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SPECIAL ISSUE

"Turkey in 2000s: Change within Continuity, Continuity within Change" - Guest Editors: Aslı Telseren, Şirin Duygulu


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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Explaining the Role of Intervening Variables in Turkey's Foreign Policy Behaviour

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to offer a neoclassical realist analytical framework to identify the influence of agent-structure interplay on Turkey’s foreign policy behavior during JDP-led governments. The main argument is that the adjustments in Turkish behaviors between 2003 to date, analyzed by most scholars starting from the systemic or domestic level alone, could be better explained intertwining the explanans. Considering four intervening variables – national role conception, decision-making model, perception of strategic environment and orientation towards the regional order – this article discusses Turkey’s shift from a wary isolationist attitude to a wary interventionist one. The last two decades of Turkey's foreign policy will be analyzed to show why the neoclassical realist analytical lens is particularly useful to grab the different determinants that have affected Turkish foreign policy behavior.

KEYWORDS: Turkey; Foreign Policy; Neoclassical Realism; Intervening Variables; Foreign Policy Executive; National Role Conception.

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1. Introduction

In the post-Cold War era, most observers have suggested that the line between domestic and international politics is not just blurry but it is quickly disappearing because of globalization (Kaarbo 2015). Some have called it ‘intermestic’, combining the words to indicate the intertwine of issues and interests. Among them, Baghat Korany who retains that intermestic is ‘a reflection of creeping globalization, characterized by the retreat of exclusive state sovereignty, and the rise instead of the intensity of societal interconnectedness and speedy circulation of ideas, but without wiping out the impact of local features’ (Korany 2013, 83). Such interpretation results particularly useful in understanding the Middle East as a ‘penetrated system’ composed of several distinct levels - the global environment, the interstate environment, the trans-state environment, and the domestic environment – exposed to a high rate of influence by external actors (Brown 1984, 3-5). Turkey is one of the regional actors whose foreign policy has changed most in the last two decades, switching from a cautious and wary approach to the region to an active and interventionist one. The transformation of Turkish foreign policy (TFP) behavior has been proved to be particularly affected by the local-global nexus (Keyman & Gumuscu 2014).

In the following pages, the article tries to expand the existing studies on TFP behavior under the Justice and Development Party (JDP) governments applying a neoclassical realist analytical framework to identify the concurrent influence of certain domestic constraints and priorities. It seeks to offer an interpretation of Turkey’s strategic adjustment during the last two decades, one that explicitly combines the material and ideational entwined factors in the manner suggested by neoclassical realism. The neoclassical realism evokes some intuitions of classical realism to integrate and better specify the structural theory of neorealism. The article’s purpose is to improve the dominant neorealist and constructivist analysis of TFP and thereby demonstrate the value of neoclassical realist interpretation. The article seeks to show how the realist perspective does not deny the relevance of the non-material dimension.

1 For an in-depth analysis see (Wivel 2005).
of power, but rather includes them as intervening variables useful to expand the explanatory or explicative factors.

The main research question that this paper attempts to answer is what are the factors that have driven the shifts in TFP? By using data from interviews and fieldwork across the region the article aims to demonstrate the salience of the so-called intervening variables, such as the foreign policy executives (FPE) perception of the surrounding international and regional environment.

The article presents the analysis in three distinct sections. The first section introduces the main tenets of the Neoclassical realism, the theoretical framework within which the research is developed. After a brief overview of the main traits of the traditional TFP before JDP, the second section proceeds with the case study highlighting the strategy change implemented by the first JDP-led governments. Thereafter, the analysis examines the factors that led to the change in TFP behavior between 2003 and 2019. Dividing the timescale into three distinct periods - 2003-09; 2010-14 and 2015-19 -, the research outlines the intertwine among international, regional, domestic, and individual variables that have driven Turkish behaviors. Finally, in the last section, the implications of the Turkey case are examined for what they reveal about the nexus between domestic and foreign policy. The main argument is that the adjustments in TFP could be better explained including in the analysis some state-level variables, specifically related to leaders or foreign policy executive (FPE) – such as perception/threat assessment, national role, and decision-making process – and their interactions with the external environment. Therefore, for each section, three-images or levels related to Turkish foreign policy have been considered: individual (foreign policy executive and leadership); state (domestic concerns and institutional framework); and external environment (regional and international).

2. Theoretical and Analytical Framework

As ‘an emerging school of foreign policy’ neoclassical realism (NCR) is among the newest branches of realist school that wrought by a very productive theoretical debate within International Relations (IR) field (Taliaferro, Lobell & Ripsman
Over the last two decades, the NCR, whose purpose is to study the foreign policy of the states, without claims to explain broad systemic patterns of recurring outcomes, has become one of the most widespread approaches to the study of international relations. Yet, as well as constructivists, neoclassical realists consider that ideas matter – ideology, threat assessment, leaders’ perceptions –, this is why James (2009, 259) argued that NCR is ‘realist-inspired constructivism’. The core principles of neorealism on state, relative power and the primacy of the anarchical material structure are largely shared by neoclassical realists. The overall argument is that systemic factors are the most important to explain international developments over time (Ripsman, Taliaferro & Lobell 2016). In other words, this approach maintains that relative power – resources and capabilities – of the state is the main causal variable of state actions. At the same time, NCR has distanced itself from neorealism because it does not consider anarchy as an independent causal force but, rather, as a permissive condition that gives states considerable latitude in defining their security interests. Neoclassical realists believe that systemic effects on state’s behaviour vary and are indirect (Wohlforth 2008). While it emerges that the system gives incentives to state actors, it is not immediate its involvement in determining their behaviour (Rathbun 2008, 305). Indeed, there is not ‘an immediate or perfect ‘transmission belt’ between structural pressures and the formation of foreign policy behaviours, as the state cannot always directly respond to international incentives’ (Rose 1998, 146; Schweller 2004, 164-166).

The central tenets of NCR are that foreign policy is the result of international structure, domestic influences, and a complex relation between the two. Similar to the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), in the NCR the decision-making unit (be it a leader, a small group, or a coalition of actors) is a funnel through which other factors are transmitted and interpreted (Kaarbo 2015, 206). Emphasising the role of state-

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2 In contrast to other scholars (Rose 1998; Wohlforth 2008) who consider the NCR as an alternative theory to neorealism, this article assumes neorealism and neoclassical realism as complementary.

3 The scholars that pursue the neoclassical realist approach argue that the domestic factors are placed in the middle, as mediating or intervening variables, as a nexus between the independent variable (relative power) and the dependent variable (foreign policy outcomes).
level factors, strategic assessment, and policymakers’ perception, NCR offers a two-level theory of foreign policy (Putnam 1988). Indeed, if the external environment of a state determines the kind of challenges – threats and opportunities - it faces, how the state responds to them varies according to internal factors, notably the level of state formation, the social composition of ruling coalitions, the elite threat perceptions and the capacity of institutions to mobilize power (Hinnebusch & Ehteshami 2014).

Some studies have paid a lot of emphasis on the role of individuals in foreign policy choices. Although it is not possible to say that those choices are solely the result of individual ‘human agency’ (Jensen 1982) it is also necessary to consider the personal characteristics of the leader, especially in the present-day Middle East. Within the Middle East political environment, the leaders' role, their personality, leadership style, beliefs, and convictions take on greater importance in the foreign policy decision-making process. As pointed out by Hermann et al. (2001), the Middle East, with politics being heavily autocratic, without institutional and/or bureaucratic constraints, provide optimum conditions for the expression of the leaders' personality to the extent of making them 'predominant' in the decision-making process. Neoclassical realists recurring topic is the relationship between state leaders or FPE and the people. From NCR perspective, state leaders or FPE exist at the intersection of the international and the domestic with their charge of perceptions and misperceptions (Lobell 2009). Several neoclassical realists have developed the notion of state power to better explain the link between state leaders and society. Such concept refers to ‘the portion of (total) national power the government can extract for its purposes and the relative ability to extract and mobilize resources from domestic society within a certain geopolitical setting’ (Zakaria 1998, 10). Consequently, state leaders need to

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4 As Putnam (1988) two level game approach also NCR takes into consideration international and domestic levels of analysis, but there is no ideological closeness.
5 See for example (Hermann 1980; Kaarbo 1997; Rosati 2000; Keller 2005; Grove 2007).
6 This argument is echoed by the classic realism that considers the qualities of leadership and the bond of the leadership with society as an important factor in understanding the ability of state leaders to pursue a rational foreign policy. See for example Morgenthau (1948).
secure public support in order to mobilize necessary resources for their foreign policies as well as to safeguard their own positions and their ability to govern.\(^7\)

The ideational factors such as ideology and nationalism are particularly useful, mainly when the security in the international system is scarce, because they can play an instrumental role in helping a state’s leadership extract, mobilize and direct societal resources and cultivate support among its power base (Taliaferro, Lobell & Ripsman 2009). The great limit of NCR is that it does not provide enough information to predict national strategic choices.

2.1. The methodological approach

Following the JDP’s rise to power in 2002, Turkish foreign policy has changed apace, drawing the attention of many IR scholars. Several of them argue that Turkey has adopted a more assertive policy in the surrounding regions thanks to greater self-confidence and capability. Due to the neorealist theoretical approach that these scholars have adopted, many of the studies have overlooked the numerous transformations that have occurred within the Anatolian country. As a result, part of the extant literature on TFP has disregarded the main context in which foreign policy decisions are taken (Hale 2000; Candar & Graham 2001; Yalvag 2012). On the other hand, following the constructivist approach few scholars have pointed out the importance of the ideational factor without considering the saliency of state’s relative power in terms of resources and capabilities (Sözen 2010; Atalay 2013; Keyman & Gumuscu 2014; Bilgin & Bilgic 2011).

However, both approaches present some limits, because they don’t comprehend the uninterrupted twine between external and internal factors that have influenced Turkey’s foreign policy behaviours in the last two decades. In other words, for this case study neorealist’ and constructivist’s analytical approach prove to be not completely suitable in analyzing the intermestic dimension in which Turkey have been operating since the beginning of the JDP era. For this reason, drawing into dualist interpretation of the nexus between domestic and international politics, this article

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\(^7\) For more in-depth analysis, see (Schweller 2004; Taliaferro 2006).
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aims to show why the neoclassical realist analytical lens is particularly useful, by arguing that TFP outputs are not only a result of bargaining between domestic and international constraints but it also reflects a shift in variables related to the intrastate level. What makes the NCR particularly suitable to analyse Turkey’s foreign behaviours is its explanatory power, locating causal properties at both structural and unit levels.\(^8\) It is common for multi-level analysis theories to consider foreign policy making as a process based on the sum of external factors and internal constraints, quantitatively referred to as \(P = E + D\). The neoclassical theory, on the other hand, considers the formulation of foreign policy as a correlation of external factors as affected by, or in the function of, some internal intervening factors, \(P = E(D)\).\(^9\)

Following this latter formula, the case study is operationalized by using a process-tracing method, as a form of within-case analysis, which attempts to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes (Bennett 2010; Beach & Pedersen 2013). For each of the three periods considered - 2003-09; 2010-14; 2015-19 - the article introduces some observable implications regarding the causal mechanism and the type of policy outcome to be expected. The article argues that process-tracing allows us to shed light on the causal mechanism that brought to a policy change. Considering four intervening variables – national role conception, decision-making model, orientation towards the regional order, and perception of the strategic environment – this article highlights the foreign policy behavior adopted and the policy tools used by Turkey to pursue its strategic interests. Further, the research discusses that it is possible to formulate some hypotheses about the orientation towards the regional system as well as about the general attitude or foreign policy behaviors.

In the next sections, the article assesses the validity of such a hypothesis using qualitative material, mainly academics articles, information from official institutions websites and reports from agencies and think tanks. In addition to second sources, the analysis has been integrated by data from interviews conducted over two years of research in Turkey (2017-19).

\(^8\) The NCR could not be consider a reductionist theory of international politics, but, rather as a multi-level analysis because it consider all three Waltz images individual, domestic and international.

\(^9\) See (Smith, Hadfield & Dunne 2012).
Table 1. Intervening variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>National Role Concept</th>
<th>Decision-Making Model</th>
<th>Perception of Strategic Environment</th>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Fp Behaviour</th>
<th>Fp Tools</th>
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<td>pre-2002*</td>
<td>Buffer state</td>
<td>Bureaucratic model (high militarized)</td>
<td>Threatening</td>
<td>Status quo</td>
<td>Wary-isolationist</td>
<td>Hard Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-09</td>
<td>Bridge state</td>
<td>Bureaucratic model (low militarized)</td>
<td>Permissive</td>
<td>Revisionist</td>
<td>Proactive</td>
<td>Soft Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-14</td>
<td>Central or Hub state</td>
<td>Narrow circle</td>
<td>Permissive ('11-'12) &amp; Restraining ('13-'14)</td>
<td>Revisionist</td>
<td>Assertive</td>
<td>Soft Power + Hard Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015-19</td>
<td>Buffer state</td>
<td>Leader dominant model</td>
<td>Threatening</td>
<td>Status quo</td>
<td>Interventionist</td>
<td>Hard Power</td>
</tr>
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*The table reflects the intervening variables considered in the case study, highlighted the shifts in perceptions and behaviors among Turkish FPE between 2002-19.
Source: author's elaboration
3. The awakening: from status quo to the accommodationist approach (2003-2009)

After the 2002 victory election, the JDP policy-makers began to revitalize Turkey’s role in the international sphere. The shift of decision-making power gradually away from the military has brought up new elite with completely different backgrounds and identities. As a consequence, FPE perceptions of constraints and opportunities drastically changed compared to the previous decades. The surrounding, global and regional environment, previously perceived as a potential threat to national security and stability, it became a playground in which the ambitions of the new FPE could be nurtured (Öktem, Karli & Kadioglu 2012). Specifically, the post-9/11 international system offered an unprecedented opportunity for Ankara to play a more autonomous and ambitious policy in the surrounding regions. As a consequence, the JDP government’s foreign policy doctrine was outlined for an active engagement with all regional systems through a multi-dimensional approach.¹⁰

Between 2003-2009 the reshaping of Middle Eastern balances offered to the Ankara government the opportunity for a more assertive approach with a revisionist orientation towards the regional system. The conjunctural determinants led to a rapid change in Turkey’s national role conception, modifying what Aydin (2004) called ‘structural variables’.¹¹ This shift proved one of the classic realism principles that states with greater power resources – wealth, population, size, social and historical coherence – are more likely to have a pro-active foreign policy (Walt 1987).

In the post 2003, a firm incentive from the system for Turkey’s rising role in the regional politics, came from the endorsement and support of the US.¹²

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¹⁰ One of the main signs of the "multidimensional" approach was the handling of the EU accession process; despite Turkish leaders' commitment to make Turkey a full member of the EU, this was not seen as an alternative to regional integration in the Middle East and growing economic cooperation with the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

¹¹ According to Mustafa Aydin structural 'static' variables are continuous and relatively static and can exert long-term influence over the determination of foreign policy goals. Structural variables include geographic position, historical experiences and cultural background, together with national stereotypes, images of other nations and continuing economic provision (Aydin 2004, 119-121).

¹² If during the 1990s Turkey was not in the position to play this role continuatively due to both national and regional constraints, with the new millennium the rapid economic growth and the political stability tied to the one-party government created the suitable conditions for Turkey to take advantage of the structural incentives.
According to the Bush administration the soft Sunni’s green of Turkey appeared to be a perfect match to counterbalance the rising Shia’s green wave of Iran. Turkey’s FPE adopted a more regionally-oriented foreign policy without doubting the traditional pro-Western projection. This new approach sets the stage for a scholars and analysts’ debate on Turkey’s ‘shift of axis’, that is, the erosion of Turkey’s predominantly Western orientation (Zalewski 2010; Bagdonas 2012; Başer 2015). Even though Turkish FPE firmly denied arguments to that effect, Turkish foreign policy undoubtedly took an autonomous course, that diverged or converged with Western partners time by time (Yorulmazlar & Turhan 2015).

The different attitude towards the Palestinian–Israeli dispute\(^{13}\) was illustrative of a more autonomous regional policy. Among the domestic determinants of this new orientation, the rising business elite takes on relevance. The group of Turkish traders and entrepreneurs, mainly from within the Anatolian interior cities, represented a steaming force in Turkey’s engagement with all segments of its neighborhood, particularly the Middle East and Africa (Özdemir & Serin 2016). The internationalization of Anatolian capitalism, arose as a key non-state actor in Turkey’s external diversification, supporting the idea of Turkey as a trading state (Kirişci 2009) and as a bridge between the West and the East (Öniş & Yılmaz 2009).

3.1. Davutoğlu’s vision and the neo-ottoman belief

The growing JDP’s autonomy in domestic and foreign policy spheres paved the way for Ankara’s firmer moves towards an integrated Middle Eastern order (Yorulmazlar & Turhan 2015). The shift – from status quo to revisionist orientation – was determined also by profound changes within the FPE. From the JDP first mandate, leading government figures began recruiting a separate group of advisers in the realm of foreign affairs. Until that moment, the Turkish foreign policy decision-making process was bureaucratized and highly militarized, with a significant number of high-ranking decision-makers from or related to the military sector (Uzgel 2003).

\(^{13}\) Turkey’s increasing distance from Israel in the 2000s, and its rhetoric in support of the Palestinians, represented a relevant change that has led to a shift on the perceptions of the country in the Middle East.
The initiatives promoted by the emerging FPEs were, therefore, often constrained by the different attitudes of the former bureaucratic and diplomatic establishment.

However, this period coincided with a general de-securitization of both foreign and domestic policy, thanks to the reforms implemented within the framework of the EU accession process. The decline of the political power of the military has allowed the civil government to adopt a less securitized and more autonomous approach to foreign policy (Göksel 2016). The brief honeymoon with the EU, especially among Western observers, fostered the idea of the Turkish model as a mix of secular institutions, moderate Islam, democracy, and globalization. The improvement of relations with the EU continued until 2008 when the government’s approach towards the EU membership process gradually changed. Another factor related to the de-securitization of the domestic policy was the opening of a space for a political solution of the Kurdish issue (Ozcelik 2006). The domestic’s transformations created favorable conditions for the change of approach in regional policy.

Turkish involvement in the region was driven by a new strategy commonly known as zero problems with neighbors. Even though the Arab uprisings in general, and the Syria stalemate in particular, have shown all the limits and the weaknesses of the zero-problem strategy, with no doubts it represented a break, or a shift, with the traditional one (Chiriatti & Donelli 2015). Indeed, although since the second half of the 1980s there have been many efforts to (re)establish ties with the region (Laçiner 2009), Turkey’s attitude changed with the JDPs rise. The regional agenda of the first two JDP governments witnessed a more confident Turkey that was able to pursue leadership ambitions in the Middle East (Ozkececi-Taner 2017).

The idea of Turkey to shape the regional order according to its preferences and to put itself at the center was a logical evolution of its historical role (Saraçoğlu & Demirkol 2015). The new national role conception of the Turkish FPEs was aiming

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14 The ‘zero problems’ derived by the former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s strategic depth doctrine that brought the country to adopt a new agenda to reposition Turkey from the periphery of international relations to the center, minimizing the troubles in the neighboring regions.
to enlarge Turkey's influence in the neighboring regions reasserting its Ottoman-Islamic legacy (Ozkececi-Taner 2017).

During this phase, the Turkish strategic vision was based on the perception of Turkey as a potential regional great power and the possibility of acquiring a more important role in the international arena (Haugom 2019, 10). The process of reformulation of the country's identity and international role was underpinned by recurrent and growing neo-ottomans rhetoric. As noted by constructivist theory, identity building is always supported by a narrative that ensures biographical continuity making any changes seem natural. For Turkish FPEs, neo-ottomanism as a kind of supra-state identity seemed useful both to counterpose the pervasive autonomy claims within its borders – Kurdish issue – and to strengthen trans-state relations by recalling historical and cultural ties with the Middle East and the Balkans people (Yavuz 2016).

Simultaneously, Turkey launched a series of initiatives to mediate the main regional disputes to prove its commitment to acting as a cooperative builder in the region. Exploiting the principle of pro-active and pre-emptive peace diplomacy, Ankara tested its diplomatic tools in conflict situations, operating as a mediator in sensitive areas such as the Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the Middle East (Israel-Syria, Syria-Saudi Arabia).

From perspective of the nexus between international and domestic politics, this period reflects a dualist approach. Indeed, there were both strong international and domestic incentives to adopt a more active and less securitized FP behaviour. The JDP rise resulted in a harsh criticism of the traditional ‘status quo’ agenda, that has been replaced by a new spectrum of mix (more) soft and (less) hard security issues. In this period, as illustrated in Table 1, Turkey started to adopt a revisionist orientation toward the regional order and a pro-active FP behavior. This attitude was induced by the perception of the strategic environment as a permissive one.
3. The resilience of TFP (2010-2014)

In the early 2010s, especially with the blast of the Syrian civil war and the military coup in Egypt (2013), Turkish assertive behavior in regional policy was challenged by serious security threats. The transformed regional environment led Turkey’s FPEs to redefine their priorities, keeping an eye on the turmoil that was agitating the whole region - internal wars, failed states, and human tragedies - (Keyman 2016). The Middle East is more a system of territorial states than a system of nation-states in which multiple levels of identity – substate, state and supra-state – coexist (Kienle 1990).

Thus, as pointed out by Noble (2008), the regional states could be better represented as a set of interconnected organisms, rather than as responding to the realist’s impenetrable ‘billiard balls’. Therefore, when a democratic wave erupted in Tunisia all regional states started to feel exposed to such turmoil. Following Obama’s administration strategy of the ‘pivot to Asia’, the strategic engagement of the US in the region gradually diminished, leaving room for maneuver to other great powers such as Russia and China. This systemic incentive, combined with the regional dynamics, drove Turkey as well as other regional powers such as Iran to engage in a more assertive behavior in regional affairs (Hazbun 2018; Gürzel & Ersoy 2020). In other words, the new international geostrategic order directed towards a post-Western one (Stuenkel 2016), and the dramatic changes in the regional power balances provided to Turkish FPEs a strategic environment even more permissive, that has been considered by NCRs scholars as an important variable to explain foreign policy decision making (Ripsman, Taliaferro & Lobell 2016).

