike the parties of the National Order Movement, [it] does not want a strong grassroots movement” and “prefers a loose party organization which is based on some leading figures …and a charismatic party leadership which keeps different trends together” (Duran 2008, 86).

Fourth, the AKP started to address all groups of society and also secured the affiliation of a number of recognized politicians of other political orientations. It tried to leave its past as a religious party behind and described itself as a conservative party although most of its leading politicians had already been active in the Welfare Party. As a result, the AKP “has been extremely successful in constituting a cross-class electoral alliance” in contrast to the Center-left parties which had failed to construct a broad interclass alliance (Önis 2006, 209-11). Fifth, the AKP connected to important interest organizations beyond its affiliated organizations. Among its supporting organizations, the Muslim organization of prevalent small business’ MÜSIAD (Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association) had already had the upper hand over the Muslim trade union Hak-Is when only 2 representatives of Hak-Is were elected on the AKP list for the 2002 elections compared with 21 members of MÜSIAD (Duran and Yilderim 2005, 227). The AKP’s rapprochement to organized big business represented by TÜSIAD (Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association) was facilitated by the common interest in EU accession; TÜSIAD’s statements concerning the AKP’s determination to comply with IMF and EU accession requirements became even more supportive than MÜSIAD’s (Önis 2006, 223).

In this similarly to Christian democrats after the Second World War, the AKP government turned from its predecessor parties’ general criticism of liberalism and materialism to what has been labeled as the “marriage of Islam and neoliberalism” (Atasoy 2009): pronounced liberal market and monetarist policies. These encompassed in particular the privatization of state-owned companies and the abolition of fixed prices or state subsidies for basic goods as well as a strict anti-inflation policy. For instance, the new tax law in 2006 reduced tax rates such as the corporation tax considerably whereas the social security reform has been quoted as an example for the abandoning of populist policies (Duran 2008).

However, free market policies were given a justification in terms of religious references by “the party’s vision of society” as “organic and unified by Islamic values”; preventing the interference of the Kemalist state would allow to combine individual freedom and community values as “Islamic and family values and agents of socialization seek to mould and discipline citizen believers with a sense of communal duty” (Yavuz 2009, 96). The major difference in the party transformation of Christian democrats and the AKP is that Christian democrats rapidly converged with the economic and state elite after the Second World War, mainly due to the preceding national catastrophe and the dawning anti-communism. By contrast, Turkey witnessed a
period in which a staunchly secular state elite kept is resistance against the AKP whilst the established economic elite had found common interests in the opening to globalization and accession to the European Union (Önis 2006).

6. Cushioning free-market policies: Catholic ideology and cross-class politics

It would be misleading to reduce Christian democrats' role in socioeconomic development to their free-market policies. Christian democrats swiftly discarded an anti-capitalist rhetoric, which had characterized for instance the CDU’s “Ahlener Program” of 1947 or the Dossetti faction in the DC, for the technocratic discourse and program of a liberalist economic school. However, “social Catholicism”, encompassing a religiously inspired “social doctrine” and religiously based organizations, remained influential (i) in socio-economic milieus in economically lagging regions, (ii) in welfare organizations and social policies and (iii) in a general emphasis on intermediary organizations.

Social Catholicism conceived politics as founded upon a notion of harmony between all groups or classes of society. Social Catholicism claimed a third position between liberalism and communism as well as between individualism and collectivism and inspired a specific Christian democratic position on property, intermediary organizations and the welfare state. The papal encyclicals Rerum Novarum (1891) and Quarragesimo Anno (1931) provided a justification of private property but also introduced the seminal distinction between private property and its use. A repercussion of the principle that private property should be used in social responsibility was the insertion of article 14 in the German postwar constitution, “property entails responsibility” (“Eigentum verpflichtet”), as a base for many state regulations to limit market mechanisms. Another repercussion of social Catholicism (in this converging with social democrats’ demands) was the concept of co-determination in the German steel industry providing trade unions with an equal number on the board of directors (see Misner 2003).

Furthermore, Catholic social philosophy, often termed “personalism”, elaborated on the social embeddedness of the individual in the family and in social groups as a necessary precondition for the development of property, intermediary organizations and the welfare state. The Catholic encyclicals gave a philosophical justification for “intermediary organizations”, to use Claus Offe’s (1996) term, long before their importance was rediscovered as being instrumental for economic and social development through the production of “social capital” (Putnam 1993). It is the emphasis on intermediary organizations or “natural communities” (in Catholic parlance) which support and/or take over state tasks which distinguishes Christian democratic programs from a pure mixture of liberal and conservative policies. A political ideology such as “Thatcherism” has never been an option for Christian democrats because the Thatcherite vision was limited to a liberal market and a small but authoritarian state and even encompassed “an attack on intermediary organizations” (Offe 1996, 324), be it trade unions, local governments, public housing or public health service - in stark contrast to social Catholicism.
Christian democrats’ intermediary, ancillary organizations contributed to seminal economic and social developments. In peripheral rural areas with a tradition of wide-spread entrepreneurship and small independent farming, they provided the necessary resources of trust and cooperation for an economic development based on SMEs and industrial districts, in particular in southern Germany and north-east Italy (Trigilia 1988). Christian democracy has also strongly influenced a specific type of welfare state which Esping-Anderson in his path-breaking work on types of welfare states (1989) classified as conservative or continental welfare states. In contrast to the social democratic welfare state in Scandinavia, based on “social rights”, the Christian democratic version is rather based on the Christian duty of providing help to the poor and regards social policies as secondary and dependent on the achievements of economic development (see Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 2010). Moreover, Christian social tenets have developed the principle of subsidiarity, which maintains that help to the individual should be provided by the smallest level of organization. As a consequence, the Christian democratic welfare state is characterized by its emphasis on intermediary organizations and the family. State-organized assurance systems for pensions, health and unemployment are typically organized by status groups and run by tripartite bodies including worker and employer representatives.

7. Cushioning free-market policies: social compromise in AKP policies

As in the case of Christian democrats, the reduction of AKP policies to free-market policies would be misleading. The reference to religious “social tenets” also helped the National Order Parties to develop a cross-class appeal and some of them were kept by the AKP. As in political Catholicism, Islamic movements tended to see society as “functionally differentiated corporate bodies and not as classes in mutual opposition” (Yıldırım and Dinan 2005). Interestingly, Dinan and Cinar (2008, 19) even identified German romanticism juxtaposing the community with its sense of belonging against the anonymous market society which was regarded as an erroneous historical development (see also Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 2010), as one of the sources for the anti-liberal and anti-western attitude of early political Islam in Turkey.

Political Islam’s view of industrial relations is firmly entrenched in a traditional view of corporatism involving management based on shura (council), mutual respect and a sense of responsibility shared by all workers in an enterprise. Despite the general anti-labor mood in Turkish politics, Islamist parties initially held a close relationship to Hak-İs, an Islamic trade union, emphasized social dialogue and tripartite structures and promised even to promote unionization (Yıldırım and Duran 2005, 239).

The economic development in Turkey in the last decade resembles the "economic miracle" during the Christian democrats’ dominance in western Europe in the 1950s and early 1960s: rapid and sustained economic growth and increasing price stability accompanied by limited social redistribution during the period of the economic take-off and a parting of the ways with trade unions. However, although the AKP had tuned down the rhetoric of a “just order” (“adil düzen”), prominent in the Welfare Party, it continued to stress the pursuit of social justice as an
important theme (“its foremost objective”) in its program (Hale and Özbudun 2010, 100). Moreover, the AKP government also recognized the regulatory and social failures of free-market liberalism, increased social expenditures in critical areas and improved the provision of public services; as a result, the rate of poverty decreased from 27 per cent in 2002 to 18 per cent in 2009 (Onis 2012, 142).

At the same time, the AKP’s ancillary organizations continued to have a social function both in economic development and in the provision of social services. The social milieu in east Anatolia provided a cultural base for entrepreneurship and co-operation among the so-called “Anatolian tigers”, or, to put it in Putnam’s terms, provided the “social capital” to foster economic development in these lagging regions. In addition, the Islamic banking system played an important role in dealing with the lack of capital supply, one of the main problems of small and medium enterprises. International Islamic capital provided only a small part of the capital inflow in Turkey, which, however, seemed to have been pivotal in some business development. An important religious tenet, the condemnation of interest rates, supported the development and coherence of Islamic banks, although they started to get around interest rates through novel forms of profit and risk sharing (Toprak 2005).