Although the external environment had shaped the structural conditions for the formulation of a new policy, were mainly the unit-level factors (intervening variables) that determined Turkish actions. Specifically, to better understand Turkey’s behavior after the 2011 Arab upheavals, it should be considered the JDP’s ideological frame and the strengthening of its power in the domestic sphere. The JDP is a post-Islamist party with a powerful religious-conservative core (Robins 2007; Duran 2010). Many among its members share a background within the ranks of the Islamist
Outlook Movement, which policy has traditionally been close to Islamist movements in the region. Among the most influential FPE, there was Ahmet Davutoğlu, who since the 1990s upheld the idea that Turkey should have supported the Islamic political movements in the region. According to him, the region’s authoritarian regimes would sooner or later collapse, paving the way for Islamist movements. The opportunity showed up in 2011 with the violent unrest that crossed almost all Middle Eastern countries. A feeling shared in those months by several international analysts, who viewed Turkey as a viable model for the Arab world.

With so many challenges, Turkish FPEs have faced a kind of ethics versus interest dilemma, resulted in an ambiguous behavior. As shown by some studies, at the outbreak of the uprisings despite the JDP government's discourse had embraced the shift towards democracy in the region (values-oriented), this was not followed by concrete support for the opposition movements. This ambiguous attitude was evident in the reluctance shown towards intervention in Libya (interest-oriented). Initially, Turkish FPEs perceived the uprisings as a positive dynamic that would make the regional environment more permissive. This interpretation was inspired by the belief that the so-called Arab Spring would boost Turkey's rise as a global power through the institutionalization of a favorable regional order. As a result, Turkey increased its commitment to the many regional disputes triggered, or simply exacerbated, by the 2011 wave of instability. Besides, because Ankara had no particular interests in regime continuity in either Tunisia or Egypt, the JDP leadership sustained the popular formula ‘let the people decide’ (Robin 2013; Gökşel 2015). Strengthened by its third term victory election (June 2011) JDP’s government started pursuing more pro-Islamists policies in its regional agenda. For a while, when the Ennahda Party in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt seemed to be conquering the government, Davutoğlu’s and Erdogan’s ambitions of Turkey’s leading the Middle East

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15 In his book *Civilizational Transformation and the Muslim World* (1994), Davutoğlu provided an 'Islamic alternative' to the 'modernist paradigm' that was shaping the international order up to that date.
17 See for example (Aras and Akarçşim 2011; Öniş 2012; Altuṅşık 2013; Yakış 2014).
18 Turkey gave its staunch support to Palestine’s Hamas, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, Tunisia’s Ennahda, as well as to the militant Islamist groups within the Free Syrian Army in Syria.
into a new era of ‘civilizational awakening’ seemed to have taken its first crucial steps (Gürzel & Ersoy 2020).

The JDP assumed an unprecedented level of assertiveness in the neighborhood, which led to a complete transformation in the principles of Turkey’s actions towards the Middle East, driven by a strong revisionist, almost revolutionary, orientation of the regional system. Some JDP officials’ thought this would have represented a key to overcome the issue of the claimed ‘incompatibility’ of Islam and democracy and to the reshuffle of regional balances. The return of the demonstration of compatibility would have reinforced Turkey’s case for EU membership. Turkey, indeed, was playing a leading role in shifting the normative framework in favor of ‘universal’ values in the Islamic world (Yorulmazlar & Turhan 2015). The assertive approach to regional issues was dictated by an excess of optimism. The Turkish EFPs, above all Davutoğlu and Erdoğan, were subject to a so-called positive illusions (Johnson 2004). The overconfidence led them to overestimate their abilities to drive or even handle regional turmoil (Renshon and Renshon 2008). It was during the Libyan crisis and the beginning of the Syrian civil-war that Turkish FPE eventually faced the actual structural constraints and chances produced by the uprisings. Initially, Turkey encouraged a dialogue among the different sides in the Syrian context. It quickly emerged how there was no support for this approach from both regional and extra-regional powers, and eventually, Turkish behavior alienated the Syrian people’s sympathy. As a consequence, Turkey adopted a more assertive policy, presenting an undeniable contrast with the former decade. This active engagement in the Syrian crisis has been well marked by Erdoğan’s statement that ‘Syria is Turkey’s internal affair’. Since then, Turkey’s policy towards Syria has been guided by humanitarian and ethical determinants and by realpolitik.


3.1. New priorities at home, new policies abroad

The Arab upheavals have curbed or eliminated some key elements and principles of the new foreign policy strategy formulated by the JDP. The endure of the Syrian crisis has been the turning point because it has shown the limits of an independent and multi-dimensional foreign policy in the Middle East (Hinnebusch 2015; Chiriatti & Donelli 2015). A final blow to the ‘zero problems’ policy and its founding principles has been given by the domestic developments. The so-called Gezi Park protests and their aftermaths became emblematic of the failure of the balance between democracy and security in Turkey, raising new doubts about Turkey’s ambitions to act as a role model to the Muslim Arab states. Furthermore, the rift between the Gülen movement and JDP also has exacerbated the domestic political climate, creating a rift within some institutions and amongst FPEs (Salt 2015).

Once the Arab upheavals have eroded the structure of regional fragile balance, Turkish ability to reframe its assertive foreign policy completely dropped. According to Diodato, this outcome is imputable to the FPE, since the state was incapable to understand that foreign policies of states are dialectics of inter-subjective relations and not a pre-given format that society cannot change (Diodato 2016, 32). Therefore, although the regional sub-system had provided Turkey with chances to prove its democratic credentials, the events did not follow the path hoped by Turkish FPEs and international observers. Moreover, the crisis of the Westphalian system within the region gave non-state actors many opportunities to fill the power vacuum. Particularly, two militias groups had a profound impact on Turkish security: the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a PKK-affiliated Kurdish militia in Syria, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), a radical Islamic movement. When the ISIL militants sieged Kobani (2014), Ankara had to face a dilemma. In the first stages of the clashes, Turkey did not allow the Kurdish fighters from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to pass through its borders to support the YPG militias, regardless of the many pressures coming from the international community. The event has

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21 On this issue see also (Teschke & Cemgil 2014).
shown a contradiction inherent in the new Ankara’s policy towards the regional events, namely the clash between self-interest and higher ideals.

Since 2011 also the national role conception and the narrative behind the Turkish foreign policy agenda have changed a lot. If the idea of Turkey as a model for other region’s countries has been damaged by few domestic developments, Turkish discourse assumed a more ideational tone, focusing on the role of Turkey as a global humanitarian actor and emerging donor country. Turkey has become one of the key “global humanitarian actors of world politics” (Bayer & Keyman 2012). This discourse reflects a teleological, even utopian understanding of world affairs. Turkey’s narrative adopted a new missionary approach according to which Turkey plays a historical role of leader or hegemonic country not only in the region but of a wider Muslim community (ummat) as well demonstrated by the Turkey’s humanitarian response to Rohingya’s crisis. Such a missionary approach to foreign policy reflected some peculiar Turkish socio-political dynamics. When the JDP’s third term started in 2011, the Kemalist influence over the media, judiciary, and military was already marginalized (Kuru 2012). Indeed, since the 2009 Turkey has witnessed a gradual process of JDP-ization of the political system and institutions, along with the rise of the concept of a ‘New Turkey’ (Yeni Türkiye). Meanwhile, an early reshuffle had also begun within the ruling party. The figure of Erdogan was becoming ever more dominant and the internal voices of dissent were gradually dispelled. There was, therefore, a twofold trend; if on the one hand, the country was going through a phase of JDP-ization, on the other hand, the JDP was increasingly Erdoganized (Yilmaz & Bashirov 2018). Inevitably, these two closely intertwined internal dynamics began to affect also the TFP behavior, centralizing decision-making power in the hands of the Prime Minister and his inner circle of advisers. At the same time, the rhetoric behind


23 The concept of a ‘New Turkey’ has been used to refer to the widely held opinion, both in Turkey and in the Western world, according to which the JDP’s coming to power in 2002 had started a whole new era in Turkish political history (Alaranta 2015, 10). For a more in-depth analysis see (İnsel 2014; Yilmaz 2017; Aydıntaşbağ 2020).
the Turkish agenda began to fuel the image of Turkey as the main patron of all Muslims. The change of perception of the surrounding environment from permissive to restrictive and internal developments did not change the revisionist approach to the region, favoring the adoption of a more assertive policy. The Turkish FPEs, driven by an excess of optimism, increased their involvement in the domestic dynamics of the countries experienced by the protests.


Even if leaders and domestic forces determine what the state wishes or tries to do, it is the systemic level that determines what it can do. Indeed, over the years, mainly systemic determinants obliged Ankara to alter its revisionist soft-power oriented policy towards the region. Specifically, the Libyan and Syrian crisis have shown to Turkish FPEs that ‘a cautious ‘wait and see’ approach was not a viable option’ (Keyman 2016). The uprisings gave new impetus to the regional power struggle. Three regional power’s blocs, led by Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia competed to shape the post-Arab Spring regional order and have affected the internal struggle for power within the countries that were experiencing uprisings. However, as the Syrian conflict deepened into intractable civil war, the Ankara government seemed to be ineffectual in controlling the turmoil within its borders and much less bid for regional leadership (Hinnebusch & Ehteshami 2014). Moreover, Turkish FPE “miscalculated the Islamist movements political chances in the post-2011 democratic wave, over-assessed Turkey’s power and influence, and did not predict the reactions of other regional and global actors” (Yeşilyurt 2017, 76). In other words, the Arab upheavals and Turkish inability to handle the Syrian crisis with diplomatic tools have jeopardized Turkey’s ambition to be a leading country. Ankara’s over-activism has resulted in a growing number of threats to its security along the Southern border. Moreover, the different approaches pursued by Russia and the West have further convoluted the post-Arab Spring geopolitical environment.

The developments on Turkish Southern border have made Turkey’s status more unstable and they have influenced Turkish FPE orientation towards neighbors
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(Donelli 2018). These latter were increasingly as potential enemies - as during the pre-JDP era. Meanwhile, the perception of threat coming from the extra-regional powers (US, Russia, and EU countries) has increased, as they were considered as producers of instability within Turkey. The ‘order maker’ role in the region asserted by Davutoğlu proved to be too optimistic as shown by the worsening of the Syrian civil war. These circumstances have also driven to another change in the Turkish national role conception, from the idea of a ‘central country’ to the one of Turkey as an isolated country24 with a buffer role. Similarly, to the Cold War period, Turkey perceives itself as a buffer state. This current conception is security-driven and based on the notion of containment and status quo orientation. As underlined by Keyman (2016, 2280) ‘the current Turkey’s buffer identity has three subtexts: (1) to contain refugees in Turkey; (2) to contain the ISIL problem in the MENA region, mainly in Syria and Iraq; and (3) to balance Iran’s regional hegemonic aspirations’. This shift is a double backward step towards a position akin to the pre-JDP era.

The international and regional context that had previously created a permissive environment had changed, reducing the Turkish room for maneuver. Domestic constraints also increased. Firstly, the discontent for democratic backsliding (Tansel 2018). Secondly, the warfare between the Turkish authority and Gülen movement within state institutions, blast in the failed coup attempt in mid-2016. Thirdly, the large number of attacks by terrorist groups such as ISIL and TAK (a PKK offshoot) in Turkish cities. Finally, the disappointing results of the June 2015 general elections in which JDP saw its majority fading away, forcing the government to reshuffle political alliances. The events depicted above, indicate how the domestic level is currently characterized by growing challenges to JDP’s role and depict the rising polarization among different social and political communities in the country. Several transformations also involved the TFP decision-making process where Erdoğan has taken the primary role, leaving a limited position to Davutoğlu’s circle (Kuru 2015). Alongside, Turkey had to left aside its ambition to become a ‘city upon a hill’ in the Middle

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East, in line with Davutoğlu’s grand vision, and embraced a more pragmatic and less ideological FP behavior in regional competition. Since 2015, Turkey’s strategy has followed a greater alignment with Russian positions on some issues, through a compartmentalized approach (Oztem 2017). The trilateral cooperation with Iran (so-called Astana process), aiming to reach a sustainable ceasefire in Syria, represented a milestone in this new path of Turkey-Russia relations.

Turkey’s decision to adopt a pragmatic approach vis-a-vis Russia resulted from a multiplicity of factors: a. the development of the Syrian crisis with the American support for the YPG militia against the ISIL, and the Russia’s direct military intervention in support of the Assad regime; b. the Western criticism of the JDP government in the aftermath of Gezi Park protests; c. the personal relationships between the two leaders, Erdogan and Putin, further improved following the 2016 failed coup; d. finally, the emergence of a new strategic culture among the Turkish FPEs, the Eurasianism. The rise of the Eurasianist perspective, not new in TFP, is related to the power struggle within FPEs to fill the vacuum left by the wave of arrests of Gülenist affiliated. Among the factions that have acquired more influence is the so-called Perinçek group. The group, which revolves around the leader of the arch-secularist and ultranationalist Patriotic Party, Doğu Perinçek, is known for its staunchly secular, isolationist, socialist, anti-US, anti-West, pro-Russian and Eurasianist characteristics.

25 The two states the two countries mainly kept security and defense concerns outside bilateral cooperation.
28 For an in-depth analysis, see (Akcali & Perinçek 2009; Colakoğlu 2019).
5.1. Back to the securitized model

The increasing number of threats (real or simply perceived) in the neighborhood led to a switch in FP behavior and the tools used with a growing commitment to the hard power. The escalating frictions with the traditional Western allies - EU countries, the US - (Haugom 2019) and the increase in regional competition with the deterioration of relations with the Saudi-led bloc (Hazbun 2018; Cannon & Donelli 2020) contributed to change the Turkish FPEs’ perception of the surrounding environment from restraining to threatening. As a consequence, Turkey has adopted a more securitized FP in which the hard power regained supremacy over soft power. The increasing use of military means has come together with a clear doctrine of pre-emptive action, which is called ‘Erdoğan doctrine’.29 The core idea of this new security approach is that facing a wide range of external problems and threats, Turkey must adopt preventive policies. This doctrine recalled the 2002 G.W. Bush National Security Strategy of ‘pre-emption’, defined as pre-emptive and preventive action.

The first and clear outcome of such a new pre-emptive approach was the military intervention in northern Syria launched in August 2016 (Euphrates Shield).30 Yet, in January 2018 Turkey launched another military operation (Olive Branch) in the Afrin region, followed by the Operation Peace-Spring (October 2019) in order to prevent the consolidation of the Kurdish militia position and to create a safe zone on the border. Besides operations across the Syrian border, Turkey has launched several actions on the northern Iraq (Claw Eagle, Claw Tiger operations), as well as support to the UN-recognised GNA Libyan government led by Fayez al-Sarraj in Tripoli. The unilateral acts carried out by Turkey, to which has been added the East-Med dispute, have put the country in direct clash with the US and other NATO allies’ interest. As underlined by Altunisik (2020), these dynamics are parts of a new Turkish

30 The military operation, ended in March 2017, had the aim to oppose the ISIL advance and to prevent the constitution of an independent Kurdish state in Syria.
“game of balancing” between the Western states (mainly the US) and Russia, aiming to increase Turkey’s room for maneuver.

The domestic variable that contributed to the shift in FP behaviour was the transition to the presidential system. Within the new Turkish institutional system, FP decisions should be taken by a multiplicity of entities coordinated among each other by an extensive set of consultative structures and mechanisms. At the top of these structures, there is the President of the Republic, who is the main authority in foreign policy decision-making (Duran & Miş 2018). The consultative roles belong to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Committee for Security and Foreign Policy, the National Security Council (NSC), the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), the formally appointed advisors of the President and the various connections of the President outside the Presidency (so-called informal advisors), as well as the Turkish Army in a role of external influence (Strand & Neset 2019). Beyond the institutional framework, in practice, FP decisions are taken by the President and a small circle of formal and informal advisors — including the Minister of National Defense, Hulusi Akar, the Head of National Intelligence, Hakan Fidan, and Special Adviser to the President, Ibrahim Kalin (Haugom 2019, 214). In other words, although from an institutional point of view the Turkish structure evokes the political process model (Hilsman 1990) or the inter-branch politics one (Qingshan 1992), in essence, the current Turkey’s foreign policy decision-making process is more like the leader-dominant model (Kaarbo 1997).

The institutional shift has allowed President Erdogan to give his imprint, both formal and substantial, to foreign policy. President Erdoğan increasing ‘one-man’ rule has been observed in almost all aspects of Turkish politics, including FP within which has increased the relevance of the personal (idiosyncratic) characteristics. As well pointed out by Dawisha (1988), the idiosyncratic variable usually occurred in regimes where power is personalized and concentrated, especially in time of fluidity or crises. The leader-dominant model has driven Erdoğan to use FP as an instrument to expand and energize his domestic constituency (Kesgin 2020). The securitized approach and the rising chauvinistic rhetoric have provided the ground for
a new political alliance (so-called People Alliance) between the JDP and the ultra-nationalist MHP party (Altunisik 2020). The ideological turn towards hard-liner nationalism in government policy has reinforced the promotion of a more interventionist and security-focused FP especially regarding regional disputes (Ulgen 2018). An example of how the current Turkish approach prioritizes domestic politics over foreign policy is visible in the decision of opening military bases abroad. Indeed, the establishment of a military base in Qatar in 2015, the first-ever Turkish outpost abroad, and the one that Ankara opened in Somalia (2017) would paint a new picture of success in the domestic sphere, reinforcing the idea that Turkey’s new foreign policy is alive and well (Aras & Akpinar 2017).

An unusual aspect of this new deal in FP is that the new concept of pre-emptive action is being discussed a lot in Turkish media. It seems that the government is working to generate support from the Turkish public, by promoting the doctrine of pre-emption and cross-borders operation as the sole method to combat the threats. As underlined by Kardaş, ‘the strategy involves concepts such as the effective use of military force beyond borders when needed, the possible disregard of traditional alliance relations and taking unilateral action independent by the US and NATO’. As did by the Kemalist establishment in the pre-JDP era, to foster public support, the Ankara government has used a rhetoric that beats the old Turkish fears, namely a hidden project of Western powers to establish a new regional system - an updated version of the Sèvres Treaty and the territorial integrity threatened by Kurdish claims (Kaliber & Kaliber 2019). Such discourse was also evident in the first few weeks after the mid-2016 failed coup attempt when high government officials accused the US and Europe of supporting the coup plotters.

31 For an in-depth analysis see (Rossiter & Cannon 2019).
Since 2015, Turkish gamble policy has driven to the military involvement in a multiplicity of crises from which Ankara has trouble to get out (in addition to Syria and Iraq also Libya), the overuse of economic and human resources, the escalation of tensions with several NATO allies (France, Netherlands, US), and the general isolation in the region and beyond. Yet, ‘Turkey’s ambitious policy based on supporting Sunni Islamist groups was interpreted as a sectarian approach’ (Yeşilyurt 2017, 74) by Western countries who started to see Turkey as a destabilizing force in the region. At the same time, Ankara’s activism and growing support for the Muslim Brotherhood caused a harsh vigorous reaction from other regional players, the so-called Arab Quartet. As pointed out by Aras and Akpınar (2017) the Gulf crisis (2017) has further demonstrated Turkey’s declining ability to bring parties to the table in the region.

6. Conclusion

As depicted above, Turkey's relative power has proved to be insufficient to shape post-Arab Spring political balances. The analysis of this case study has shown how Turkey is an example of a state in which domestic politics, international politics, and leadership style were and still are inter-penetrated because each of these domains has shown a limited degree of autonomous development. After almost sixty years in which following the Kemalist motto ‘peace at home, peace in the world’ international politics influenced TFP, the rising and consolidation of JDP governments have paved the way to almost thirteen years in which domestic and international politics equally have been influenced FP through a nested game.

After June 2015, this tendency seems to overturn again towards a more status-quo oriented FP, posing the national security at the core of its approach. Such trend corroborates the theory according to which during a period of high polarization within society, the ruling elite aims to keep its power and to preserve the status quo (Hinnebusch 2014), therefore it raises the level of threats to the state and consequently securitized not only its FP but also several domestic political issues. The focus on national security and the use of hard power tools links the Kemalist past to the

35 For an exhaustive analysis on this issue see also (Ayata 2015).
current years. Especially, Turkey’s regional policy has come ‘full circle as the discourses and policies of the 1990s, focusing on threats, zero-sum mentality and mistrust, have returned’ (Altunisik 2020, 17). However, there are differences between the two periods. Whether in the pre-JDP era, TFP was characterized by a wary and isolationist attitude, nowadays Turkey pursues its strategic goals through interventionist behavior.

Besides the substantial ideological differences between the Kemalist and the current TFP, a key element concerning the different decision-making models. From a bureaucratic politics model to a leader dominant one. The centralization of executive power in leader’s hand has increased the significance of the idiosyncratic or individual variable. A dynamic that is not at all new in Turkish politics but which is bound to be influenced by the personality and style of the leader in charge.

NCR approach allowed to take into account among the unit-level variables also the impact of strategic ideas, leaders perceptions, and national role by considering them as intertwining ideational variables. What changed in the case study is also the perception of the surrounding international and domestic environment or to better say about the structural and internal inputs: from being considered as incentives and opportunities, they became restraints and even threats. While the general orientation towards neighbors and great powers has swung from friend/patron to enemy/threat, domestic dynamics such as the Kurdish question and the social polarization (secular-conservative/center-peripheries), that represent two ‘bottom-up’ issues (from domestic to international), have determined significantly TFP.

See for example (Kesgin 2013).
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‘All Quiet on The Western Front’: Turkey’s Reintegration(?) into NATO through National Defense Industry

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ABSTRACT

Nationalizing the defense industry has been a priority for the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – JDP). This attempt was also interpreted as a part of Turkey’s move away from its Western alliances, specifically North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

This study suggests that while Turkey’s fluctuating relations with NATO fueled its efforts to develop a national defense industry, the continued development of the industry relies on sustained relations with NATO (at least for the foreseeable future) for two reasons. First, despite the significant progress made, Turkey’s membership in NATO created a path dependence and resulted in the national defense industry’s heavy reliance on NATO members for its growth. As a result, the industry is still tied primarily to NATO allies for the sustained imports of technology, parts and licensing. Second, the coercive instruments at NATO’s disposal (sanctions and embargoes) increase the costs of a potential departure from the Alliance.

KEYWORDS: Turkey; NATO; National Defense Industry

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1. Introduction

When, the then prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced JDP’s ‘2023 Political Vision’ (2023 Siyasi Vizyonu) in 2011, the development of ‘national tank, national aircraft, national ship and national satellite’ was listed among national defense policy goals (Sabah 2011). In early 2019, the head of the Presidency of Defense Industries summarized Turkey’s goals about its national defense industry as ‘By 2053, the Turkish defense industry aims to be 100 percent independent with an export capacity of $50 billion’ (Demirtaş 2019). Regardless of the feasibility of this goal, it is true that Turkey has made observable progress in developing its national defense industry. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) categorized Turkey as an ‘emerging producer’ in its 2020 report along with Brazil and India (SIPRI 2020a).

While Turkey’s desire to develop its national defense industry is a technonationalist project that aims to increase Turkey’s role and power within the international system, it is also informed by the insecurity that Turkey feels about the existing security protection it gets through its primary defense alliance, the NATO. As a reaction to reoccurring tensions between Turkey and NATO countries, in general, and the USA in particular, Turkey not only started to invest heavily into its defense industry but also took steps to diversify its defense capacity.

In December 2017, Turkey announced that it concluded a deal with Russia for the procurement of the S-400 missile defense system. The announcement met with strong criticism from Turkey’s NATO allies that voiced concerns about the compatibility of the system with NATO’s defense structure. The deal came at a time when the relations between Turkey and NATO are increasingly tense and when a perceived shift is taking place in the Turkish government’s foreign policy priorities. These conditions heightened the negative reaction the deal created.

The NATO members’ discontent with Turkey’s decision to buy S-400 escalated to such a level that Turkey got suspended from the F35 Joint Strike Fighter Program. Around the same time, Turkey initiated a military operation into Syria (Operation Peace Spring), which resulted in the initiation of an arms sales embargo.
by several NATO countries. As a reaction to the embargo, the President of Defense Industries İsmail Demir said in an interview 'we did our analysis, we have taken measures in areas such as alternative energy sources and domestic production’ (CNN Türk 2019). In the face of coercive measures used by NATO, the political rhetoric increasingly hints at potential severance from NATO and highlights the national defense industry as both a reason for and instrument through which such parting would take place.

It is the argument of this paper that Turkey meeting its defense needs by itself (and only for itself) is neither technologically nor economically or politically attainable or even desirable, at least in the foreseeable future. The globalized nature of the defense industry creates incentives for Turkey to increase its exports and remain engaged with the global market if it wants to keep developing its national defense industry. If Turkey was to be engaging in these activities in a political vacuum it would have, theoretically, given Turkey a free hand to pick and choose its alliances. However, both the historical development and the current functioning of the Turkish defense industry is heavily tied to its membership in NATO. On the one hand, the continued reliance on imports (in parts, technology as well as licensing) constitutes the economic and technical reasoning behind these ties. On the other hand, the embeddedness of NATO in Turkey’s defense structure, policies, and capacities in addition to the coercive mechanisms that the Alliance has (specifically in the form of sanctions and embargoes) create strong political and military incentives for Turkey to stay committed to NATO. Thus, while the tensions between Turkey and NATO have been one of the most important driving forces behind Turkey’s quest to develop a national defense industry, such desire in return creates incentives for Turkey to stay within NATO.

The first section below details the functioning of the global defense market to illustrate the difficulty of reaching defense autarky. The second section discusses the role of NATO in shaping its members’ defense industries. NATO’s function (and the tools at its disposal) both as an enabler and as an inhibitor for member states’ quest to develop their defense industries are highlighted. The third section provides
a historical account of Turkey’s quest to develop a national defense industry and how these efforts were affected by Turkey’s membership in NATO. The paper concludes with a discussion on why Turkey’s desire to further develop its national defense industry is likely to sustain its ties with NATO rather than resulting in further estrangement.

2. Global Defense Market and Defense Autarky

The defense market is highly globalized and is characterized by a small cluster of suppliers that derive not just economic but also political power through the intricate web of trade in defense products. Several factors contribute to the globalization of the defense market. While on the one hand, the logic of economics has been contributing to the development of transnational defense companies, the desire to be self-reliant (be less dependent to the largest arms producer, the USA), for security and economic reasons, made more and more countries invest in their defense industries (Hayward 2009). Nevertheless, the structure and the functioning of the global defense market make reaching defense autarky economically, technologically, and politically extremely difficult, or even undesirable for newly established producers.

When we look at today’s global defense market, what we see is somewhere between what techno-nationalists and techno-globalists believe in. To the distaste of ‘techno-nationalists’, who believe in the predominance of national boundaries in the development of technologies, military technologies spread around the world not just through imperialism but also through the export of weapons and the transfer of weapon producing technologies (Buzan & Herring 1998). Yet, as opposed to what ‘techno-globalists’ would argue, such expansion did not create an even market where technology is globally developed, produced, and consumed (Edgerton 2007). Rather the diffusion of military technology contributed to the unevenness of relations between countries, a hierarchy between the haves (which also have a hierarch within it depending on the types of weapons that a county can produce) and the have-nots.
which continuously fluctuates with the development of new military technologies and the expansion of production capabilities (Buzan & Herring 1998).

According to the most recent ‘Arms Transfer Data’ by SIPRI, the United States is the largest arms exporter with close to $10.8 billion export per year, which is more than double of what the second-largest exporter Russia did ($4.7 billion) in 2019 (see Table 1). Given the fact that the defense industry and arms trade is dominated by a few countries, and the extreme difficulties that other states face in their bids to be competitive internationally, it becomes important to understand why developing states, such as Turkey, still invest in national defense industries and what kind of an impact such attempts have on the global market.

Economics of scale also creates an incentive for states to export their arms. Since the more advanced a military technology gets the more expensive it becomes, ‘nearly all arms producers have strong incentives to export’ to meet their needs for reasonable costs (Buzan & Herring 1998, p.35). This in return ‘ease[s] [developing countries’] access to much-needed technology transfers for the development of their domestic defense industries’ and allows them to develop their indigenous defense industries (Kurç & Neuman 2017, p.220).

Technological advancements such as ‘3-D printing and improved computer modeling and capacity for simulation’ also contributes to the globalization of defense suppliers as such advancements would make it possible for more companies to shoulder the costs of prototyping and testing (Rowlands & Kabongi 2017, p.65). Yet, such changes are not likely to fundamentally change the market in the short run, which means that further developing national defense industries will continue to rely on international cooperation and continued transfer of technology from established producers.
Table 1 - Ratio of arms exported to arms imported (2019 figures)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Exports in arms</th>
<th>Imports in arms</th>
<th>Ratio of arms exported/arms imported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>United States</td>
<td>10752</td>
<td>1048</td>
<td>10,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>4718</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>9436,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>3368</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>33,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1423</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>1,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1185</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>30,4</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1061</td>
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<td>18,9</td>
</tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>377</td>
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<td>1510</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0,9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*As a supplier.

*In million US$.


It should be noted that while any defense industry, that wants to expand its operation and profit, needs to be integrated into the global market, not all countries’ defense industries are equally dependent on exports (see Table 1) and hence, they are not equally eager about the globalization of the market. In addition to the defense industries’ capacity, the decisions regarding the sale of arms (and to whom) is a balancing act between strategic and economic calculations of the states. Lucie Beraud-Sudreau and Hugo Meijer (2016, p.58) suggest that a country’s position in the ‘world hierarchy of weapon producers’ as well as the defense industry’s level of dependency
on exports shape policies. The authors suggest that if the defense budget of a country is big then there would be less dependency on exports and less enthusiasm to sell weapons. Similarly, the higher a country is on the hierarchy of weapon producers, the less inclined they would be to export to hold onto their ranking by preventing the diffusion of advanced military technologies (Beraud-Sudreau & Meijer 2016). The varying degrees of willingness to diffuse defense technology further contribute to the creation of an ever-expanding yet increasingly uneven market, where the implications of diffusion for states’ relative position in the international system are taken into account alongside the economic gains to be cultivated.

From the perspective of developing countries, the desire to invest in their national defense industries is not only a result of the opportunity that the interests of the established producers created for it. There are security, identity, and economic dimensions that states take into account in prioritizing the development of their national defense industries. Rather than being separate concerns, these dimensions are intertwined. National defense industries are, at the most fundamental level, developed to allow a country to be self-reliant on equipping its military with necessary capabilities. However, they are also a source and an indicator of identity and international prestige that illustrates a country’s industrial and military capabilities and signals its strength, if need be. Bitzinger and Kim (2005) explain developing countries’ attempts to develop their national defense industries partly as a result of ‘techno-nationalism’. In David E. H. Edgerton’s (2007, p.3) words, techno-nationalism is not only about becoming autarchic but also illustrating that a ‘country is best fitted for the technological age’ which supports the reimagining of national identities in the face of a changing global environment.

In addition to being a source of pride and prestige, becoming an arms producer also has implications for a state’s relative power in the international system. Arms suppliers enjoy varying degrees of control on buyer states through shaping (and limiting) their military capabilities as well as their foreign policy (for instance through embargoes), which is an edge that developing countries would benefit from having (Neuman 1988; Boutin 2009). However, as the below analysis illustrates, states’
capacity to convert defense production to political power varies based on the relative power of the state within the international system, how advanced of a producer the state is, and how reliant the defense industry is to exports.

The desire to develop a national defense industry is also driven by domestic motivations to create jobs and to cultivate political capital from increased economic wealth (Bağcı & Kurç 2017). It can also be used as a way of ‘improv[ing] balance of payments’ by limiting the money spent on importing weapons (Brzoska & Ohlson 1986). As it is pointed out earlier, the national defense industry becomes a source of economic wealth only when it has an export component to it. Rahman and Siddiqui (2019) illustrate in their recent study that, while defense spending normally harms economic growth as it means less of the budget is spared for other areas (Ram 1995; Dunne & Tian 2013), when coupled with arms exports, it has a ‘positive and significant effect’ on GDP.

The importance of export in the defense industry is not only limited to its impact on a country’s economic growth, it is also considered to be essential in ‘maintain[ing] [the industry’s] size and sophistication’ so that if the domestic need arises the industry could respond quickly (Hen-Tov 2004, p.57). This leads to what (Moravcsik 1991) calls an ‘autarky-efficiency dilemma’, which means that even though the optimal scenario is to be self-sufficient in defense needs and to not sell them to other countries (to avoid security dilemma), the production of weaponry involves high costs and keeping the defense industry up to date requires continues investment, as such selling of weapons to other countries becomes a necessity.

Since governments are the main buyers in the market, both domestic and international factors shaping their procurement decisions are of the highest importance for the future of any defense industry. For that reason, a country’s defense industry’s ability to sell its products internationally cannot be thought independently of that country’s relations with the others. Therefore, while increasing security concerns is important for defense sales, the more dependent a country’s defense industry is on exports the more they would be susceptible to any potential disturbance they might have with their trading partners. Similarly, as identified above, since
established producers also make strategic calculations in choosing which newly developing industries to share their technology and collaborate in production with, newly developing defense industries are also vulnerable to any disturbance they might have with their collaborators. Thus, while developing national defense industry has a lot of security, political, and economic value to it, the connections through which it develops has a strong bearing on the trajectory of its developments.

3. Military Alliances and Defense Industries: The Case of NATO

The discussion above illustrates the unevenness of the global defense market and highlights the conditions that drive (and limit) the expansion of defense industries. The discussion also suggests that the ability of a country to develop a national defense industry depends on not just domestic factors but also conditioned upon the willingness on the part of the established producers to welcome the new producer into the market. This section discusses the opportunities and limitations that NATO, as a prominent military alliance, presents to its members’ attempts at developing national defense industries.

The North Atlantic Treaty that created a mutual defense alliance among its members was signed in 1949 as a part of the perceived need to counter the ideological and territorial expansion of the Soviet Union (Sandler & Harthley 1999). As the political landscape evolved, first with the end of the Cold War (that brought an end to ‘the Soviet threat’) and then with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (that turned non-state actors into the biggest security threats in the international system), NATO found itself in a dire need to reidentify its purpose and reclaim its relevance. First by shifting its focus to civil wars and humanitarian crises after the collapse of the Soviet Union and then by identifying ‘terrorism’ as the threat to defend its members against, NATO has tried to survive a crisis of mission and a crisis of identity. Currently, with the rise of populist leaders and increasing tendency to seek unilateralism, as seen in the steps taken by the Trump administration, NATO is facing yet another problem in front of its relevance and efficacy.
Military alliances, such as NATO are identified as important in the literature not just for the military protection they provide for their members but also for serving as a forum for communication and cooperation as well as for their function as ‘brands’ that contribute to a state’s identity. Another dimension of military alliances that is less discussed is their political economy implications. Military alliances create a demand and supply for military supplies and encourage its members to abide by certain rules as to budgeting, production, and trade in arms. Military alliances, thus, create path dependency regarding patterns of behavior in making procurement decisions as to the established links, mutual understanding of threats, and a common identity decreases the negative externalities of arms trade for both the supplier and the receiver. As Callado-Munoz et al. (2019, p.1) analyzed the impact of the Alliance on NATO members trading in arms and found that military alliances create positive ‘security and technology externalities’ for its members, as allies are more likely to procure their arms from each other.

The earliest, and possibly the most influential study, that analyzed military alliances from an economic point of view was done by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966). Using formal modeling they approached security alliances as a public good (once it achieves its purpose all members will enjoy the security provided regardless of their contribution to its creation). Taking the disproportionate share that the USA shoulders in collective defense spending within the NATO this study suggests that the ‘public good’ nature of collective security would inevitably lead to free-riding. Duncan Snidal (1991), taking on the issue, helps explain why the USA would be willing to agree to such disproportionate burden-sharing. Snidal (1991, p.720) suggests that ‘an asymmetric distribution of absolute gains may be a requisite for striking cooperative agreements among different-sized states concerned about relative gains’. Snidal bases his argument on the assumption that smaller states would be more worried about relative gains which encourage larger states to offer more as they would prefer an ‘unequal cooperative arrangement to no cooperation’ (Snidal 1991, p.720). Later scholars, however, suggested that (Murdoch 1995; Sandler & Harthley 2001; Rowlands and Kabongi 2017), free-riding behavior would lead to
suboptimal defense spending unless mechanisms or norms that push for greater cooperation is put in place. The NATO aimed to address this problem through Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty which states that ‘in order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack’ (North Atlantic Treaty 1949). Thus, NATO, in theory, would support member states’ attempts at developing their national defense industries.

Later studies expanded this model of military alliances and highlighted the nuance between defense to be enjoyed by all members of an alliance as a public good (such as nuclear deterrence) and as private good (impurely public benefit) owned by each member (such as anti-ballistic missiles) (Russett 1970; Sandler & Forbes 1980; Sandler 1988; Sandler & Hartley 2001; Rowlands & Kabongi 2017). This new model, called the ‘joint-products model’, suggests that such private gains would limit the free-riding problem and help sustain military alliances (Oneal 1990; Sandler 1993). As such, these studies not only explain why states choose to invest in their defense industries rather than becoming ‘free-riders’ but also why members’ desire to develop their defense industries is not, by itself, a threat to the alliance.

Nevertheless, the member states’ desire to become self-reliant in their defense needs does not need to stem from an attempt to address the free-riding problem to sustain the alliance but could rather results from their concerns about the protection they get through the alliance. The tension between the USA and the Western European members of the NATO alliance has long been bubbling. This tension led to a growing effort on the part of the European countries to develop a ‘European security and defense identity’ (Missiroli 2002, p.9). These efforts were a function of European countries’ desire to make security decisions independent of the USA with the realization that transatlantic security interests would not necessarily overlap. The concerns about the divergence of interests were proven right when American president Donald Trump, who geared the USA toward unilateralism, threatened to leave the Alliance if other members would not stop ‘free-riding’ (The
New York Times 2018). However, such ‘threats of abandonment’ are not peculiar to the Trump administration, either. The historical evidence illustrates that the USA perceived its commitment to Europe to be temporary during the 1950s and threatened to leave the Alliance when in 1960s France (with the initial support of West Germany) pushed to be more independent (and in a leading role) when it came to European politics (Schuessler & Shifrinson 2019). France’s investment in developing nuclear weapons in the 1960s, for instance, was seen ‘not as a defense against the Soviet threat, but as a tool with which to free themselves from American domination’ (Regnault, 2003 cited in Côrte-réal Pinto 2017, p.305; Galbreath & Gebhard 2010).

However closely knit they might be, alliances are still composed of self-interested actors with varying levels of power and multiple interests that may diverge at any time. While such differences do not necessarily break down an alliance, competition, as well as mechanisms of coercion, should be taken into account in explaining the impact that an alliance has on a member state’s policy choices. That is to say, while the USA has been complaining about the disproportionate burden it shoulders within the NATO structure and calls for European members to pick up their share, the USA’s desire to share the burden does not aim to shake the relative power of the USA in the Alliance. As an example of this Gene Gerzhoy (2015, p.92) argues that what prevented West Germany’s from pursuing nuclear ambitions was ‘the logic of alliance coercion’, ‘a strategy consisting of a patron’s [the USA’s] use of conditional threats of military abandonment to obtain a client’s compliance with its demands.’

It can be concluded that military alliances in general and NATO, in particular, create both incentives for and limitations in front of member states’ attempts at developing national defense industries. While the powerful members of the alliance support such initiatives to the extent that they help share the burden of collective defense requirements, they object to any attempt that would shuffle the power dynamics within the alliance. Similarly, while concerns about the defense, that the alliance would provide, create a motive for states to develop their national defense
industries, the countries, nonetheless, rely on the connections they established through the alliance in developing defense industries. The alliance’s power to have such influence over its members comes from both the patterns of behavior it creates but also the coercive mechanisms it entails.

4. Turkey’s National Defense Industry

4.1. Turkey-NATO Relations as an Impetus for the Development of National Defense Industry

The history of the modern Turkish national defense industry can be traced back to the establishment of the Republic in 1923. Coming out of a war of independence and adopting an economic approach that relies on national capabilities, the state laid the early foundations of a state-led national defense industry (Côrte-réal Pinto 2017). While domestic factors played an important role in the development of the national defense industry, the below short historical account traces the development of the national defense industry in the light of Turkey-NATO relations.

Turkey’s decision to stay out of World War II created concerns about its commitment to the Western camp after the war. However, Turkey’s geopolitical position was too important for the Western camp to leave Turkey to its devices and Korean War presented an opportunity for Turkey to illustrate its commitment to the common identity (Yılmaz & Bilgin 2005). As a result, Turkey became a NATO member in 1951. The early and, due to the economic limitations, modest steps are taken to establish a national defense industry came to a halt when Turkey joined

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1 It needs to be noted that while this study focuses on the international factors’ impact on the development of the defense industry, domestic factors also have played, and still play, a role in shaping these developments. In that respect, in addition to technological limitations, institutional weaknesses and lack of coherence in policymaking can be listed as important impediments in front of Turkey’s prospects for developing defense autarky (Kurç 2017). The problem of leadership which stems from the tension in civil-military relations found its reflection in several problems including ‘[lack of] clear division of responsibilities, [lack of] agreement on the appropriate structure of the defense industry, the ownership of the companies that belong to the Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Güçlendirme Vakfı (TSKGV – Turkish Armed Forces Foundation), and the role of military factories and shipyards in defense production’ (Kurç 2017, p.266).
NATO and the surplus inventory of NATO allies transferred to Turkey free of charge (Kayaoğlu, 2009; Côrte-réal Pinto 2017).

During the 1950s, as the room given to private initiatives in the economy expanded, the connections established through the NATO alliance, allowed Turkey to take steps toward developing its defense industry which started to include more and more private firms (Côrte-réal Pinto 2017). The early crises took place in the 1960s, primarily with the USA, created the initial realization of the downside of alliances. Turkey had a fallout, primarily with the USA, first with the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and then with the Cyprus problem in 1964 and 1974, which led to an arms embargo initiated in 1975 and lasted for three years (Uslu 2003; Williams 2016). These developments led Turkey to start questioning the ‘NATO’s commitment to protecting Turkish interests and led Ankara to seek ways of diversifying its foreign policy’ (Çelik 1999, p.2). They also demonstrated the need to develop a national defense industry (Günlük-Şenesen 1993; Bozdağlıoğlu 2003; Akça 2010; TASAM 2015).

When we came to the early 1980s, while the need for developing the national defense industry has become very clear, the imminent need to equip the military with modern arms in the face of the rising threat of PKK terrorism prioritized the import of such arms (Günlük-Şenesen 2002). In the meantime, the national defense industry also started to make observable progress. A law passed in 1985 that aimed to ‘develop a modern defense industry and ensure the modernization of the Turkish armed forces’ created both a designated budget and a specific Undersecretariat responsible for the administration of the sector.² In 1996 the efforts to modernize the army were boosted by an increase in the dedicated budget which was expected to be $150 billion over the following 30 years (Hen-Tov 2004). The dedicated budget was renewed once again in 2000 and $20 billion was spared to be spent on the modernization of the army over the course of ten years (Akça 2010).

It needs to be noted that Turkey’s attempts to develop its national defense industry has not always raised eyebrows among its Western allies. The USA was

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² Savunma Sanayii İle İlgili Bazi Düzenlemeler Hakkında Kanun No.3238 Date 7/11/1985
supportive of the steps taken by Turkey primarily for commercial reasons (the possibility of a partnership between American and Turkish firms that would create new markets for American interests). The European partners saw this as a commercial opportunity, as well but they were also interested in the contribution such a development would make to European countries’ attempts to become less dependent on the USA for their security needs (Côrte-réal Pinto 2017). Turkey started to take part in ‘European military-industrial projects’ which also helped repatch Turkey’s relations with the European Economic Community (Côrte-réal Pinto 2017).