In contrast to the conservative tradition the AKP espouses, AKP politics are also characterized by an emphasis on the participation of civil society, even in the deliberation of constitutional reforms and foreign policies. Whereas the AKP’s ancillary organizations remain present in the provision of welfare services, there is some evidence that Turkey follows the southern European variant of a welfare state characterized by an extensive black economy, a strong emphasis on pensions contrasting with a lack of social assistance schemes and a panoply of assurance systems combined with the nationalization of health systems (Duyulmus 2011; see Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 2010).

8. From religious to family policies in Christian democracy?

When the economic success after the Second World War brought “affluence for all” (the famous slogan of the German Minister of Economics Ludwig Erhard), religious arguments and justifications were sidelined or relegated to the background. The interests of religiously based organizations and the Catholic Church itself were satisfied when the concordats with fascist Italy and national-socialist Germany were confirmed and, after decades of sometimes bitter struggles, state subsidies for confessional schools became a wide-spread arrangement among western European states (Stepan 2001). Moreover, a large part of social services continued to be organized by welfare organizations close to the Catholic or Protestant churches. In Italy, the Catholic Church kept its monopoly on some welfare organizations until the 1970s (Morgan 2009). In Germany, the Center Party had already introduced a system of publicly funded welfare services provided by religiously based voluntary organizations. For decades following World War II, “no social policy could be passed if the two churches were in unanimous opposition to it” (Morgan 2009, 76) and the “denominational” sector in the welfare state currently still holds
However, family policies or gender policies (as opponents would put it) retained a major reference to religious values and were defined in a most traditional way. Family policies constituted significant differences between the Christian democratic dominated states of Germany and Italy and the Nordic states, but also with France. The Nordic states had embraced female emancipation and had become pioneers in the development of family laws that assigned equal status to men and women in the first three decades of the 20th century (Morgan 2009, 67). In contrast, after the Second World War the CDU “advocated and enacted an uncompromisingly Catholic approach to family structures and social morality” (Conway 2003: 48). As late as 1961, the Italian Constitutional Court upheld Article 559 of the Fascist penal code which punished a wife’s adultery with up to one year’s imprisonment and a husband’s with a mere reprimand. It was only in 1975 that a new family code finally established parity between husband and wife in Italy (Ginsborg 2000, 440). In Germany, “until 1977, the German civil code explicitly depicted women as homemakers, and women had a legal duty to fulfill their home duties before they could justify working outside” (Morgan 2009, 76).

Tab. 2: Labor market participation in selected western European countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Female employment rate 1994</th>
<th>Difference between male and female employment rate 1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


"Christian family values", closely linked to traditional gender roles based on male employment and female housekeeping (the “male breadwinner-model”), left also significant traces in the institutionalization of the welfare state. Mandatory joint taxation of income discouraged mothers’ employment and welfare provisions have been related to the work income of the employee with wife and children being covered by the husband’s insurance. Moreover, the use of direct income transfers to the families has starkly contrasted with the Nordic welfare state types in which the state provides and organizes child care, thus permitting women to participate in the labor market. The “de-facto incorporation of the Lutheran Church into the state machinery” in Nordic countries entailed that “the responsibility for family well-being was gradually transferred from the church to the state” (Morgan 2009, 65, 67). Although France started to
promote large families in the name of national greatness, French Gaullists were often pragmatic with regard to women's issues and expanded public child care (Morgan 2009).

The lack of public child care was at the same time the result and the motive for the low participation of women in the labor market. At the end of Christian democratic dominance in the mid 1990s, the labor market participation of women was in Germany and Italy 20 to 30 per cent lower than male labor market participation whereas both were nearly the same in the Scandinavian countries (see table 2). Lastly, the emphasis on family values resonated strongly with female voters and contributed to the “gender gap” in western European elections until the 1970s. Inglehart and Norris (2000) singled out Italy and Germany for the strongest gender bias in surveys as late as the early 1970s; women’s support for left parties was 13 and 14 percentage points, respectively, lower than men’s. Thus, religiously inspired “family values” continued to characterize Christian democrats and helped to keep a majority in the female electorate until the 1970s.