The most important progress in developing a national defense industry took place under the JDP rule. Because of the opacity that surrounds data regarding the defense industry, it is very difficult to get an accurate picture of how much of Turkey’s national defense needs are met domestically. The most frequently cited numbers by the officials, including Hulusi Akar, the Minister of Defense, state that the Turkish national defense industry now produces about 70% of its military's needs which is a testament of progress compared to earlier periods (Sözcü 2019).

When the JDP came to power, they made it a point to distinguish their foreign policy approach from earlier periods, at least in rhetoric. Kemalist foreign policy was considered to be realist, cautious, reactive, and predominantly Western-oriented while JDP illustrated ambition to have a proactive foreign policy that is more engaged with its regional politics (Zürcher 2004). When JDP came to power they had a rather pro-EU attitude which led to many legal and political reforms and friendly relations with Western allies. However, due to several reasons explained below Turkey’s relations with the USA and Western European countries, and by extension, NATO started to fluctuate. While such fluctuations in Turkey’s relations with NATO are not peculiar to this new era, they nevertheless, presented an impetus for the development of the Turkish defense industry to pick up speed.

The reoccurring tensions between NATO and Turkey generally resulted from escalated tension between Turkey and the USA but were not limited to it. The first tension between the USA and Turkey of the JDP era took place in 2003 when the Turkish parliament, in the wake of the War in Iraq, rejected the proposal to allow
more than 60,000 American troops to operate out of Turkish bases which forced the entire war plan to be revised and to be delayed (CNN 2003). The civil war in Syria, that started in 2011, also contributed to the straining of relations between the USA and Turkey as they had different priorities in the region. The USA has been prioritizing defeating ISIS in Syria and cooperating with various armed non-state actors in doing so - including Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat—PYD). Turkey considers PYD as an extension of the terrorist organization Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistanı—PKK), that Turkey has been fighting against for over thirty years and the support they receive from the USA was not welcomed by Turkey. On the other hand, for Turkey, the priority was to see the Bashar al-Asad government overthrown which Turkish policymakers thought was a done deal at the beginning of the civil war (Park 2015).

Turkey’s relations with NATO has also suffered many smaller tensions including Turkey’s reluctance about the appointment of former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen as the Secretary-General of NATO due to his stance during the Muhammad cartoons controversy (resulted from the depiction of Prophet Muhammad in a series of cartoons published by a Danish newspaper which Muslims perceived as blasphemy). Turkey’s initial opposition to the deployment of NATO forces to Libya in 2011 (which resulted from Turkey’s concerns about other Muslim countries’ reaction to a NATO involvement in a Muslim country) also led to concerns about Turkey’s commitment to the alliance (Oğuzlu 2013).

NATO has not been the only side in this relationship that has concerns about the other's commitment. Turkey also interpreted several steps taken by NATO as signs of less than full commitment to Turkey’s protection. Following the downing of a Turkish jet by Syrian forces in 2012, Patriot missiles, contributed by Germany, the Netherlands, and the USA were stationed by NATO in the Southern border of Turkey (NATO 2017). In August 2015 first Germany and then the USA announced their plans for the withdrawal of their batteries. After the downing of a Russian jet by Turkish defense forces in November 2015, while voicing concerns about getting NATO dragged into a conflict with Russia, NATO agreed to increase its ‘air and
maritime presence along the borders and prevent future incidents’, (Sloat 2018, p.15) which fell short of Turkey's expectations. The failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016, not only created a significant trauma but also impacted Turkey’s threat perceptions and increased concerns about Western allies’ commitment to protecting Turkey (Egeli 2019). As discussed below, these concerns led to a warming of relations with Russia which later affected the defense procurement decisions.

The above historical account illustrates that the current tension between Turkey and NATO is not unprecedented. Historically, while NATO membership was crucial to Turkey’s defense capabilities, the fluctuating relations also created incentives for Turkey to invest in its defense industry. Combined with domestic factors, these developments paved the way for Turkey to become a sizeable defense producer and heightened the calls for/ worries about Turkey’s potential departure from NATO. The next section details out how the desire to develop the defense industry is likely to keep Turkey in NATO rather than drifting them apart.

4.2. The Ties that Bind: The National Defense Industry as an Impetus for Sustaining Turkey-NATO Relations

While Turkey’s perceived need to become self-reliant in its defense needs was the driving force behind the investment in the defense industry, further developing the defense industry depends on (i) the sustained flow of imports needed for production and (ii) increased export capacity. Due to the path dependency that Turkey’s NATO membership created, both of these conditions could not be met, at least in the foreseeable, if Turkey were to have a complete fallout with NATO.

The steps taken to rely more on the national defense industry led to both an increased domestic production and also a further integration into the global market at the same time (Côrte-réal Pinto 2017). Turkey’s progress in developing indigenous defense technologies was crucial in it. For instance, Bayraktar TB2, an unmanned

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3 There are speculations about the role of a British company, EDO MBM Technology, in the provision of ‘missile racks’ in the early development stages of the TB2. Neither side confirms the transaction and it is accepted that the final product is using components developed and produced in Turkey (Guardian 2019).
aerial vehicle (UAV) produced by Baykar not only exemplifies indigenous technological achievement but also had a demonstrable effect on Turkey’s ability to project its military capacity independent of its Western allies. Bayraktar TB2 got battle-tested in Syria, Libya, and was recently used by Azerbaijan in the Karabakh conflict and Baykar has already signed deals with Qatar and Ukraine for the sale of Bayraktar TB2 (Bekdil 2020).

The policymakers are aware of the need to find a place for Turkish products in the global market to sustain the growth of the industry. The Presidency of Defense Industries states in a report prepared in 2018 that

Within the scope of the protection of Turkish money, restrictions were imposed on foreign currency billing in domestic projects. As the healthiest way to provide foreign currency input to domestic firms is to increase exports, exports were identified as one of the main elements of establishing a sustainable and competitive defense industry ecosystem… (Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı 2018, p.12)

Turkey has steadily increased its position in the global defense market and as of 2019, Turkey ranks as the 12th largest arms exporter in the world with a sale volume of $245 million worth of arms (See Table 2). Two Turkish companies ASELSAN and Turkish Aerospace Industries rank among the Top 100 arms-producing companies around the world (See Table 3).4

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4 The significantly increased production capacity along with the observed impact that defense exports have on Turkey’s relations with its trade partners gave Turkey a boost of confidence regarding its ability to become autarkic and also project power through exports. Despite such progress, there is still a large gap between the largest arms exporters and the rest of the world, thus Turkey’s increased production and export volume needs to be contextualized within the hierarchical structure of the global defense market (See Table 1). Thus while increasing its share Turkey has not developed the capacity to match the lead exporters in the industry.
Table 2 - Turkey’s ranking in ‘Top 50 Largest Exporters’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Arms exports*</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*in US$ millions

Source: Table compiled by the author based on SIPRI Arms Transfer Database “TIV of arms exports from the top 50 largest exporters” http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_toplist.php
Table 3 - ASELSAN’s and Turkish Aerospace Industries’ ranking in ‘Arms Industry Database Top 100’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ASELSAN</th>
<th>Turkish Aerospace Industries</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ranking</td>
<td>Arms sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In US$ millions

Source: Table is compiled by the author based on The SIPRI Arms Industry Database Top 100 for 2002-2018 (excluding China) https://www.sipri.org/databases/armsindustry1

Turkey has been capitalizing on its NATO membership as a way of increasing exports. To further utilize this connection, Turkey specifically focused on finding ways to take part in multinational projects such as the ones developed by NATO and Organization for Joint Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR) and also through bilateral deals⁵ (Bağcı & Kurç 2017). The Undersecretariat for Defense Industries prepared a 2017-2021 International Cooperation and Export Strategic Plan in which 'Increasing the Contribution of NATO-CNAD [Conference of National Armaments Directors] Activities to International Cooperation and Industrialization Activities' was identified as one of the strategic goals. The roadmap to this strategic goal was explained as

with a holistic approach, increasing the contribution of armament cooperation to industrialization activities within NATO, more effective representation and

⁵ Turkey is a ‘non-member programme participating state’ http://www.occar.int/about-us
promote in NATO, more effective participation of SSM project groups in working groups, the ability of SSM project units to benefit from information gained in NATO more effectively,…the industry is aimed to take a more active role in NATO (Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı 2017, p.8).

Thus, cooperation and coordination with NATO are perceived by policymakers as an essential component for the sustained growth of the national defense industry. Moreover, Turkish firms actively seek NATO certification both to be able to sell their products to NATO countries and also to use the certification as an indication of their quality in promoting the products to other countries.⁶

While a significant increase in exports is contributing to Turkey both economically and diplomatically, the Turkish national defense industry’s continued reliance on imports creates an important incentive for Turkey to stay committed to NATO. Table 4 illustrates that as Turkey was increasing its level of exports in arms it sustained its level of imports in arms industries. Turkey currently ranks as the 10th largest arms importer in the world. Moreover, most of the imports come from NATO allies (See Table 5) which is an outcome of the historical process through which the Turkish defense industry was developed.

Table 4 - Turkey’s ranking in ‘Top 50 Largest Importers’

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Arms imports*</th>
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<td>2000</td>
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*a in $ millions

Source: Table compiled by the author based on SIPRI Arms Transfer Database “TIV of arms exports from the top 50 largest importers” http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_toplist.php
Table 5 - Turkey’s Defense Imports (2000-2019)

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<th>Year</th>
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<th>South Korea</th>
<th>Italy</th>
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<th>Israel</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>France</th>
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</table>

*a Bold indicates NATO members.  
b in US$ millions  
Source: Table compiled by the author based on SIPRI Arms Transfer Database ‘TIV of arms exports to Turkey, 2000-2019’ http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_toplist.php

Not just the sheer volume of the defense imports but also the content of the imported goods has implications for Turkey’s relations with NATO. Turkey progressed from importing off-the-shelf, completed weapons system to the import of ‘critical systems, sub-systems, and components, such as engines and radars instead of major platform’ (Bağcı & Kurç 2017, p.45). Despite these changes, Turkey still needs imported parts and technology to be able to produce much of its domestically manufactured arms and licenses to be able to sell them in the global market. For instance, first locally produced helicopter T129 ATAK was built in cooperation with AgustaWestland (an Italian company) and used American-made engines. Similarly, the production of Altay tank and TF-X combat aircraft as well as UAVs depend on imported parts and technology (SIPRI 2020a). Thus, Turkey’s ability to export its products which will be produced by using foreign supplied components rely heavily on Turkey’s friendly relations with these supplying countries especially since they require export licenses (Bakeer 2019). The importance of this became clear when Turkey’s deal with Pakistan for the sale of the T129 ATAK helicopter got halted due
to the US’s refusal to provide export licenses for the engine used in the helicopter (Bekdil 2018).

The role of NATO countries in the development of the Turkish defense industry is not limited to imported goods and technologies. ‘Direct investments and joint ventures’ have played an important role in the development of the national defense industry (Kurç 2017). Not just economic calculations but also security calculations play a role in these companies’ presence in other countries. A recent study by SIPRI illustrates that ‘geopolitical alignment’ has an impact on the international presence of arms companies, the fact that Turkey is a NATO member is a crucial reason behind the operation of these firms. According to SIPRI’s study, Turkey hosts several ‘foreign entities’ from NATO countries such as ‘BAE Systems, L3Harris Technologies, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, and Thales’ (SIPRI 2020b, 7). International companies’ presence in Turkey also takes the form of directly owning companies as we see in Leonardo Turkey Havacılık Savunma ve Güvenlik Sistemleri AŞ (SIPRI 2020a). The active presence of foreign defense companies not only provides the necessary technology for indigenous systems to be developed, but also further contributes to the benefits of NATO membership (Kurç 2017). As it can be observed from the above discussion, NATO membership played a crucial role in the direction and pace of the development that the Turkish defense industry experienced. It is also visible that sustained development is closely linked to continuation of relations with NATO.

4.3 The Rules that Bind: NATO’s Coercive Instruments as Obstacles for Turkish Defense Industry

Turkey’s dependency on its NATO allies, in general, and the USA, in particular, is not only sustained with the opportunities (such as the reliance on the import of technology, parts from the allies as well as issues of licensing) that the Alliance presents for the Turkish defense industry, but ‘sticks’ of various forms (economic, political and military) have been used by NATO to remind Turkey of the potential consequences of breaking away from the Alliance. Sanctions and embargoes have been the primary way through which NATO tried to keep Turkey stay in line
with NATO’s security priorities. For instance, Turkey’s involvement in Syria led to not just straining diplomatic relations with NATO countries but also resulted in a ban on arms sales that came after the initiation of Turkish military operation into Syria (Operation Peace Spring) in the Fall of 2019. Several NATO countries including the USA, the UK, France, Germany, Finland, Spain, the Netherlands, Norway, the Czech Republic, and Sweden have placed sanctions on arms sales (Bekdil & Bodner 2019; Koyuncu 2019). Since Turkey still relies on imports, primarily from NATO countries, it harmed Turkey’s ability to meet its defense needs.

Another concrete example of the use of coercive capacity was seen after Turkey announced its decision to buy an anti-missile defense system from a Chinese Company that was under US sanctions. The fact that Turkey’s existing air defense systems (such as the Hawks, Stingers, Nike Hercules, and Papiers) are both outdated and limited in their ranges makes Turkey rely too heavily on defending Turkish airspace through the patrolling done by F-16 fighter jets (which themselves are aging) (Kibaroğlu 2019). Thus, Turkey’s desire to better its air defense system came as no surprise. Turkey tried to fill this gap by deploying Patriots (which were temporarily deployed in 1991, 2003, and 2013) (NATO 2013), but the agreement could not have been reached. In 2009 Turkey issued a call for the purchase of a ‘long-range air and missile defense system’ and got offers from China, Russia, the USA, and a France-Italian consortium. Turkey first announced its intention to buy an anti-missile defense system from a Chinese state-owned company (China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CPMEIC)) in 2013 which was not realized eventually. During this process, when ASELSAN asked Merill Lynch, one of the world’s biggest investment banks ‘to advise and to underwrite its public offering’ they were given a rejection stating that ‘If it is possible that you will work with the Chinese company… we would not work with you’ (Sağlam 2013 cited in Egeli 2019, p.78). This example illustrated how diverging in defense interests from NATO could create reactions not just in the form of direct sanctions and embargoes but also in the form of steps taken to affect Turkish defense companies’ ability to function in the global market.
Turkey’s later decision to buy S-400’s from Russia led NATO to resort to its coercive mechanisms, with more dire consequences. The formerly strained relations warmed up with the failed coup attempt that took place in Turkey on July 15, 2016. President Putin declared his ‘unconditional support’ for the Turkish government, which was different from the cautious stance that NATO members took at that moment (Aamodt & Haugom 2019). Turkey establishing warmer relations with Russia raised several eyebrows in NATO but the discontent became vocal when Turkey announced its decision to purchase the S-400 missile defense system from Russia.

From NATO’s perspective the system’s incompatibility with NATO systems and the inconsistency that the S-400s will bring to NATO’s defense capabilities constituted the operational concerns about this deal. Any purchase to be made from outside of NATO countries was evaluated as a threat as they could ‘jeopardize the integrity of NATO’s sensitive command, control, and communication systems as well as its intelligence collecting capability.’ (Kibaroğlu 2019, p.165; Kasapoğlu & Ülgen 2019). The fallout of Turkey’s decision to buy S-400s from Russia included Turkey's suspension from the US F35 Joint Strike Fighter program to which Turkey not only was contributing through manufacturing various parts for the jets but also was a customer who placed an order for F35 jets. The coercive capacity of the Alliance was encapsulated in a statement made by a NATO official ‘The same way that nations are sovereign in making their decisions, they are also sovereign in facing the consequences of that decision’ (Defense News 2017).

In addition to being pushed out of the F35 Program, Turkey is now facing US sanctions under the ‘Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act’ (CAATSA) ‘knowingly engaging in a significant transaction with Rosoboronexport.

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8 A spokesperson for the US State Department stated in a briefing in May 2018 that ‘Under NATO and under the NATO agreement... you’re only supposed to buy... weapons and other material that are interoperable with other NATO partners. We don’t see [an S-400 system from Russia] as being interoperable.’ ‘Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief,’ Every CRyc Report, 6 June 2018. (Cited in Kibaroğlu 2019, p.166).
Russia’s main arms export entity, by procuring the S-400 surface-to-air missile system’ (US Department of State, 2020). While the implications of this decision, is yet to be seen, it is most likely to prioritize the national defense industry on the political rhetoric, while illustrating the difficulties of gaining defense autarky.

It needs to be taken into consideration that while NATO’s reaction is fueling the anti-NATO rhetoric, the current S-400 purchase or warm relations with Russia would not provide Turkey enough of a defense capacity to formally distance itself from NATO. First, the S-400s are not ‘compatible with NATO standards and cannot be integrated into NATO’s air defense system’, which Turkey still primarily relies on its defense structure and strategies. Second, Turkey’s national know-how is not likely to benefit from their installment as ‘Russia is not prepared to supply software codes, IFF systems, a joint production with Turkey and certainly no technology transfer to Turkey’ (Kogan 2018, p.29). Thus, while the reasons behind attempts at developing the national defense industry and diversifying its defense capacity through new purchases are understandable, the functioning of the global defense market and Turkey's place in it is likely to not create a shift in Turkey’s alliances.

5. Conclusion

This study does neither underestimate the important progress that Turkey has made in developing its national defense industry nor overlook the straining of relations between Turkey and NATO. However, this study highlights that two important factors need to be taken into account before reaching a judgment about Turkey’s future in NATO. First, the current problems that Turkey is having with NATO need to be understood from a historical perspective. The history of Turkey-NATO relations is filled with mutual discontent over various policy decisions or lack thereof. While this is not to suggest that nothing could lead to Turkey’s departure from NATO, the existing problems are not new or necessarily insurmountable.

Second, it is true that the insecurities Turkey has historically felt in NATO’s capability and desire to protect Turkey have contributed to its efforts to develop its
national defense industry. However, both the structure of the arms market, that makes being integrated into the global market a precondition for continued growth, and the Turkish national defense industry’s, sustained reliance on imports (most importantly in technology) from its Western allies, suggest that continued growth of national defense industry (and increased ability of Turkey to defend itself) is conditioned upon Turkey’s sustained commitment to its alliances. Moreover, NATO not only created path dependency by playing a formative role in the trajectory of the Turkish national defense industry’s development but also, through repetitive use of its coercive instruments (sanctions and embargoes), NATO tries to sustain that trajectory by making Turkey’s attempts to develop its national defense industry independent of the Alliance economically and politically costly.

It would be myopic to suggest that a pragmatic policy choice that prioritizes the further development of the national defense industry would be enough of a reason for Turkey to sustain its commitment to NATO. Turkey’s commitment to NATO and NATO’s commitment to Turkey is conditioned upon several factors ranging from political to economic and security calculations. Thus, this study does not suggest that Turkey will remain attached to the Alliance despite any problems that might arise. On the contrary, the historical evidence and current affairs suggest that the relations between Turkey and NATO are likely to see reoccurring tensions.

As the historical development of the Turkish national defense industry suggests, sustained tension with NATO members (specifically with the USA) would provide additional impetus for further development of the defense industry. It is also reasonable to assume that the national defense industry which President Erdoğan perceives and portrays as an important component and indicator of Turkey’s power (as well as a bargaining chip) in world politics will be used as an explanation (and consolation prize) for Turkey’s severance from NATO if such development were to ever happen. However, if Turkey prioritizes the development of the national defense industry in shaping its foreign policy, Turkey’s interests will be best served by staying in the Alliance. Since defense autarky is not on the horizon, for both technological and economic reasons, any calls to replace NATO with any other country or alliance
needs to be tread lightly as such steps, as far as the national defense industry is concerned, might create new forms of dependence rather than independence.
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The Search for a Government System in Turkey: The Presidentialism Debates between Democratization and the Quest for More Power

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to analyze the various debates around the transformation of Turkey's government system from parliamentarism to presidentialism. It argues that the current authoritarian nature of the Turkish politics is helpful to make sense of the way that these constitutional amendments of 2017 were made and accepted, and also of the content and the scope of the 'Turkish type of presidentialism'. However, it also suggests that limiting the discussions to the late 2010s results in incomplete accounts. Thus, by arguing that a longer-term approach is needed to fully understand the government system change in Turkey, this article shows that the AKP’s demand for a presidential system actually dates back to the first decade of the century. Accordingly, the discourse regarding the system change shifted from clashing the tutelary aspects of the state towards efficiency and persistence in state affairs, reflecting the 21st century paradigms in Turkish politics that evolved from debates of democratization to the quest for more power.

KEYWORDS: Presidentialism; Hyper-presidentialism; Parliamentarism; Turkish type of presidentialism; AKP

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1. Introduction

In 2017, Turkey’s political system experienced one of the biggest transformations of the republican era. As a result of a slight majority (51.4%) of the ‘yes’ votes in the referendum that was held for constitutional amendments mostly related to the government system, Turkey adopted what is commonly known as the ‘Turkish type of presidentialism’. Both the outcomes and the future of the current system of government continue to be discussed in political and public realms. However, the existence of these debates and criticisms does not mean that the components of the system are unexpected or shocking especially when the evolution and/or direction of politics in Turkey in the 2010s are considered.

The recent studies on Turkey employ particular concepts to analyze this evolution of the 2010s. For instance, Esen and Gumuscu use ‘competitive authoritarianism’ and argue that Turkey has shifted from being a tutelary democracy to having a competitive authoritarian regime in which the political field highly favors the power holders although opposition parties participate in political processes such as the elections (Esen & Gumuscu 2016). In addition to the popularity of the concept of competitive authoritarianism in the literature over Turkey (see also Castaldo 2018; Özbudun 2015), different variants of the term authoritarianism, such as electoral authoritarianism in which the multi-party elections exist but serve the ruling power have also been utilized (White & Herzog 2016). The theoretical concepts dealing with Turkey’s late 2010s are various (e.g., on illiberal governance see Öktem & Akkoyunlu 2016). Majority of this conceptually abundant literature also emphasize that the transformation is not Turkey-specific. Instead, it is a part of the global phenomenon in which liberal democracies or democracies are on decline (see Somer 2016).

These analytical tools that shed light upon the latest years of Turkish politics are important in order to grasp the recent events in Turkey, including the transformation of the government system from parliamentarism to presidentialism. However, the problematic of the government system in Turkey also transcends the 2010s, indicating the necessity to deal with this specific issue from a broader per-
spective. In other words, the nature of the Turkish regime of the recent context is helpful especially to make sense of the way that these constitutional amendments were made and accepted, and to make sense of the scope and content of the new system, which has been associated with the term ‘hyper-presidentialism’ by many (see Özsoy Boyunsuz 2016), yet an analysis about the quest for a change in the government system also necessitates a longer term approach.

This article aims to provide such a narrative. On the one hand, it shows that the issue dates back to the late 20th century, during which different political actors discussed and demanded the presidential system of government with distinct purposes. On the other hand, it focuses on the first decade of the 21st century particularly with respect to the AKP (Justice and Development Party), suggesting that the transition to the presidential system was already on the agenda of the party. At that time, the AKP, despite its strength in the parliament, was not very powerful vis-à-vis the specific institutions of the state such as the army or the Constitutional Court. Therefore, the government restructuring discourse was based on the notion of clashing the tutelary aspect of the state. However, as the AKP gained strength in relation to the aforementioned institutions, its discourse about the government system changed towards efficiency and persistence in state affairs. This article argues that the discourses on presidentialism in Turkey reflect the 21st century paradigms in Turkish politics that evolved from the debates of democratization to the quest for more power.

2. A Historical Glance at the Presidentialism Debates in Turkey

When scholars discuss the presidentialism vs. parliamentarism problematic in Turkey, they usually refer to the late 1980s and 1990s – the presidency of Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel respectively – as the originating point for the discussion. This understanding makes sense given the quest of Özal and Demirel for a presidential system, which had led to vivid discussions in the political and public realms, as will be shown below. However, it should be emphasized that the presidentialism discussions precede these two presidents. Even in the 1970s, there were
political parties that defended the idea of presidential system. Not being very surprising, one of these parties was the MSP (the National Salvation Party), as the party of the Islamist Milli Görüş movement (The National Outlook) that the ideology and the establishment of the AKP largely depended on. In one of its election pamphlets, the MSP promised presidential type of government to the electorate, together with a popularly elected president for an efficient rule (Milli Selamet Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi 1973).

The political deadlock, acute economic crisis and the upsurge of the political violence in the late 1970s paved way for the 1980 coup d'état (Sayari 2010), starting a new epoch in Turkish politics. The military intended to transform the political system radically, changing the work done by the previous coup of 1960 essentially (Zürcher 2004). The reference point for the military was the system brought by the 1961 Constitution which was regarded as the major reason for political fragmentation and polarization as the constitution strengthened the smaller parties in the system and politicized the masses with the enhancement of liberties. Although there was another military intervention – military memorandum of 1971 – and an interim period thereafter that had brought constitutional changes curtailing the freedoms of the 1961 Constitution, many factions in politics of Turkey continued to consider this constitution as the major reason for the systemic crisis and the quasi-civil war in the last years of the 1970s. Therefore, the junta of the 1980 coup d'état in Turkey aimed to restructure the system drastically with a new constitution that would supposedly bring stability to the country.

Wide-ranging criticisms can be made about the 1982 Constitution, from its content that protects the state vis-à-vis the individual, to the process that it was made and approved. However, specifically two issues should be highlighted given the subject of this article. First of all, the powers of the president were expanded in the 1982 Constitution. The constitution makers had supposed that the presidency would incessantly be filled by the soldiers (Özbudun & Gençkaya 2009, pp. 20-21). According to the 1982 Constitution, president remained politically unaccountable yet gained many executive functions, leaving the ceremonial and inactive position
formulated by the 1961 Constitution behind (Özbudun 2012, p. 198). This politically unaccountable but powerful president would be emphasized as a paradoxical situation in a parliamentary system, whenever the political system of Turkey was discussed later on, including the failed constitution making process of the early 2010s.

The second point about the constitution-making process was closely related to this first point of increasing presidential powers. It is seen that the political system was not solely discussed with regard to the changing balance between the executive and legislative, or the balance inside the executive within a parliamentary system. Instead, the change of the government system was another option on the table, yet without many supporters. While some of the members of the constituent council had offered presidential system of government emphasizing an alleged evolution of the systems from parliamentarism to presidentialism on a global scale; the others proposed a system which could be understood some form in between (Milliyet 1982, p. 1). As stated above, the majority of the constitution makers, specifically, the head of the commission, Orhan Aldıkactı was against presidentialism on the grounds that it could be exploited by political parties and ambitious leaders (Milliyet 1982, p. 1). The possible repercussions that a presidential system could bring about had also been stressed by a report written by the Ankara University’s professors, who suggested that a quest for authority to solve the problems of politics could eventually turn into a system counter to the basic characteristics of the regime (Milliyet 1981, p. 12).

Although a parliamentary system was accepted with a relatively powerful president in the end, the debates about the system of government did not come to an end in Turkey. On the contrary, they intensified with Özal, who frankly espoused the idea. Özal, the founder of the center right ANAP (Motherland Party), headed two one-party governments as the Prime Minister of Turkey after his party’s victory in both 1983 and 1987 elections. He calculated constitutional changes for a presidential system during his premiership for his future ambitions for presidency (Soysal 1986, p. 2), yet with no success. Özal became the eighth president of the Republic of Turkey in 1989 within the ‘confines’ of the parliamentary system. How-
ever, despite the presidency was formulated as an impartial post by the 1982 Constitution, Özal continued to act as if he was the leader of the ANAP and prime minister, by giving instructions to the government and criticizing it when he was not referred to (Heper & Çinar 1996).

In order to overcome this supposed systemic discord that had actually been created and aggravated by the president himself, Özal demanded constitutional changes that would bring presidentialism. His quest for more power paved the way for wide-ranging discussions – mostly critical towards presidentialism – in Turkish politics and society. For instance, in a major conference held by Mülkiyeliler Birliği, to which President Özal, Prime Minister Akbulut, and other party leaders attended together with academics and civil society representatives, only the President and Prime Minister had defended the presidential form of government while the remaining participants opposed the idea on the grounds that it had a potential to lead the country into a dictatorship in the future (Milliyet 1990, p. 6).

Özal had not realized his aim of presidentialism when he suddenly died in 1993. The leader of the DYP (the True Path Party), Süleyman Demirel, who was also a well-known political figure of the 1960s and 1970s, was elected president by the parliament. As opposed to Özal, his successor Demirel was regarded as respectful for his constitutional rights, mostly interested in the political stability (Heper & Çinar 1996). However, the 1990s of Turkey had everything but stability. First, the country was politically fragmented and ruled by unstable coalition governments throughout the decade. Second, the aforementioned Islamist Milli Görüş movement gained strength with the RP (Welfare Party) which became a coalition partner. The rising Islamism was reacted by another military intervention that was called ‘post-modern’ coup of 28 February, which did not seize political power but rather overthrew the government with a secularist agenda. Third, in the Southeastern Anatolia, the state security forces clashed with the separatist PKK, creating a low intensity war in Southeastern Anatolia as the top Turkish military officials named. Last but not least, all of these political problems were exacerbated by the several economic crises.
Even though the president Demirel had opposed to the Özal’s idea of presidentialism in the beginning of the 1990s, he started to talk about the need for the transformation of the relationship between the legislative and executive for the sake of political stability (TBMM Genel Kurul Tutanakları 1997). It is seen that the debates over the presidential form of government never fell from the agenda during the 1990s, constantly discussed by the politicians as well as newspapers, civil society organizations, and academic circles. In the latter realm, two issues have been mostly emphasized: First, the only successful example of the presidential system was the U.S., which had totally different political, economic and social conditions than those of Turkey. Second, the political problems of Turkey did not stem from the government system itself, instead, from the oligarchic political parties and problematic electoral systems (Milliyet 1995, p. 21; Milliyet 1997, p. 22). It is important to note that the content of these discussions over the presidential system of government during the 1990s has strong resemblances with those of the 2010s, emphases being made on the party systems, elections, political culture, and the possible dangers that the presidential system could pose to the country in the hands of a president with authoritarian tendencies.

The presidential system was not realized in the contexts of the 1980s and 1990s, although it was discussed at short intervals. Apart from the above-mentioned similarities of the discussions from the 1980s to the 2010s; several evaluations should be drawn to help the following analyses of the 21st century systemic transformation of Turkey. In this regard, the 1982 Constitution seemed to fail in formulating an ideal type of parliamentary government system, specifically flawed with respect to the position of president. In other words, the constitution created a presidency with executive powers, yet without political accountability. The parliamentary system with a president having more than a ceremonial role negatively impacted on the relationship between the president and the prime minister together with her/his cabinet.

In fact, as the previous narrative told, some of the constitution makers had searched for a stronger president, even a presidential system – as mostly associated
with Özal – during the constitution making process. However, what differentiates Özal in this respect, was the fact that while the reference point for these constitution makers – and later for Demirel – was the political fragmentation of the 1970s and 1990s respectively; the discourses about efficient decision-making process dominated the era of Özal. All of these arguments used by the proponents and the opponents of the presidential system in the late 20th century were re-used also in the 21st century, surely within a different context that would be influenced first by an ideological conflict among the different actors of the state and then by rising authoritarianism of the AKP. The next section will analyze the beginning of this new context, which also brought another systemic crisis that resulted in the popular election of the president in 2007.

3. Clash between the old and the new: 2007 Constitutional Crisis over the Presidency

In November 2002 elections, the AKP took the 34.28% of the total votes with 363 seats in the parliament (YSK Seçim Arşivi 2002), ending the era of the coalitions for Turkey that had become the norm in the 1990s. The party had been founded in 2001 when Turkey was struggling with the worst economic crisis it faced after the World War II. As suggested above, The AKP had its roots in Milli Görüş with respect to both its cadres and ideology although it was also an important attempt to break away from this tradition, with an emphasis more on center-right features (Atacan 2005, p. 197). This break from the traditional Islamist politics was closely related to the experience of the RP that had been forced to resign after 28 February 1997 decisions of the National Security Council as called ‘post-modern coup’, and had been subsequently closed by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that the party had acted against notion of secularism.

As Hale argues, the AKP had to find a balance between the Islamist project of the RP, to wit, the Milli Görüş that the new party’s cadres once belonged, and secularist state institutions such as military, judiciary and bureaucracy in general (Hale 2005, p. 301). It seemed to be the only way to ‘survive’ in the political envi-
ronment of Turkey. As a result, the party adopted a discourse of democratization together with the target of the EU membership, thus, trying to appeal to the state and the secular segments of the society as well as to provide a political framework that would enhance the religious freedoms and diminish the impact of the army on politics at the same time (Arat & Pamuk 2019, p. 97). In the first term of the AKP, the economy performed well, various reform packages on the way to the EU were passed paving the way for the alleviation of the military tutelage and the several openings such as Kurdish one, and took other initiatives such as women friendly penal code (Toprak 2012, p. 222).

However, it should also be stressed that despite the discourse of the ideological transformation of the AKP, the relationship between the party and the secularist state institutions remained conflictual. The most important turning point that revealed this clash became the constitutional crisis of 2007, which was related to the presidency in a direct manner. In fact, it was this crisis, with its results, that paved the way for presidential system of government in Turkey later on. However, it should also be emphasized that the public and political discussions of the time show that presidential system had already been existent on the mind of the AKP members, including the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and the influential figure of the party, Bülent Arınç.

In 2003, Burhan Kuzu, the then head of the Constitutional Commission in the parliament, started the discussion of presidentialism. Erdoğan supported Kuzu in this respect, suggesting that the presidential system should have really been considered since there were conflicts between the state institutions (Milliyet 2004, p. 26). The conflicts that Erdoğan implied were between his government and the presidency, the higher judiciary, and surely the military, which were regarded by the AKP as bureaucratic oligarchy. In this respect, Erdoğan suggested the American type of presidentialism (Tamer 2005, p. 6), whose separation of powers would help the government in its endeavor to clash with this bureaucratic oligarchy. In other words, the idea of presidential system in the context of 2002–2007 was directly related to the democratization discourse of the AKP, which had aimed to decrease the
power of the institutions associated with Kemalism. However, it was not easy to impose such a grand change at that time, as Bülent Arınç openly suggested that the AKP should have suspended these debates for two legislative terms since Turkey was not ready for a government system change yet (Tamer 2005, p. 6). The 2007 presidential elections, in this respect, constituted not only a crisis but also an opportunity for the AKP.

In 2007, the then president Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s term would come to an end. The election of presidents in Turkey, which had been executed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) until 2014, had always been stressful since it necessitated compromise on a person who was expected to be an impartial head of state. Surely, the above-mentioned clash between the AKP and the secularist state organs together with the main opposition, the CHP (Republican People’s Party) exacerbated the already troublesome process. Therefore, in the late 2006, Turkish politics and also public opinion had focused on two interrelated issues: the possible candidates for the Turkish presidency, specifically the position of the then Prime Minister Erdoğan, and the different legal opinions about the electoral process which had been started by the former Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeal, Sabih Kanadoğlu.

Kanadoğlu started a significant discussion in politics as well as judiciary by suggesting that meeting quorum for the presidential election for the first and second rounds was the two-third of the parliament (367), not one-third (184) as suggested by many (Milliyet 2006, p. 18). As Özbudun and Gençkaya suggests, until Kanadoğlu’s novel idea about the meeting quorum, the parliamentary calculations were showing that the AKP’s candidate could be elected not in the first and the second rounds since the decision quorum was 367 (not the meeting one), but in the third and/or the fourth ones, since these latter rounds necessitated the votes of 276, less than the total number of the AKP deputies (Özbudun & Gençkaya 2009, p. 97). Yet, Kanadoğlu’s argument about meeting quorum seemed to have a potential to obstruct the process of presidential elections. The idea of Kanadoğlu, which implied that the process could be sent to the Constitutional Court, divided both the
judicial and political circles. It is not the task of this article to analyze all these legal arguments, but it should be suggested that the related articles of the Constitution together with the TGNA’s Bylaw were interpreted differently even by the former supreme court judges, former Justice Ministers and the law professors (see Milliyet 2006, p. 18).

As opposed to the expectations of the late 2006, Erdoğan did not run for the office. Instead, one of his comrades from the Milli Görüş, Abdullah Gül, became the presidential candidate. The tension between the secularists and Islamists had already intensified before the elections. For instance, Cumhuriyet Mitingleri (Republican Rallies) had been held in order to protest the AKP’s Islamist agenda – as the secular circles of the society and the politics believed that it existed – threatening the Republic. In a similar vein, the Turkish General Staff released an e-memorandum on the night of the first round of the presidential elections. The memorandum emphasized the responsibility of the armed forces in the protection of the republican notions, specifically laicism. In other words, it was a warning from the military which had shown its uneasiness about the possibility of an Islamist president.

Far from being surprising, after the first rounds of voting in the parliament, the CHP, by utilizing the idea of Kanadoğlu, applied to the Constitutional Court for the investigation of the voting with regard to the two-third meeting quorum. When the Court decided in favor of the application, Abdullah Gül could not be elected as the president, leading to a political crisis, which brought about bold moves by the AKP. The ruling party decided to make early parliamentary elections as well as constitutional amendments that would transform the presidential elections from parliamentary voting to popular voting.

The decision of the Constitutional Court exemplifies well how the state institutions, the leadership position of which were still dominated by the old cadres, challenged the authority of the elected government in the first period of the AKP. Köker rightly suggests that the court was allied with the ‘power centers of the establishment, making it more of a guardian of the state than a constitutional court of rights and liberties’, yet with diminishing democratic legitimacy (Köker 2010, p. 18).
The democratic legitimacy is an important term here, because the simple definition of the clash between the old and new, in other words, between the secularists and conservatives translated itself into a clash between anti-democrats and democrats.

Undoubtedly, this contrast yielded two positive results for the AKP in the conditions of 2007. On the one hand, the AKP augmented its voting rate from 34.28% to 46.58% in July 2007 general election (YSK Seçim Arşivi 2007). Çarkoğlu states that the campaign of AKP was not only based on the thriving economic performance of the government in the last five years, but also on the rhetoric of the ‘wronged and oppressed’ based on the previous electoral process (Çarkoğlu 2007, p. 506). In the election manifesto, the party had emphasized the ‘people’ as the source of legitimacy, personal freedoms, and democracy, positioning itself against the ‘anti-democratic forces’ (Seçim Beyannamesi 2007). All these parameters; economic growth, rhetoric of the oppressed and the discourse of democracy brought a significant electoral victory to AKP, which consolidated its power.

On the other hand, in the same electoral manifesto, the AKP had also promised a new civilian constitution, which would include personal freedoms vis-à-vis the state based on human rights; would clearly define the relationship between legislative, executive, and judiciary as the notion of ‘separation of powers’ necessitated in a parliamentary system, and would establish participatory democracy rather than the representative one (Seçim Beyannamesi 2007). The manifesto had stressed that the ‘separation of powers’ would be organized under the framework of parliamentary form of government. In other words, the AKP, despite its preference over presidentialism as suggested above, had not clearly mentioned such a change. Yet the next step, October 2007 referendum, which not only amended the meeting quorum in the parliament but also brought a change in the presidential elections by adopting the popular voting that would start to be implemented by 2014, became a significant source for discourse change towards presidential system as would be

1 In the manifesto, there was a statement of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, ‘Millete efendilik etmek yoktur, hizmet etmek vardır’ which can be translated as such ‘One should not patronize but serve the people,’ implicitly targeting the institutions who were supposedly against the will of the people.
seen below. In this regard, the AKP government in the 2010s, started to differentiate the president that would be popularly elected than the former ones, although the constitutional rights and duties of the president had not been changed yet. As Arat and Pamuk suggest, popularly elected president would claim more power based on democratic legitimacy, creating a problem of ‘dual legitimacy’ within a parliamentary system (Arat & Pamuk 2019, p. 103).

It should be suggested that the constitutional and political crisis of 2007 turned into a major victory for AKP. The clash between the secular establishment and the old Islamists/new conservatives turned into a binary opposition of democrats and anti-democrats/tutelary powers. It was in this atmosphere that AKP consolidated its power for a second term by representing nearly the half of the electorate, and actually made its first serious attempt for a presidential form of government although the shift of the discourses from parliamentary to presidential system was specified during the constitution making attempt between 2011 and 2013, to wit, two legislative period later, as suggested by Bülent Arınç in 2005.


The clear emphasis on presidentialism reflects well the transformation of the AKP’s policies, which were increasingly analyzed in the academic literature through the lenses of ‘competitive authoritarianism,’ specifically referring to the period after 2013 (see Esen & Gumuscu 2016; Özbudun 2015). What happened in between is also significant on the way to the evolution of the regime, even though the democratization discourse persisted and was embraced by many. In this respect, army and the judiciary, which had been the two power centers that created problems for the AKP, had to face overwhelming changes.

The military-civilian relations in Turkey had always been a problematic area given the frequency of the coups and the interventions that took place in the republican period. In this respect, two major legal cases that targeted military, namely the Ergenekon and Balyoz (Sledgehammer), starting with 2008 and 2010 respective-
ly, tried to change the military’s relationship to politics. These cases were formulated based on alleged coup plots by the Kemalist officers who were faced with severe sentences and dismissed from the armed forces.

These trials started a series of discussions on a wide range of topics, from civilian control of the armed forces to democratic consolidation. As Ilter Turan suggested, all of these trials may have decreased the probability of a military intervention in the future, yet this would not mean democratization of Turkey per se, which actually needed compromise among other things (Turan 2010). The results of these trials were not about democratic consolidation, but rather about institutional weaknesses in two respects. First, since the one-tenth of the Turkish Armed Forces’ generals and admirals were arrested during these trials (Gürsoy 2012, p. 736), the structural changes that the armed forces experienced were intense. The positions of many former officers were filled by the Gülenist soldiers (i.e. called Fetö after 2013, meaning Fethullahist Terrorist Organization), who were ideologically religious and led the coup attempt of 15th July, 2016. It may well be suggested that these trials actually paved the way for another junta within the army. Secondly, as Arat and Pamuk rightly put it, all these trials weakened also the judiciary given the fact that proven irregularities in the process and partisanship of the judges and prosecutors with the support of the government shook the legitimacy of this power (Arat & Pamuk 2019, p. 106).

The structure of the judiciary in the meantime had already experienced transformations. In 2010, another referendum took place specifically dealing with the judiciary. The constitutional amendments, which were accepted by the 57.88% of the voters (YSK Seçim Arşivi 2010), restructured higher judiciary, increasing the authority of the president in the appointment of the members of the Constitutional Court and the HSYK (The Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors). Referendum included other amendments challenging some of the tutelary structures of the 1982 Constitution. Therefore, the protagonists turned the yes vote into sup-
port to democratization, placing the opponents automatically on the other camp. The then Prime Minister Erdoğan evaluated the results as ‘the festival of democracy’ that the ‘putschists’ lost (CNN Türk 2010). The proponents of the amendments had foreseen ‘a significant step forward democratization process’ (Yazıcı 2010, p. 10) yet, the debates around the judiciary did not come to end. On the contrary, starting with 2013, the government would start to make more radical changes over the judiciary, specifically related to the clash between the government and the Gulenists, which had dominated the military, judiciary, and the other state institutions.