9. From religious to family policies in AKP policies?

One of the path-breaking differences in the policies of the AKP in comparison to its predecessor party, the Welfare Party, was that its party program and rhetoric officially relegated religion to the realm of privacy. The AKP leadership even persistently argued that politicization of religion is dangerous for democracy and religion (Duran 2008, 81). There is also some evidence for a shift in attitudes of the Turkish population at the time of the AKP’s ascent to government (although it is difficult to prove the causation). According to the Carkoglu-Torprak survey, the number of supporters of a Shari’a based government dropped from 21.2 per cent in 1999 to 8.9 per cent in 2006. Other surveys have supported these results with numbers further dropping if asked for the support of specific Islamic regulations (Hale and Özbudun 2010, 31). However, the mobilizing role of religious policies was transferred to a number of highly emotionalized and politicized issues, in particular the headscarf ban and the religious Imam Hatip schools.

After a quarter of a century of total absence of religious education, Imam Hatip schools were opened in 1949 following the same curriculum as state schools with additional religious education. After reaching its peak in 1996-1997 with more than 500,000 students, the repression of Islamic organizations in the so-called “February, 28th process” (in 1998) closed down the junior high-school grades and made it nearly impossible for the graduates to enter universities. Whereas the AKP refrained from pushing through changes against the veto of President Sezer (who retired 2008), regulations and practice were changed in favor of the religious schools in the last years. Moreover, the headscarf issue became the most contested symbolic policy marking the cleavage between the secular and the religious “camp”, when the AKP proposed during its second term in government to abolish the headscarf ban. This regulation was annulled by the Constitutional Court in June 2008 and brought forward as major evidence in the (failed) closure case against the AKP.
The headscarf issue as a symbolic policy did not only concern the role of religious symbols in public but also the different values, in particular regarding gender relations, between the secular middle classes and the rising “Islamic bourgeoisie”. The concept of the family remained a core concept of the AKP’s ideology as “the middle ground where it could merge its moral and economic stances”; the party’s ideological support for private property and free enterprise was even “presented as a venue to strengthen the family structure” (Tepe 2008, 212). The classic division of labor within the family has resulted in the low participation of Turkish women in the labor market and the low support of society for it; women’s participation in the workforce decreased from 34 per cent in 1988 to 25 per cent in 2008, possibly due to the fall of agricultural employment in Turkey (Gerhards 2007). In contrast, women play a major role in Islamist welfare and other organizations (Altinordu 2010); local organizations have a separate branch for women members and women’s group attend training programs “that teach them how to share their communication and political mobilization skills and visit orphanages, all on the same day” (Tepe 2008, 202).

However, the number of female party representatives was kept extremely low. The National Order Party and the National Salvation Party had with 3.27 and 3.09 per cent respectively the lowest number of women candidates and originally only 13 of the AKP’s 384 members of parliament were women (Tepe 2008, 202). In contrast, the gender gap in the left-right self-placement in contemporary Turkey remained significant; women tend to place themselves to the right of men (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 443, 449) and the World Value Survey 2008 differentiated the intention to vote for the AKP (44%) with 48 % of female and 41% of male voters.

10. Conclusion

A comparison of the development of the parties which originated in political Catholicism and political Islam demonstrates a number of communalities; religious tenets and organizations inspired the design of a set of policies to “reconcile capitalism and democracy”. The CDU and DC, as well as the AKP, integrated formerly excluded social groups in rural and peripheral areas but also the urban poor and produced sustained economic growth from which most groups in society (albeit to very different degrees) benefited. This did and does not exclude authoritarian traits (the 1968 student rebellions in Western Europe were at that time regarded as evidence for a profound crisis of the “system”). Moreover, it encompassed traditional if not backward-oriented gender policies.

First, Catholic as well as Islamic parties originated as predominantly mass integration parties\(^4\) linked to their electorates of practicing Muslims or Christians by a panoply of religious organizations and the use of religious tenets. Religious mass integration parties already entailed cross-class coalitions of the rural nobility, farmers, the rural and urban middle classes and the reli-

\(^4\) Christian democrats kept some traits of cadre parties, though, in the periphery and adopted clientelist traits in their transformation to catch-all parties in southern Italy.
igious part of the workers and urban poor. Whereas in Germany and Italy Catholic parties had been set up during the full mobilization of Catholics and gradually lost their capacity to integrate the different milieus, in Turkey the National Order parties originated in the Anatolian periphery and encroached on the large cities in the 1990s. Religious doctrines entailed anti-liberal and anti-capitalist tenets; whereas the “Catholic social doctrine” focused on social corporatism, Islamic tenets emphasized “Islamic” interest-free banking.