All of these restructuring processes mostly based on the binary opposition of democracy vs. tutelage changed its shape and scope in 2011 as constitution-making stepped into the agenda one more time. The AKP’s promise for a new constitution before 2007 parliamentary elections had not been materialized. Before 2011 parliamentary elections, however, not only the AKP but also the opposition parties pledged to make a new constitution for Turkey. The AKP won the 49.83% of the total votes, gaining the 327 of the seats in the parliament (YSK Seçim Arşivi 2011). Although the election result was a huge success for the AKP, it meant that the party needed the support of other parties in order write and submit a new constitution to the electorate (Kubicek 2011, p. 445). Therefore, since all of the parties acknowledged the necessity for a new constitution to get rid of the existing one mostly associated with the coup of 1982, they formed a commission that would be called the Constitutional Conciliation Commission (Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu, AUK) to write a new – and this time civilian – constitution for Turkey.

As Özpek explains, several issues, such as separation of powers, unitary nature of the state, and fundamental rights and liberties, were the potential sources for friction between the parties given their different priorities (Özpek 2012, pp. 163-165). However, it became the system of government problematic that would block the negotiations, leading to the failure of the process eventually. In this regard, it is

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2 This democratization discourse had also been supported by the liberals, which created the famous motto of Yetmez Ama Evet (eng. ’Yes but not enough’), which became an ongoing debate in Turkey.
useful to emphasize specific points over this particular problematic, focusing on the debates within the conciliation commission.

The constitutions of 1961 and 1982 had been written after *coup d’états*. Therefore, all of the parties agreed that both the preparation process and the content of this civilian constitution should have reflected a broad social consensus. Political parties outside the TGNA, civil society organizations, universities and media were consulted in the process. It is important to note that all these debates have become the first and the last broad-based exchange of views regarding the government system. Overall, majority of these participants emphasized the necessity to proceed with the parliamentary system (see 1 Nolu Alt Komisyon Tutanakları 2011-2013).

On the other hand, deliberations of the university professors almost unanimously indicated the contradictions in the existing government system. According to them, the major contradiction stemmed from the fact that the rights of the president were not compatible with a parliamentary system. Therefore, the position of the president had to be brought in compliance with that of a parliamentary system (1 Nolu Alt Komisyon Tutanakları 2011-2013). Another contradiction that was pointed out by Prof. Hikmet Sami Türk, the former Justice Minister, was the election of the president by popular voting, which was actually a procedure used in presidential or semi-presidential systems (1 Nolu Alt Komisyon Tutanakları 2011-2013, pp. 99-100). Since the majority of the professors preferred strengthening of the parliamentary system rather than the adoption of presidentialism, the election method was discussed as well. Different suggestions were made. On the one hand, some professors supported the reinstation of the parliamentary procedure, undoubtedly with particular changes that would prevent a deadlock (1 Nolu Alt Komisyon Tutanakları 2011-2013, pp. 142-143). On the other hand, some professors talked about the possibility of the persistence on the popular voting as long as the role of the president were restricted to a ceremonial one, showing the examples of Ireland and Austria (1 Nolu Alt Komisyon Tutanakları 2011-2013, p. 357).
Most of these professors tried to explain their respective positions based on both constitutional law and political science. First, the parliament was referred as the main source of democratic legitimacy within the historical democratic development of Turkey. The presidentialism, which would diminish this legitimacy, was not compatible with the historical development of Turkey (e.g., 1 Nolu Alt Komisyon Tutanakları 2011-2013, p. 294). Second, it was emphasized that presidentialism is more open to deadlocks especially when the majority of the parliament and president are not from the same party. In other words, passing beyond a deadlock in the presidential system is much more difficult given the lack of compromise in the political culture of Turkey (e.g., 1 Nolu Alt Komisyon Tutanakları 2011-2013, p. 343).

Last but not least, parliamentarism has been regarded as a more democratic system specifically because in the countries where the mechanisms of checks and balances have been weak, the presidential system could create uncontrolled arbitrary administrations, as in the cases of Latin America (e.g., 1 Nolu Alt Komisyon Tutanakları 2011-2013, p. 357). It is seen that the pros and cons of the systems were deliberated in an open-minded fashion in these sub-commissions.

However, the representatives of the political parties started to clash with each other in the writing commissions. As expected, the AKP proposed a constitution based on presidentialism while the CHP and the MHP (Nationalist Action Party) were keenly against this proposal. The AKP representatives usually put an emphasis on the ‘separation of powers,’ by utilizing the example of the U.S. system. The opponents of the presidential system, on the other hand, indicated the difference between the U.S.A. and Turkey. For instance, the MHP representative, Faruk Bal stated that almost all of the countries, which wanted to transform their government system similar to the U.S. system turned eventually into dictatorships since the system did not work (2 Nolu Yazım Komisyonu Tutanakları 2011-2013, p. 307). Likewise, the CHP representative Rıza Türmen also explained that Turkey was very different from the U.S., in terms of party, parliamentary and administrative structures, as well as certain freedoms like those of media (2 Nolu Yazım Komisyonu Tutanakları 2011-2013, p. 359). The two opposition parties were afraid of the con-
centration of power on the hands of the president, with no proper mechanism of checks and balances. Here, it should be noted that the position of the pro-Kurdish BDP (The Peace and Democracy Party) was in between. The BDP suggested that presidentialism may have been discussed, yet together with the changes in the administrative system, referring to more autonomy, or federal structure (e.g., 2 Nolu Yazım Komisyonu Tutanakları 2011-2013, p. 529). This suggestion for an administrative change was not appealing to the other parties.

The constitution making process of Turkey reached an impasse mostly due to the discord over the government system. On the one hand, the ruling party AKP started to pressurize the process. In addition to the AKP’s insistence on presidentialism, the declarations of Bekir Bozdağ, the then Deputy Prime Minister, implying other methods that the party intended to employ to make a constitution in case of a failure of the process in 2013 (Anadolu Ajansı 2013) resulted in harsh criticisms inside the commission. On the other hand, the effort and necessity to continue to the process even if the parties could not agree upon the system of government led to a deadlock. This deadlock was not shocking given the fact that the members were trying to write the ‘legislative’ without deciding upon the system of government.

In 2013, the constitution making process was halted. The AKP had attempted to change the system of government with no success, before the upcoming 2014 presidential elections that would definitely be a major alteration. As Petersen and Yanaşmayan rightly argue that the process failed because ‘comission members were unable to overcome their disagreement and deeply rooted political cleavages’ (Petersen & Yanaşmayan 2020, p. 50). Among other things that have not been dealt with in this article, the parties had two irreconcilable positions towards the system of government. However, despite its failure, the analysis of the negotiation process is still significant because all of these deliberations reflect the background of the systemic transformation that took place in 2017.
5. From Parliamentarism to Presidentialism: The Transformation of the System in Turkey

2013, in which the Constitutional Conciliation Commission was officially dissolved, became an eventful year for Turkey. First, the decision to construct a shopping mall in Gezi Park, one of the last green places left in central Istanbul, led to widespread protests all over Turkey. The protests, which started with environmental concerns, turned into anti-government demonstrations. As Yardımcı-Geyikçi rightly puts, the expansion of the protests was closely related to the intensification of the social unrest and the political polarization inside the country, long before 2013 (Yardımcı-Geyikçi 2014, p. 445). Regardless of the reasons, it may well be suggested that the harsh reaction of the police towards the protesters became a real turning point about the perception of the government.

Another important political development of 2013 was the dissociation between the AKP and Gülen network. It was concretely revealed by the December 2013 corruption allegations directed against several ministers by the members of this network, who had been very active specifically in the institutions of education, justice and security, including the army. Therefore, the clash between these groups created a fight within the state. This fight which was mostly stemmed from the power-sharing resulted in further empowerment of the executive particularly vis-à-vis the judiciary, as a result of the radical changes within bureaucracy (Arat & Pamuk 2019, pp. 112-113).

It was in this political landscape that Turkey held its presidential elections, for the first time by popular voting based on the 2007 referendum’s result. The then Prime Minister Erdoğan won the elections in the first round by the 51.79% of the votes (YSK Seçim Arşivi 2014), appealing to more or less half of the electorate. In addition to the 2007 referendum and the failed constitution making process of 2011–2013, the 2014 presidential elections became another turning point on the way to the presidential system. The fact that Erdoğan had already declared that he would not be a neutral president despite the impartiality clause of the constitution during the electoral campaign and acted accordingly after the elections resulted in a
system debate, which indicated that presidentialism à la Turca was on the way (Kalayçıoğlu 2015, pp. 172-173). It should be emphasized that until 2017 referendum that changed the system of government, Turkey was actually ruled by a de facto presidential system that President Erdoğan became the dominant persona who took the decisions and expected the then Prime Minister Davutoğlu to execute them.

However, despite the implementation of ‘de facto’ presidentialism, the situation could not be sustainable in the long run either, given the clear principles of the constitution. As a result, before the 2015 parliamentary election, the AKP, one more time, promised a new constitution in its election manifesto. According to the document, the AKP had cleansed the tutelary nature of the presidency with 2007, thus the division of the duties and responsibilities should have been made accordingly (Seçim Beyannamesi 2015, p. 41). In this way, administration would overcome the possibility of a deadlock between the President and Prime Minister on the one hand and would be faster and more effective on the other hand (Seçim Beyannamesi 2015, pp. 40-41). The effectiveness, in this sense, turned into a key term regarding the quest for more power.

However, the AKP, although became the first party in the elections, could not get the seats needed to form one party government in June 2015, as a radically different situation from the previous elections. The coalition building process of the AKP failed although the task was not given to the CHP or any other opposition party, to wit, ‘an election result was ignored’ for the first time in the history of the Turkish competitive politics, leading to the snap elections of November 2015 (Öktem & Akkoyunlu 2016, p. 471).

At this point, it should be noted that the November 2015 election took place in a highly polarized and insecure political and social environment. On the one hand, already halting Kurdish peace process came to an end. The escalation of war with the PKK in Southeastern Anatolia resulted both in a sharp decrease in the popularity of the HDP (People’s Democratic Party) which had become successful in June 2015 and in a highly polarized political atmosphere (Grigoriadis 2016). On the other hand, Turkey had to deal with terrorism also in the big cities throughout
the summer and autumn of 2015, owing to the ISIS attacks. In this highly fragile atmosphere that the AKP increased its votes to 49.5% from the previous 40.8%, taking the majority in the parliament back (YSK Seçim Arşivi 2015). Kalaycıoğlu explains the result based on the aforementioned political instability which ‘seemed to reinforce the image that coalition government formation and good governance were not necessarily correlated’ (Kalaycioğlu 2018, p. 31).

After the snap election, President Erdoğan reiterated his position about presidentialism and summoned the other parties to make a new constitution (Sözcü 2015), since the seats of the AKP in the parliament fell short of making constitution or holding a referendum for a draft. Although there was not any positive answer to the call at that point, another Constitution Conciliation Commission in the parliament was convened in early 2016. Actually, this commission was doomed to fail from the beginning given the extreme polarization between the political parties in the conditions of 2016. Therefore, after few sessions, the commission was disbanded since the main opposition party CHP adamantly refused to discuss anything related the presidential system (BBC Türkçe 2016a).

Within the existing rules and regulations, the AKP had nothing but to prepare its own draft, then to seek support from parliament for referendum. However, July 2016 coup attempt, which was undertaken by the Gülenist factions of the army, absolutely changed the political scene in Turkey. To analyze the coup attempt goes beyond the scope of this article. But it should be noted that the post 15th July period in Turkey brought massive waves of purge of Feto members alongside a long-term state of emergency. It is in this state of emergency conditions that the leader of the MHP, Devlet Bahçeli, declared his support to bring the constitutional amendments that mostly aimed at the transformation of the government system to the parliament. In the conditions of the late 2016, the presidentialism was discussed based on the need to form a system that would provide ‘constant powerful political will’ in Turkey (BBC Türkçe 2016b).

So, what kind of presidential system could the AKP bring to the parliament, after years of efforts, debates and negotiations? Özsoy Boyunusuz justifiably
argues that the proposal of this ‘Turkish type of presidentialism’ could be classified as ‘hyper presidentialism’ in which the executive is overpowered at the expense of the legislative and judiciary, with little balance of power mechanisms and no separation of powers (Özsoy Boyunçuz 2016). Therefore, the proposed Turkish type of presidentialism has had more resemblances with the Latin American government systems than that of the U.S., which had been incessantly shown as an example in the discussions of 2004–2005 and in the sessions of the Constitutional Conciliation Commissions between 2011 and 2013, in order to aggrandize presidentialism, and its separation of powers. While lacking checks and balances, the amendments particularly weakened the legislative since the president gained the right to dissolve the assembly and to issue decrees having the force of legislation in specific realms without parliamentary control (Özsoy Boyunçuz 2016, p. 84). Actually, the amendments set forth little or no parliamentary control for any actions of the executive body.

The proposal was accepted for referendum in the parliament with the support of the MHP deputies. During the campaign period, the AKP emphasized ‘power, stability and effectiveness’ (Anadolu Ajansı 2017) compatible with the zeitgeist while the opposition party CHP tried to explain that the amendments were changing not just the system but the regime. The constitutional amendments were accepted in the referendum held in April 2017, with the 51.4% of votes, confirming the polarization, to wit, the division in the society that took shape through the 2010s (YSK Seçim Arşivi 2017). After years of debates based on democratization and the U.S. type of presidentialism, Turkey’s a-century-long parliamentary system eventually changed into a presidential one with the features of hyper-presidentialism, within an increasingly authoritarian setting.

6. **In lieu of conclusion**

When this article was written in 2020, the politicians in Turkey were still discussing the recently changed system of government. Apart from the usual opponents of presidentialism, such as the CHP or the HDP; it is remarkable to see that even the former Prime Minister of the AKP, Davutoğlu, who ardently defended
presidential system during his tenure, were conducting campaign for parliamentarism with his new party (Cumhuriyet 2020). This acknowledges, on the one hand, that the current hyper-presidentialism restricts political space for all of the actors and the parties other than Erdoğan or the AKP. On the other hand, it shows that the transformation of the system in 2017 did not (and will not) end the discussions around it.

Accordingly, this study aimed to show that the system of government has always been discussed since the late 20th century. Different actors have kept the matter on the agenda with different impetuses. From efficiency to the drive to overcome instability; different discourses have been adopted. This article argued that the debates on the system of government is not intrinsic to the authoritarianism of the recent period, though particularly emphasizing that it was this authoritarian turn in Turkey that shaped the features of the system as eventually accepted in 2017. The excessive power of the executive with no proper checks and balances yet with a highly politicized justice system is directly related to rising authoritarianism in Turkish politics. Surely, it was not possible to handle such a massive change either in the late 20th century or in the first decade of the AKP rule since the other institutions of the state were strong in the face of the respective governments. Therefore, it is not surprising that this change could take place in the 2010s that the AKP dominated the other institutions.

However, as this article showed, the presidential system was thought as an option, even in the conditions of 2004 and 2005 with a different discourse. This was a good reflection of a common political attitude in Turkey that has usually – and wrongly – regarded the government system change as a panacea to the flaws of the Turkish politics. In this respect, it is possible to follow not only the basic paradigms but also the problems of the (sub)periods in Turkey on the debates associated with presidentialism; as could be seen in the evolution of discourses from democratization to the quest for more power.
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Turkish Penal Politics within Biopolitics: Changes and Continuities since the 2000s

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ABSTRACT

The Turkish criminal justice system has undergone significant reforms since the early 2000s. Probation services and addiction treatment centres have followed the legislative changes. Prisons have changed through centralization and securitization processes and improved in terms of prisoners’ rights with an increase in the availability of prison space. These developments have impacted positively on the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. In the last years, however, prison administrations have been struggling with overcrowding problems alongside the bottlenecks in judicial cases. It is true that Turkish penal politics has been shaped around its will to protect first and foremost the sovereign power of the state. I further argue that the prison regime has transformed in such an efficient way that its governance corresponds both to transformations in the neoliberalizing political economy and the state’s will to consolidate its own sovereign power and security. There is a convergence of increased securitization in crime control with a neoliberal trend and sovereign state’s own security.

KEYWORDS: Turkish criminal justice system; Turkish prisons; Security; Social control

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1. Introduction

The Turkish criminal justice system has undergone significant reforms since the early 2000s. The introduction of the probation services and mediation, as well as developments in addiction treatment centres, followed legislative changes. Prisons have undergone major transformations in terms of both architecture and management through centralization and securitization processes. They have acquired a modern look and acceptable standards in terms of prisoners’ rights. These changes and transformations have occurred as an extension and reaction to international developments, including the human rights principles introduced through legislation, training and new institutions, as Turkey lies at the periphery of Europe and wishes to emulate European standards. At first glance, all these developments indicate progress that has had a positive effect on the legitimacy of the Turkish criminal justice system. In the last few years, however, the Turkish prison administration has been struggling with overcrowding problems alongside bottlenecks in judicial cases, due to political crimes. There is an increase in the imprisonment rates and an accelerated securitization process in the prison regime. What are the underlying political, economic and social causes of this securitization trend in the Turkish penal politics? This paper provides an overview of the major transformations in the criminal justice institutions, with a particular focus on imprisonment and sheds light on social control in Turkish society through crime control, i.e. Turkey’s penal politics.

Criminological literature has remained sparse in Turkey until today. A common language to argue about the penal history or culture of Turkey has not yet been developed to tackle general crime rates and policies. Criminal incidents find space in the media as individual and sensational cases, disconnected from structural variables such as class or ethnicity. Criminal justice policies or direction of penal policies do not find much space in broadcasts, except for highly politicized issues such as counter-terrorism or violence against women. Crime rates or issues in the criminal justice system do not translate into material for the current government or the competing

1 I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments on the earlier versions of this paper.
parties to collect votes in a populist manner. Crime control is tackled primarily by law graduates or the police department but not by social scientists. Moreover, there is no established work culture of calculating and presenting trends in crime and imprisonment rates. Data is mostly presented raw in tables rather than interpreted in graphs, which makes it difficult to keep track of crime and crime control rates and yearly trends. There is a pressing need for the standardization and systematization of the official data gathered by different state organs. The following changes are also needed: making data accessible for researchers; introducing a routine national victim survey; identifying recidivism through the organization of data between different state organs; uncovering factors leading to recidivism; and facilitating the introduction of intervention programmes (Topçuoğlu 2015).

Across the international literature, imprisonment is used synonymously with punishment as its most severe form in most countries (Hudson 2003, p. 119). Hence, an analysis of the prison system gives the most relevant data to analyse the penal system. In Turkey, prison politics and policies have focused on political prisoners, which has resulted in a lack of regard for the problems of ordinary prisoners (constituting approximately 90% of all prisoners in 2015) (Mandıracı 2015). Until recently, these political prisoners were detained either on the basis of their stance against political economy, i.e. being leftist, or on the basis of their ethnic identification, such as being Kurdish. Though the literature on the detention of political prisoners has made an invaluable contribution to the history of imprisonment in Turkey (Neziroğlu 2006; İbikoğlu 2012; Hakyemez 2017), it has been written with the purpose of questioning the legitimacy of detaining political prisoners, and by nature does not tackle imprisonment and control of perpetrators of street crime in general. According to Neziroğlu (2006), İbikoğlu (2012) and Eren (2014), throughout the history of the Turkish Republic, penal politics has been shaped to govern political prisoners that threaten the sovereign power of the state that holds the monopoly over the means of violence. I agree with this, but further argue that the prison regime has transformed in such an efficient way that its governance corresponds both to Turkey’s political economy and the state’s will to consolidate its sovereign power. In this article, I will demonstrate...
how the developments in neoliberalizing the political economy and concerns around the government’s security, as the sovereign state power, have converged in the penal culture and imprisonment policies of Turkey.

Overall, there are two axes in this paper. One axis scrutinizes the security concerns deriving from the sovereign state power throughout the history. The other axis analyses the concern over the security of the population that is threatened by ordinary non-political crimes. Both the security of the state and the security of the population are sustained through increasing imprisonment numbers and securitization of the prison regime in terms of architecture. It is possible to analyse these security concerns separately. However, this paper aims to weave the ways in which they intersect in Turkish penal politics.

2. Biopolitics as a tool to analyse security concerns in Turkey

In the international literature (Rusche & Kirchheimer 1939; Melossi & Pavarrini 1981; Feeley & Simon 1992; Cavadino & Dignan 2007), imprisonment and penal culture are analysed in correspondence to relations of production and transformations in the political economy. Turkey’s general criminal justice and imprisonment system have yet to be analysed with this approach, except for Sipahi’s studies (2006, 2016) that covers mid-20th century prisons. The concept of biopolitics or governmentality (Foucault 1991, 2007, 2008) is a theoretical research tool, and a guideline to scrutinize Turkey’s penal culture holistically.

Biopolitics refers to the production of knowledge and techniques to manage the population as a social entity within the transformations in the capitalist relations of production. Penal politics constitutes one of the aspects to manage the population, besides the issues of health, hygiene, birth rates, death rates, race, life expectancy, and the general social security of the population. By definition, biopolitics takes ‘population’ as its target, ‘political economy’ as its principle form of knowledge and ‘apparatuses of security’ as its technical means (Foucault 1991, 2007). Foucault (2007) argues that this art of governing develops as the population becomes the main target of the governor and economy is introduced as a correct way of managing individuals.
Government is defined as a right manner of disposing things so as not to lead to a form of common good, as the jurists’ texts would have stated, but to an end which is ‘convenient’ for each of the things that are to be governed (Foucault 1991, p. 95). So, things must be disposed. Foucault underlines the term ‘dispose’ as government disposing things rather than imposing law, even ‘using laws themselves as tactics- to arrange things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be achieved’ (Foucault 1991, p. 95). The term governmentality refers to the production of strategies and tactics to dispose things and to manage the population. Imprisonment is one of the mechanisms of disposal. Population is governed with a wide notion of security that encompasses all areas of life, including health, hygiene, birth, death, life expectancy, social security system. Drawing from Foucault, Agamben complements the concept of Biopolitics by contemplating on the sovereign power’s own security.