Second, Catholic as well as Islamic parties transformed into (hegemonic) catch-all parties in the aftermath of profound national crises which had discredited competing parties to the right. The CDU and DC as well as the AKP fully espoused democracy at the same time they shifted towards a pronounced neoliberal agenda (together with an opening towards global markets and regional integration); however, they gave them a religious or religious inspired justification as combining individual freedom and community responsibility. In this process, Christian democrats obtained the full support (including significant funding) of economic elites and big business which had been suspicious towards what sometimes had been called “white bolshevism” in Italy and “heart-of-Jesus (i.e. Jesuit) socialists” in Germany. The AKP was (albeit less full-heartedly) supported by Turkish big business but still had to face the resistance of the state elite. At the same time, the influence of trade unions, lower in the case of the AKP anyway, diminished.

Third, neoliberal politics were supplemented and cushioned by social milieus which fostered economic development in the periphery, welfare organizations and social policies for workers and the urban poor and a participatory role for intermediary organizations. These cross-class politics were based on the religious tenets of an organic and just society as well as on religiously inspired organizations in business networks and welfare services. In this regard, Islamic banking can be regarded as a functional equivalent to mutual aid societies and local saving banks in Western Europe. Social policies remain secondary to economic development and are largely based on status maintenance or the duty to provide assistance to “those in need”. The corporatist approach common to Christian democratic parties is less strong in the AKP; however, the latter voices a strong emphasis on civil society.

Fourth, apart from the question of denominational schools, traditional family policies have been the most salient reminders of the parties’ religious origins; the low participation of women in the labor market in contemporary Turkey rather resembles earlier developments in Italy and Germany than provides evidence for a major difference. Christian democratic market-making policies stopped short of integrating women in the labor market; the welfare state arrangements incorporated and further strengthened the “male-breadwinner”-conception of their gender and family policies. However, by claiming family values, Christian democrats attracted until the 1970s a significant majority of female votes and the same (albeit to a lesser degree) holds true for the AKP.

Can we generalize from the comparison that all religious parties take the development analyzed for the Italian, German and Turkish case? It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze religious parties in other parts of the world (see also Minkenberg 2007; Nasr 2005; Stepan 2001); however, the analyzed cases define scope conditions for the dynamic sketched above.
Both Catholicism and Islam represent a transnational religious order which challenges the nation state (Driessen 2013). Paradoxically, it is state repression in combination with social exclusion and conflict which “forces” social movements to organize as mass parties which are closely linked to their electorates by associational networks. As socialist parties, these religious mass parties can subsequently integrate social groups into the “system”, thus devising not only a “reconciliation” of the nation state and transnational religion but also of “capitalism and democracy”. However, among Western European states there is already one exception: the French case. The demise of the Christian democrat MRP (Mouvement Républicain Populaire) has been attributed both to its failure to develop into a mass integration party due to the lack of associationalism and support by the French Catholic Church (Kalyvas 1996; Conway 2003) and to its failure to transform into a catch-all party because of a competing political party to the right led by General de Gaulle (Warner 2002).

Whilst it is questionable whether all parties which have been labeled as Muslim democratic parties are or have originated from mass integration parties (conservative parties may also have taken religious rhetoric on board), Islamic parties in Arab countries such as Tunisia and Egypt seem to fulfill the criteria of mass integration parties. As in Turkey, a “progressive” and “Western” state elite built the nation state against the resistance of the imperialist states, subsequently ruled the country and produced a liberal bourgeoisie which is strongly opposed to Islamic or Islamist mass integration parties. It seems tempting to expect in the long run similar developments as those sketched above. However, there is still one major difference in contemporary Arab countries and its impact on party development is yet unclear. Catholic movements and parties originated by claiming the middle ground between a conservative-nationalist right and a socialist left and this also held true for Islamists in the Turkish party system before its transformation in the aftermath of the crisis of 1999-2001. As recent events drastically demonstrated, this is not the case in Arab countries where from the beginning the state elite (and liberal parties) confronted Islamic mass parties. It remains to be seen which influence this binary conflict will have on the development of religious parties.

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AUTHOR INFORMATIONS:

Joerg Baudner holds a PhD from the University of Birmingham (UK) and is currently lecturer at Osnabrueck University in Germany. He was a lecturer at Bilgi University Istanbul and a visiting researcher at Bogazici University Istanbul and published on German, Italian and Turkish politics and policies in leading European journals such as the Journal of Common Market Studies and (with M. Bull) Comparative European Politics.