Agamben (1998, 2005) elaborates the modern biopolitics through the control techniques over people who are in conflict with the sovereign power of the state with a focus on the ‘state of exception’. Agamben studies the exclusion from protection of the law, the emergence of bare lives outside of the protection of the law, and the suspension of legal rights while the law is still in force. The sovereign power, i.e. the central state that holds the monopoly over the means of violence, may suspend the law for certain groups that are perceived as a threat to the very security of the state itself. The suspension of law while the law is still in force is practiced in many anti-terror policies in the world, including Turkey. Hence, Topaloglu and Firat (2012), Yonucu (2018a) and Mercan and Denizhan (2020) have studied law and policing practices in Turkey in anti-terror actions of the state, from Agamben’s lens. The concept of biopolitics as developed by Foucault (2007, 2008) and later by Agamben (1998, 2005) provides a robust basis to interpret what issues become security concerns in Turkey and how penal politics respond to these security concerns.

Overall, in this paper, the history of imprisonment in Turkey is considered within biopolitics, ‘as the politics of optimizing life of (a selective) population’, both in relation to the political economy (Rusche & Kirchheimer 1939; Foucault 1977,
1980; Melossi & Pavarini 1981) and in relation to the manifestation of sovereign power (Agamben 1998, 2005). A quick overview of the recent implementations in the Turkish prison regime could imply that the prison regime is mainly shaped by the will of the sovereign power of the current government and its tactics to eliminate the threats against its very own existence. In other words, some of the changes and shifts have taken place due to the sovereign state’s power’s concern about its own security. A historical analysis of the prison regime, however, also situates these transformations within the political economy. The transformations must be observed as a convergence between the developments in political economy and the sovereign power’s own security concerns. Below, I will first present an account of the shifts in the history of Turkish prison regime and architecture. Following the transformation in the prison regime, newly developed legislations and institutions will be discussed.

3. Prisons of Turkey

3.1. Prison regime and architecture until the 2000s

Revisionist penitentiary theories allow researchers to analyse the prison as the main site of punishment in relation to the political economy and relations of production that transform over time. Rusche and Kirchheimer’s (1939, p. 5) well-recognized analysis of the correspondence of punishment systems to the productive relations forms the basis of discussion, whereby ‘every system of production tends to discover punishments which correspond to its productive relationships’. Imprisonment emerges as the main site of punishment in correspondence to the development of wage labour in capitalist relations of production. Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939, p. 62) first present the objective of modern prison as the rational exploitation of labour power in times of its scarcity but later admit that prison became the standard method of punishment even when the demand for prison labour had fallen (Cavadino & Dignan 2007).

Eren (2014) has studied imprisonment in Turkey in three eras. The first era is identified as the ‘dungeon’ era until the end of the 19th century, when no building was constructed as a prison and no specific laws on the management of prisons
existed. At the start of the second era (late-19th century until the 1960s), a reform process began. Special buildings were constructed as prisons, prisoners were kept in wards and new laws were introduced to govern these institutions. Overall, the second era is the era of ward-system prisons in which prisoners were managed in inadequate conditions. Between the 1930s and 1950s, during the triumph of state-led industrial capitalism, labour-based prisons occupied policy-makers’ agenda for boosting national production (Sipahi 2006). In line with the theory of Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939), prison conditions improved, and prison labour began to be widely used. ‘The labour-based prisons were founded not as an instrument of controlling the masses, but as state enterprises for augmenting national production’ (Sipahi 2006, p. 25). However, the government did not make a considerable profit from the labour-based prisons, nor did the prisoners turn into docile members of the labour force (Sipahi 2016). In 1941, reformatories for child convicts were assigned under the same regulations as labour-based prisons (Sipahi 2006, p. 48). Altogether, these special prisons received one-third of the entire prison population, which, according to Sipahi (2006), was a significant population, showing the impact of political economy on the criminal justice system. Labour-based prisons declined together with the decline of labour scarcity (Sipahi 2006). The ward system continued from the 1970s onwards (Eren 2014), but with smaller units.

In the 1960s, prison classification changed to closed, semi-open and open prisons. Similar to Eren (2014) and İbikoğlu’s (2012) arguments, Sipahi (2006) claims that from the 1960s to the 1990s, the primary concern in Turkish penality shifted from prisoner-workers in prisons with production facilities to political prisoners in high-security prisons, reserved especially for prisoners charged with crimes against the state. After the coup d’état in 1971, left-socialist struggles became prevalent in Turkish prisons. Torture and violence occurred routinely and resistance took place, which eventually led to a transformation in prison design. During this third era from the 1970s onwards, in which socialist movements were repressed, the design of the prison started to be transformed from a ward system to room-cell systems to better
control the prisoners (Eren 2014, p. 14), but this transformation did not happen overnight.

State Security Courts were established and began operating in 1984. These courts, as befits the name, were ambiguous by design to protect the state with a judge appointed from the military, which inevitably undermined its independence. During this period, the normal juridical-penal law and rights could be suspended for an uncertain period of time while maintaining their force in the ‘state of necessity’ commanded by the will of the sovereign power of the state for the security of its population (Kaynar-Kars 2013). Eventually, in 2004, they were abolished. The Anti-Terror Law (No. 3713)\(^2\) entered into force for cases involving the crimes against the state in 1991. The State Security Courts (1984-2004) and the introduction of the Anti-Terror Law (No. 3713), the Law on Assemblies and Demonstrations (No. 2911)\(^3\) and Article 250 in the Code on Criminal Procedure (No. 5271)\(^4\) on the establishment of special courts to prosecute acts of working in illegal organizations, have been the mechanisms to continue the never-ending fight against state’s inner enemies and organized crime. Article 250 in the Code on Criminal Procedure has been abrogated later and amended. These legislations and courts indicate a ‘state of necessity’ (Agamben 1998, 2005) that claims the insufficiency of normal penal courts in dealing with ‘security’ of the state. Turkey’s anti-terror law\(^5\) has a vague and broad definition of terror, in line with global trends in anti-terror legislations (Yonucu 2018a).

Imprisonment of political prisoners, those associated with socialist movements or pro-Kurdish movements, has grown and shrunk over the decades in


changing political environment and legislations. Drawing from an Agambenian understanding of a ‘state of exception’, as sovereignty existed but law was suspended, the actions were neither legal nor illegal. After the second coup d’état in 1980, military prisons held political prisoners who were referred to as anarchists and kept them under a brutal disciplinary regime. In the 1980s, torture was inflicted as a common, routine, discouraging, terrorizing form of punishment (Topaloğlu & Fırat 2012; İbikoğlu 2012; Can 2016). Later in the 1980s and 1990s, prisoner resistance in the form of social/communal culture and discipline inside the prisons trumped the military’s discipline (İbikoğlu 2012, p. 156). İbikoğlu (2012) views this transition as a two-sided process; a failed disciplinary system of the military on the one side, and an effective disciplinary system of the political prisoners themselves on the other. The military’s disciplinary regime diminished as civilian administrations took over control of prisons in the 1990s. Prisoners relied on well-rehearsed methods of resistance, and prisoners’ communes gained autonomy through social/communal discipline, daily programmes, division of labour and compulsory education sessions, with prisoners being ready to fight for the commune against the state (İbikoğlu 2012, pp. 48-49).

3.2. Prison regime and architecture of the 2000s

Imprisonment of Political Prisoners

In 2000, hundreds of different political prisoners in various prisons went on hunger strike to prevent their transfer to F-type high security prisons that would stop them from meeting and unifying. On 19 December 2000, security forces intervened in the prisons in an operation known as ‘Operation Return to Life’ that cost the lives of thirty prisoners and two soldiers and left many injured. Immediately after the operation, nearly all political prisoners (accused of terror and organized crime) were transferred from wards into new cell-based F-type high security prisons designed to have one to three prisoners per cell (İbikoğlu 2012, pp. 139-140). The ward system favoured by political prisoners started to disappear in exchange for cells favoured by the Ministry of Justice (Neziroğlu 2006, p. 424). A European Commission for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) report published in 1996 that criticized the living
conditions in the ward systems at the time provided a legitimate back-up to the government in this transition while the official authorities aimed to regain control of the prisons (İbikoğlu 2012, pp. 120, 147; Neziroğlu 2006, p. 166). These F-type prisons generated discussions in academic studies and the media, specifically over solitary confinement and isolation. Although the terms ‘prison (hapishane)’ and ‘punishment house (cezaevi)’ are used interchangeably by the public, in the 2000s, ‘punishment house’ replaced ‘prison’ upon the initiative of the Ministry of Justice. Eren (2014, pp. 229-232) demonstrates this change through his discourse analysis of a mainstream newspaper. Accordingly, the term ‘punishment house’ is problematic, as the word ‘punishment’ inherently refers to a crime which itself is a contestable term, especially when considered in the literature for political prisoners and pre-trial detention. Punishment house connotes the certainty of an uncontested crime, implying that the punishment is well deserved. Today, the use of the term ‘punishment house’ corresponds to the ‘room/cell system’.

According to İbikoğlu (2012), the maximum-security prisons in Europe and North America influenced the transition to F-type prisons in Turkey. This prison population is no longer the mere subject of a sovereign state or subjects to be transformed into ideal citizens but is managed and reduced to utilitarian individuals (İbikoğlu 2012, pp. 100-159). The goal of these new prisons is ensuring security by appealing to the self-interest of the rational individual prisoner. There has been a transition from the political prisoners’ disciplinary regime of control to a security-oriented managerial regime of control. This new regime of control imagines prisoners as utility-maximizing rational individuals who naturally conform to the rules of the system in order to benefit from the rewards and avoid punishments, such as further isolation.

Although Turkish F-type prisons could be influenced by the maximum-security prisons in Europe and North America in design and regime, the term ‘managerialism’ needs to be utilised more carefully if it is to explain this transformation because the target population is different. Managerialism connotes a certain way of ruling corresponding to the political economy but not the political-sovereign rule.
Feeley and Simon (1992), the pioneering authors of the term managerialism, state that in this ‘New Penology’, the prison is not an institution to transform individuals, but functions as a custodial institution that ‘manages aggregates’. This ‘New Penology’ is managerial rather than transformative, i.e. it is not concerned with reforming and treating the offender. New Penology is more consistent with the idea of ‘security power’ than ‘disciplinary power’. While discipline targets the individual to be socialized and integrated into the community, ‘security addresses itself to the ‘ensemble of a population’ (Hudson 2003, pp. 161-162). The idea of danger that applies to the individuals to be transformed is displaced by the idea of risk that applies to the aggregates. Efficient management of the aggregates is the main target of these actuarial practices, instead of normalizing individuals in the long term (Hudson 2003). So, the term ‘managerialism’ had been placed in the agenda by American criminologists to explain the transformation of American penality, where prisons lock up aggregates of ordinary prisoners to be managed. Political prisoners in Turkey, on the other hand, are deliberately placed in high-security prisons and managed carefully. The physical design of new Turkish prisons with their emphasis on security might resemble the American model. And it is this very intersection of the manifestation of the Justice and Development Party’s sovereign power to govern the political prisoners in maximum security and its will to govern the non-political prisoners that must be studied. Eventually, the security-oriented prison regime fulfils the aim of controlling both the ordinary and ‘commune-oriented political prisoners’; the latter refers to the prisoners with leftist tendencies that act as a unity in the prison, rather than indifferent individuals.

*Imprisonment of non-political criminal acts*

The new prisons that mostly prioritize security in large prison campuses have become prevalent in the 2000s in Turkey, in the neoliberalizing political economy that idealizes individual responsibilization. From the 1980s onwards, Turkey’s political economy transformed in line with neoliberal trends in the global market. The dominant political ideology after the 1980s is defined as a coalition of the right
(neoliberal) with religious (conservative) cleavages (Göçmen 2014, p. 94). In this outward-oriented liberal era, income inequality rose due to both global conditions and domestic developments (Pamuk 2013, p. 313). It must be noted that Pamuk (2013) does not view liberalism as the sole reason for inequality, as he detects other eras with high-income inequality levels in inward-oriented, state-led economies. In fact, since the early 20th century, Turkish social policy and security have been based on the family and community (Göçmen 2016).

In the 2000s, ‘a new welfare system has largely eliminated the fragmented structure, creating a social security institution and a general health insurance system to cover all citizens… Turkish welfare system expenditures as a percentage of the GDP have increased from 3.1 percent in 1980 to 12.5 percent in 2013’ (Powell & Yörük 2017, p. 89). However, still according to Buğra (2020, p. 459), new forms of market regulation since the 2000s ‘have sustained the trends toward privatization and marketization in a hybrid system of social security provision in which both the state and the private sector are important’. While public social spending increased and new institutions acquired a more inclusive character, this transformation was shaped by market-oriented reforms, which resulted in the deepening of class and gender inequalities (Buğra 2020). Moreover, according to Yörük’s findings (2012), the Turkish state uses social assistance to contain the ongoing Kurdish unrest. Internally displaced, impoverished Kurds receive more social assistance not because they are poorer but for being Kurdish and being a potential security threat.

Although it is hard to reach a consensus on the categorization of Turkish welfare regime within the existing clusters as it is ‘rapidly changing’ (Powell & Yörük 2017), up until now, the Turkish welfare regime has been attributed characteristics of residualism (Buğra & Keyder 2006), informality (Eder 2010), dualism (Buğra & Adar 2008), eclecticism (Buğra & Candaş 2011) and ‘regulatory neo-liberalism’ (Öniş 2012). These attributes underline the welfare regime’s non-universalistic character that reasserts social stratification and inequality. Alleviating these burdens are attributed to the (extended) family, informal social ties and the voluntary sector (Yazıcı 2012). In this paper, the construction of neoliberal subjects that are individually responsible, self-
sufficient, initiating and supported by the family in case of failure constitutes the basis of neoliberal governmentality. In neoliberalizing political economies, in which, the *homo oeconomicus* is responsible for his/her sustainability in the market and society (Foucault 2008), the defendant/criminal is fully responsible for the illegal act that he/she rationally and individually chooses to commit.

Gönen and Yonucu (2011) who have written on the criminalization of urban poor populations in Turkey, claim that since 1980s, in the neoliberalizing political economy, deregulation of the labour market conditions, reduced the power and living standards of workers. New consumption and leisure patterns of rich urban populations were possible thanks to the sharpening regional and class inequalities, poverty, unemployment and destruction of social safety nets. This coincides with the destruction of Kurdish villages in 1980s and 1990s, leading to forced migration to the urban West. Consequently, poverty and marginalization contributed to sharpening antagonisms in the cities (Gönen & Yonucu 2011).

Gönen (2011, 2017), focuses on crime discourses and police practices on urban crime; especially, theft, mugging, vandalism and drugs in İzmir, the third largest city of Turkey, in early 2000s. She concludes that ‘tough on crime’ measures of the police rest on a deliberate strategy of profiling and criminalization of ethno-racially differentiated urban poor populations. Accordingly, the public order/policing strategies targeted the poor segments and populations in the city, distinguishing them from the ‘respectable’ citizens (Gönen 2017, p. 4). Since the late 1990s, urban poor has been constituted as ‘dangerous criminals’ in the mainstream media. Representation of ‘criminals’ as dangerous ‘monsters’ naturalizes crime and conceals the structural inequalities underlying the criminal incidents (Gönen & Yonucu 2011, p. 81). The urban poor is perceived as a security issue and target of public order measures. Young people in the margins of urban life are criminalized (Uluğtekin 2012). The juvenile justice system, ‘oscillates between an attitude that is both repressive and lax and a protectionist will that is not detached from neoliberal tendencies’ (İrtiş 2010, p. 251).

In his understanding of governmentality, Castel (2004, pp. 76-77) draws attention to the contradiction embedded in neoliberal governmentality and states that
the modern individual cannot sustain him/herself in society without social security provided by the state. ‘Such ‘biopolitics’ demands from the free individual self-actualization while simultaneously denying her the resources and opportunities that used to be provided by various sources, including the government, in earlier periods’ (Yıldırım & Kuyucu 2017, p. 9). As the neoliberal governmentality that focuses on risk-management is embraced, preventive and security-oriented practices imprisonment increase (Özkazanç 2011; Doğuç 2014, p. 60). In the absence of social security institutions, prisons manage the rational individuals who have failed in the market, i.e. security is maintained via prisons. The priority given to the handling of the political prisons through F-type prisons in Turkey has accelerated this transformation within securitization discourse in a neoliberalizing regime. In Foucault's terms, certain segments of the population are disposed through imprisonment.

In this socio-economic context and according to the official website of prison administration, many prisons have been closed down and replaced with new ones, to reduce the operating costs, to enhance the quality (of what is not specified) and to act in line with a modern punishment administration approach. Thus, hundreds of small district prisons have been closed down since 2006 as they did not meet international norms and physical standards. Alongside this, about a hundred new ‘healthy, secure, mechanical and electronically equipped prisons that are eligible for rehabilitation services’ have been designed as modern projects. Here, there is a similarity between the politics of the current Justice and Development Party government and the populist Democrat Party of the mid-20th century. Similar to the populism of Democrat Party, which invested in over 100 small prisons in less than 4 years (Eren 2014) while building roads, the Justice and Development government has invested a lot in constructing and renewing prison facilities, also while building roads and boosting the construction sector. The long-lasting power of building contractors in the construction business in Turkey has been effective in prison construction. In fact, during the first wave of migration flows in the aftermath of the Syrian civil war, the camps were recognized as 5-star hotels by the European authorities (Mcclelland 2014). The architecture and designs of camps or prisons that have been introduced
during the reign of the Justice and Development Party since the beginning of the 2000s have impressed both the public in Turkey and European policy makers. The design of the prisons, especially juvenile prisons, has given primacy to privacy and has thus given legitimacy to the imprisonment. It would not be wrong to conclude that the speed of the construction sector in Turkey has coincided with and contributed to the acceleration of securitization in the criminal justice system. Though the prison design might be a concern, especially for human rights activists caring for the privacy, health and security of the prisoners, the outlook and physical facilities should not mask the primacy of the questions of who are incarcerated and for which reasons. These questions are important not only due to the imprisonment of politically-engaged persons. Scrutiny of the prison population could give insights into the overrepresentation of certain ethnic minority groups as well as the growing class inequality in Turkey. This has remained overlooked and understudied.

Despite the introduction of probation services, alongside the increase in the number of prison facilities, imprisonment numbers have been rising steadily. There has been a rise in the number of prisoners per 100,000 people in Turkey since the 1990s. From 1992 to 2008, this number rose from 54 to 135 (Yücel 2009, p. 230). According to the World Prison Brief, the Turkish prison population has increased considerably since 2000, rising from 49,512 to more than 200,000 in 2016. The prison population rate (per 100,000 of the national population) rose from 73 in 2000 to 251 in 2016. Since 2016, there have been mass arrests and imprisonment in the aftermath of the attempted coup d'état. Thousands of political prisoners accused of terrorism have been incarcerated. There has been an acceleration of concern for security, related to the enunciation of the sovereign power of the Justice and Development Party. According to recent data shared by Turkey’s Centre for Prison Studies, the number of prisoners has risen to over 280,000 in 2020. Overcrowding has reached the level of 28%.
Until very recently, the current government has resisted solving the overcrowding issue in the prisons with general amnesties. Prior to the Justice and Development Party, with 157 amnesties since 1923, Turkey has been the leading country in the number of amnesties passed (Yıldırım & Kuyucu 2017). The Justice and Development Party has resisted this trend, which Yıldırım and Kuyucu explain in relation to the neoliberalism trend that leads to increased punitiveness, ‘holding individuals responsible for their criminal acts’ and a rationalized managerial approach (Yıldırım & Kuyucu 2017, p. 863). Accordingly, the Justice and Development Party’s populist image of a strong and capable state does not allow it to take extraordinary measures in dealing with structural problems (Yıldırım & Kuyucu 2017). However, that image has collapsed in the early months of 2020 as the government has relied on releases alongside probation for ordinary crimes to decrease prison populations, in order to counter the spread of Covid-19 (Dal 2020). Having said that, these extraordinary measures do not cover those imprisoned for political reasons.
3.3. Pre-trial detention: an issue that remains

Prisons in Turkey have been known to be accommodating a considerable number of pre-trial detainees in various eras. In fact, the proportion of defendants on remand to convicted prisoners was too high until 2006, which is a significant indicator of crisis in the system. After all, prisons are considered to exist to facilitate the ultimate form of punishment, not detain people who have not yet been found guilty. Human rights expert Manuel Lopez-Rey, who was invited to conduct research for the Turkish state, raised the problem of remand back in 1967. Lopez-Rey (1967) stressed that remand imprisonment was used as an earlier form of undeclared punishment and it was difficult to prove otherwise. In 2010, the high proportion of pre-trial detainees to sentenced prisoners started receiving attention as members of secularist and ultra-nationalist organisations with possible ties to the military and security forces started to be tried and were on remand for a number of years. During the same years, some journalists were also placed on remand and tried, and others were on remand because they were tried according to the special law on state security (Türkiye Barolar Birliği İnsan Hakları Merkezi 2011, referring to the Code on Criminal Procedure, article 250). Consequently, the Turkey Bar Association Human Rights Centre released reports in 2009 and 2011 on the issue. According to the report, the proportion of prisoners on remand to sentenced prisoners had been rising in the last decade; the gap had increased to 162% (Türkiye Barolar Birliği İnsan Hakları Merkezi 2011, p. 18). Remand imprisonment gained attention as some public figures and journalists, rather than ordinary citizens, started to be detained on remand. Only a few studies (Şen 2011; Şen & Özdemir 2012; Erkul 2013) have problematized the issue of remand imprisonment for non-political crimes. By 2013, the Minister of Justice was proud to talk about the significant drop in the proportion of prisoners on remand (Şimşek 2013). However, the methods to reduce the ratio of remand imprisonment have not been expounded on in formal documentation. Since 2016, pre-trial detention has been back on the agenda, as most of the mass arrests have led to frequent and long periods of detention without trial or completion of the adjudication process. However, it is not possible to obtain reliable data on the pre-trial detention ratios.
Table 1. Pre-trial detention ratios (2000-2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number in pre-trial/remand imprisonment</th>
<th>Percentage of total prison population</th>
<th>Pre-trial/remand population rate (per 100,000 of national population)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>29,953 (of which 26,297 untried)</td>
<td>41.7% (untried are 36.6%)</td>
<td>44 (untried rate 39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30,061 (of which 25,919 untried)</td>
<td>55.4% (untried are 47.7%)</td>
<td>42 (untried rate 26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56,107 (of which 34,827 untried)</td>
<td>46.6% (untried are 28.9%)</td>
<td>77 (untried rate 47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>48,242 (of which 32,475 untried)</td>
<td>40.1% (untried are 27.0%)</td>
<td>64 (untried rate 43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100,003 (of which 79,121 untried)</td>
<td>43.1% (untried are 34.1%)</td>
<td>124 (untried rate 98)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4. Further developments in the 2000s: New legislation, introduction of probation and reforms in policing

A series of legislative reforms took place at the beginning of the 2000s. Turkey’s first Penal Code that was adopted from Italy, which was amended many times, was totally replaced in 2004 (Law No. 5237, 2004)\(^6\). The first Code on Criminal Procedure that was transferred from Germany was in force until it was replaced by a new one in 2004 (Law No. 5271, 2004). This new Code on Criminal Procedure introduced diversion and control mechanisms that are alternatives to remand imprisonment. The New Law on the Execution of Penalties and Security Measures (Law No. 5275)\(^7\) was adopted in 2004.


With these legislative changes, there have been some positive developments in the criminal justice system, such as the introduction of probation services to lift the weight off prisons, and the introduction of Mediation (Law No. 26594, 2007)\(^8\), which allows two parties to resolve a dispute without a prosecution process. The introduction of probation with the new Turkish Penal Code in 2005 and the passing of the Law on the Probation Services (Law No. 5402)\(^9\) in 2005 were important achievements in terms of reforming the criminal justice system and reducing the prisoner numbers. Probation mainly targets crimes related to drug use and drug dealing. As shown in Figure 1, the number of cases transferred to probation services increased steadily from 2006 onwards.

In fact, availability of drugs in working-class areas increased recently (Yonucu 2018b). Since the early 2000s, this increase in drug availability and increasing poverty has led some segments of working-class youth to engage in car theft, shop robbery, pickpocketing, sex work and drug dealing (Yonucu 2018b). While neoliberal policies and relations deter certain segments of the population from decent wages and labour processes, the same policies still produce a desire in them to be part of society as consumers. This desire to be respected members of the society by being ‘successful consumers’ (Bauman 2013) is one of the main factors that can lead certain youth to engage in petty crime and drug dealing in urban sites (Yonucu 2018b, p. 413).


Eventually, probation officers go through a role conflict and dilemma between their role as offering rehabilitation services and tough incarceration policies (Erdem et al. 2019). In line with the development of probation services that mainly target drug use and drug dealing, the number of centres for Treatment and Education for Alcohol and Substance Abuse (AMATEM) has also increased. Ünlü and Aksu (2018) claim that Turkish drug-control policy heavily relies on deterrence-based supply-side policies but lacks a holistic strategy to address the supply and demand reduction. The authors further state that, despite the increase in levels of illicit drug use, capacity of the rehabilitation/treatment centres appears to be weak (Ünlü & Aksu 2018).

Alongside the increase in imprisonment numbers, the number of police officers has been increasing since the 1990s. Atak (2020, p. 9), who has made the first attempt to investigate longitudinal crime statistics in Turkey from the 1990s onwards, states that ‘the number of police officers grew twofold from 164 to 331 per 100 000 between 1992 and 2015’. The latest reduction in 2016 can be presumably linked to the recent purges from the public sector on the grounds of the massive crackdown against the affiliates of the Gülen movement, which is alleged to be the main orchestrator of the coup attempt in 2016.
Based on their examination of policing in Turkey, Mercan and Denizhan (2020) argue that extra-legal actions of the police towards historical criminal enemy categories, in line with the anti-terror law, represented the raison d’État of the sovereign power of the state especially during the 1980s-1990s. In the 2000s, a series of amendments were made in policing with the hope of easing these human rights violations of the 1980s-1990s. However, the amendments to the legislations on policing reinforced the sovereign power of the current government in policing, thus legalizing extra-legal actions (Mercan & Denizhan 2020).

Atak (2020) states that the police increased its capacity for surveillance and control by implementing high-tech preventive strategies. He further argues that the qualitative and quantitative expansions in the state capacity to police might have led to an escalated control over crime, leading to a rise in crime rates. In other words, it is questionable whether the increase in the number of prisoners corresponds to a real increase in criminal acts, i.e. changes in criminal behaviour. Rather, the increase in imprisonment rates might occur due to an expansion in crime-control techniques. The rise in crime statistics can be explained by the police effect. In conclusion, the insufficiency or the exility in probation services, increase in policing, increase in imprisonment rates and securitization trend in the prison regime reflect the politics of crime control in Turkey.

5. Conclusion

Overall, the Turkish criminal justice system cannot be analysed without acknowledging the effects of coup d’états, military interventions, repression of the leftist movements and criminalization of the Kurdish movement throughout the last century. Incapacitation of political selves has been the centre of Turkish criminal justice system to the present day. Though a wave of decriminalization of political identities and attacks on militarism created an emancipatory atmosphere at the beginning of the 2000s, prosecution and incarceration of political persons who allegedly pose a threat to the security and unity of the state have proven the continuity of the primacy of state security in the criminal justice system. Accordingly, the bulk of literature on
the Turkish criminal justice system and especially prisons has addressed the criminalization of the leftist movement and the Kurdish movement, questioning the impartiality and the legitimacy of the government. The lacuna in the literature addressing the criminalization process of street/ordinary crimes and the lack of comprehensive statistical data make it difficult to see a clear and holistic picture of Turkish penal culture.

In this paper, I aimed to draw an account of the trends in the general Turkish criminal justice system, with a particular focus on prisons. I argued that the transformations in the prison regime and architecture indicate a process of securitization as part of a neoliberalizing trend. In the neoliberalizing political economy, in which an individual is responsible for his/her own welfare by contributing to the labour market, security rather than welfare needs becomes the dominant value. So the security of individuals is ensured through the criminal justice systems, creating gated communities and CCTV through the design and use of space. Prisons epitomize the security discourse. Neoliberal tendencies in Turkey have led to increased punitiveness, holding individuals responsible for their criminal acts (Yıldırım & Kuyucu 2017). Overall, the construction of the neoliberal individual that is stripped from the socio-economic context and held responsible for the illegal activities he/she has engaged in, finds him/herself prosecuted and incarcerated in criminal justice system institutions. Moreover, the prison system works as a revolving door for this marginal population who shuttle between the courts, prisons and marginalized neighbourhoods, which reminds us of Wacquant’s (2009, 2010) analysis on the relation between ghettos and prisons. The drastic increase in the capacity of the police force is perhaps one facet of this securitization process. The neoliberalization of the welfare regime of Turkey that has attached substantial value to the family and informal social ties and control mechanisms corresponds to what Bauman calls ‘the individualization of the perception of injustice’ (Bauman 2001, p. 86). Eventually, the insecurity of individuals grows, leading to more demands for security through policing and imprisonment. The instability in the social security system and welfare regime leads to securitization. Probation services and Centres for Treatment and Education for Alcohol and Substance Abuse are
not developed enough to reverse the securitization trend. Given the insufficiency of social services institutions in the history of Turkey, the newly introduced legislations and institutions like probation have not necessarily led to a positive change in the justice system. The securitization trend that started in the 1980s continues in the 21st century.

Overall, since the 2000s, the Turkish criminal justice system has been adopting policies leading to an increase in securitization, imbued with managerialist tools that prioritize system management over social security and social work. However, these concepts of securitization or managerialism are not directly implemented on the criminalization of political identities. On the contrary, what we see is a convergence of increased securitization in crime control as part of neoliberal tendencies and increased emphasis given to the security of the state’s sovereign power, through an Agambenian lens. This convergence is crystallized in the change in prison design and prison regime. Hence, the Turkish prisons and criminal justice policies of the 2000s reveal the two sides of securitization in governmentality: securitization in crime control through the rise of high security prisons, private security firms, CCTV cameras and police force on the one hand and the rise in the prosecution and imprisonment of political identities that pose a threat to the sovereign state power on the other hand. While the latter is a continuity peculiar to Turkish penal culture, the former development is a repercussion of international developments taking place in the Western and Anglo-Saxon justice systems.
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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Changing Gender Politics in Turkey throughout the 2000s: A Feminist Analysis of Gender Policies Pursued by Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP) Governments

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ABSTRACT

Founded as a conservative party combining neoliberalism and Islam in 2001, AKP has had an important role in shaping Turkey’s social and political landscape since 2002. Having the majority of the parliament seats since then, the transformation of AKP is reflected in politics, including gender politics. Even though it was established as a conservative-democrat party, AKP has changed its political identity towards authoritarianism over time and Turkey accordingly witnessed a continuous gender regime transformation for better or worse throughout the 2000s. Therefore, in this article, I attempt to show how different periods of AKP have influenced and changed gender politics between the years 2002 and 2020.

KEYWORDS: Gender; Women’s rights; AKP governments; Neoliberalism; Conservative politics

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1. Introduction

Established after splitting from the religio-political movement “National Vision”, named after Turkish politician Necmettin Erbakan’s 1975 manifesto (Atacan 2005), AKP was founded in 2001 and defined its identity as a conservative-democrat party. It pledged to follow liberal economic principles as a part of the Western world and demonstrated its respect for democratic values by claiming Turkey’s aim to join the European Union (EU) (Acar & Altunok 2013). After coming to power in November 2002, AKP declared its commitment to the Western political and economic system and explicitly rejected the traditional heritage of the National Vision movement, which explains the decline of the Muslim world as a result of the imitation of Western values (Carkoglu 2006). One of the main differences of AKP from its predecessors was its commitment to neoliberalism (Erturk 2016). Even though Turkey’s neoliberalism adventure started in the 1980s, AKP combined neoliberalism and Islam, exhibiting a new form of conservatism (Yarar 2018). Ideas of social hierarchy and authority are among the main tenets of conservatism, which, as a political ideology, promotes traditional institutions such as organized religion in the context of culture (Heywood 2012, p. 68). Using populist discourse since its first appearance in the political scene, AKP bases its conservative regime on populism.

According to Finchelstein, populism is a form of politics that develops in unequal democracies, where the inequality of income grows, and democratic representation loses its legitimacy (2019, p. 31). Nevertheless, the literature on populism confirms the difficulty of defining this term (Fassin 2018:18; Müller 2016). As a shadow of modern representative democracy, populism is not a codified doctrine, but it is a set of distinct claims (Müller 2016, p. 23). Most of these claims, such as anti-pluralism and suppressing the civil society (Müller 2016) will be seen as a part of AKP’s politics. Having a centralized organizational structure around a charismatic leader, AKP was able to develop political reflexes in line with the rapidly changing political conjuncture. In that case, Erdogan’s personal views became important in determining politics to follow in each field, including gender.
Since 2002, Turkey has experienced a series of changes regarding gender politics in various fields such as education, family, employment and male violence, as well as changes in the Constitution and Penal Code. In this article, I will question how these changes can be traced in shifts in AKP’s political identity between 2002 and 2020. I begin with a brief presentation of the methodological and theoretical frameworks. Then, I discuss and analyze the changing gender politics during AKP rule over eighteen years (divided into 5 sub-periods in total). In conclusion, I summarize the main findings and provide an overall assessment of this period from a feminist perspective.

2. Methodological and Theoretical Frameworks

To understand the impact of the shifts in AKP’s political identity on gender politics between 2002 and 2020, I will analyze this period in five chronological phases. This will allow us to see how the gender policies carried out by AKP during two decades have changed considering the same issues and will help us understand these gender politics’ meanings in a historical dis/continuity. The five phases that I distinguish consist of social and political cleavages that occurred during AKP rule. Cleavage, as Zuckerman suggests, denotes a specific kind of division (Zuckerman 1975, p. 231). Here, I use cleavage as a social and political line that causes a change in the existing political attitude of the governments and in the ongoing political identity of AKP. I determined these cleavages and the shifts in AKP’s political identity according to my analysis of the Turkish politics of the last two decades. I base them on the discourses, and political acts of Erdogan and the members of AKP governments diffused through the mass-media as well as the existing literature on Europeanization and feminist analysis of gender politics.

The first phase (November 2002 - August 2007) includes the 58th and 59th governments of Turkey. In this period, AKP defines itself as a conservative-democrat party, pursues a neoliberal program following the world market order and EU conditionality (Hurriyet 2003). The second phase (August 2007 - July 2011)
includes the 60th government. This period can be considered to be in continuity with the first phase (Yilmaz 2016). However, towards the end of this period, patriarchal values led by religious concerns in the party’s preeminent actors’ discourses started to stand out.

The third phase (July 2011 - November 2015) includes the 61st, 62nd, and 63rd governments. Even though this period starts with two important law-making processes against violence against women, patriarchal, conservative, and neoliberal values combined with religion become increasingly dominant in policy-making during this term. I admit that this is the most complicated and chaotic phase that AKP experienced throughout the 18 years. This period contains various social and political cleavages that caused several shifts in AKP’s identity and gender politics. Among these cleavages, there are Solution Process (CNN Turk 2014) developed to resolve long-lasting Turkish-Kurdish conflict, Occupy Gezi Movement (CNN Turk 2013), AKP’s loss of the majority of parliamentary seats as a result of the General Elections on June 7, 2015 (Balli 2015) and the end of the Solution Process (Tasci 2015).

The fourth phase (November 2015 – July 2018) includes the 64th and 65th governments. This period also consists of several political and military cleavages. In this period, AKP’s rhetoric on nationalism combined with Islam shaped the political, social, and cultural landscape. As an ideological construction, nationalism is a political concept related to the emergence of the nation-state. According to Enloe (1990, p. 45), nationalism (as well as nationalist conflicts) is led by a masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation, and masculinized hope. In such a context, masculinity is seen as an important factor for political militancy; therefore, it produces a mechanism of male control over society (Waetjen 2001). Socially constructed notions of femininity and masculinity determine the political and social existence of men and women due to the gendering of nationalism. In this line, a new alliance has been built with the ultranationalist far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP) (Bila 2017) around conservative and patriarchal values. Weakened during the previous phase, AKP’s old alliance with Gulenists, an Islamic movement
with political aspirations, has been brutally terminated as a result of the coup attempt by soldiers who were involved in the Gulen Movement (Yarar 2018, p. 43). Two years of State of Emergency followed this failed coup (Hurriyet 2016). In 2017, the regime changed from a parliamentary system to the Turkish-type presidential system”. And finally, the fifth phase (starting from July 2018) includes the 66th, the first presidential government, and the period that follows a two-year state of emergency.

Considering these social and political events, I will trace the changes in gender politics from an intersectional feminist approach. This approach provides a framework for understanding complex ways of thinking and treating various inequalities of gender, class, race and such, and how they intersect with each other (Crenshaw 1989). Researches that focus only on gender-based oppression marginalize the experiences of women and ignore their diversity regarding ethnicity and class. In this article, I consider class in a broader sense as the concept referring to a person's socio-economic status (Bereni et al. 2012). Here, this approach will be utilized to discover how the negligence of structural intersectionality, which refers to the inequalities stemming from the social and economic structure, and political intersectionality, which refers to the ambiguous position of women within more than one subordinated groups (Crenshaw 1991, pp. 1245 and 1251), in policy-making impacts the lives of women from different backgrounds negatively.

I will mainly focus on the changes in the Constitution, the Turkish Penal Code, and the changes of policies on family, employment, and education. To write this article, I analyzed 163 legal changes regarding gender policies during the eighteen years of AKP. The numbers of the documents analyzed are 47, 36, 26, 12 and 42, concerning the fields of family, in/equality, employment and social policies, education, and violence, respectively. I include news, reports of feminist organizations, statistics on women published by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat), and the writings in feminist online magazines on these changes. Although I have scrutinized the discussions evoked around these changes by AKP
deputies and pro-AKP journalists as well as feminist organizations to provide a better understanding, I exclude a deepened discourse analysis as it is too broad for the scope of this article. Despite having examined significant data on LGBTI+ politics of AKP at discursive and legal levels, I cannot include it in this article for the same reason. As a final note on the scope of the article, I would like to clarify that the role of women’s organizations and the feminist movement are mentioned when they are effective and directly related to the legal changes that I have examined. The analysis of the feminist movement in Turkey during the 2000s is beyond the scope of this article, and its efforts in Turkish politics deserve to be analyzed in another article.

This article offers a comprehensive analysis of Turkey’s gender politics in the last two decades by analyzing the whole gender policies AKP governments pursued by exploring how those policies have been changed due to the shifts in AKP’s party identity. While considering this article as a reference guide for researchers who work on gender politics of Turkey, I wanted to show how the political, economic and social factors influenced the shifts in AKP’s identity and how these shifts influenced gender politics. Thus, this paper aims to go beyond presenting empirical evidence and has both a descriptive and interpretative goal. The literature on Turkey’s gender politics focuses mainly on just one field at once. The literature gap is particularly large regarding the connections between the policies pursued in each field, such as employment, education, social policies, and such. When analyzed separately, it is hard to see the analogies between them. Seeking to fill this gap, this paper offers an analysis of changing policies in various fields and their consequences regarding gender politics. It also aims to provide a better understanding of how AKP pursues conflicting policies regarding gender in a single field from one time to another.

In this context, based on an intersectional approach, my theoretical groundings are in transnational feminist theory and its critique of neoliberalism. As a feminist paradigm, this theory focuses on how women from different nations, classes, ethnicities, and sexualities are affected by globalization and neoliberal
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capitalism (Grewal & Kaplan 1994). For this article’s scope, the importance of this theory derives from its role in understanding how neoliberal capitalism shapes the political, social, and economic oppression of women across the world, including Turkey, and how the structures of patriarchal and neoliberal capitalism influence the reconstruction of gender inequality. As Mohanty (2003) puts it, feminist criticism is needed to demystify neoliberal capitalism and to imagine social and economic justice. Both patriarchy, as a system of subordination, and neoliberal capitalism benefit from the unpaid labor of women (Acar-Savran 2003). According to Hartman (1992), patriarchy and capitalism can both reinforce each other or contradict. As a matter of fact, capitalism’s tendency to include women in the wage labor market for having cheap labor, and the need of patriarchy for women’s domestic labor, create contradictory dynamics, and sometimes one (and at another time the other) becomes dominant.

Neoliberalism is marked by market-based governance practices such as privatization, commodification, and the proliferation of difference (Mohanty 2015). Representing a governmentality method and an economic and social policy, neoliberalism regulates the whole dimensions of life like the market (Foucault et al. 2004). This market rationality is dispersed through political, social, and cultural spheres. In a neoliberal political context, the states create a new political culture, where citizens become individual entrepreneurs and burden the responsibility for their own self-care, access to a good level of education, health-care and social security. Combined with conservatism, neoliberal states confirm their presence in the political order by inscribing political and moral notions by discourses of nationalism, religiosity, culture, and tradition (Acar & Altunok 2013). In such a context, as a high stage of capitalism, the role of neoliberalism in the reconstruction of power relationships between genders seems significant. Since its emergence, capitalism has changed the role of women and men in everyday life, and now neoliberalism deepens gender roles by creating a new political, economic, and social order. In this context, women are instrumentalized for the justification of neoliberal
economic policies under the pretext of giving them more time to spend with their families in the guise of part-time work, thereby leaving them a secondary position in the labor market. Thusly, patriarchy and neoliberalism compromises and women become economically dependent on their husbands or families (Hartman 1992, p.155).

In this regard, it seems that the state’s regulatory influence on gender relationships has become important. Nevertheless, that does not mean that gender relations are fixed; on the contrary, they are dynamic and multilayered power relationships. In this article, I consider gender as a social construction referring to the cultural, social, political, and economic distinction between social roles, which can change across time and space. Therefore, it is a relational process and can be modified by political actions (Berenci et al. 2012). Thus, as a concept, gender marks a break with the essentialist thought of difference, which divides the world into two antagonist categories as woman and man. Essentialism attributes fixed essences to women and men, and marks them as completely different in essence (Kelly et al. 2011). It identifies women generally with characteristics such as empathy, care, and nurturance, etc. and causes a belief that all women share those characteristics at all times. Thus, it implies a sort of impossibility of change and renders the differences among women invisible (Grosz 1995). As Simone de Beauvoir (1948) says: “One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman”. There is no essence of femininity or masculinity, but there is lifelong learning of the socially expected behaviors. According to Scott (1986), gender is a primary way of signifying relationships of power. In almost all known patriarchal societies, this power relationship creates hierarchies regarding the distribution of economic and political resources (Héretier 1996).

In the context of Turkey, I consider the aforementioned power relationships in a neoliberal, conservative, and patriarchal context as both sociological and political questions. It is sociological because it is a question of understanding the concrete ways in which relations of domination are articulated. It is also political because it refers to the construction of political subjects and their

demands. As a set of beliefs, attitudes, and norms that legitimize male domination over women and the society and the key to maintain the societal patriarchy, patriarchal ideologies (Millet 1970) are embedded in social norms, laws, and policies and assure gender inequality. Now, I will attempt to show five different phases of AKP and its gender politics.

3. Changing Gender Politics

This article focuses on the national and international laws elaborated in the field of gender rather than anti-gender discourses of politicians, AKP elites, or adherents. Although there are various debates on the fields of employment, family, and education concerning gender issues, except for the 5th phase, I will handle them only if they are directly related to concrete changes in gender policies. If the elections, referendums, or other political upheavals in these periods do not directly affect gender policies concerning women’s lives and rights, they will not be addressed.

3.1. Phase 1

The gender politics that AKP pursued in its first period was coherent with the EU accession process that had begun following the Helsinki Summit (Castle 2011). Since then, Turkey has experienced many domestic changes in many areas, including women’s rights (Yılmaz 2016, p. 89) in accordance with EU accession requirements. The literature on the Europeanization of Turkey confirms that EU conditionality was one of the primary factors behind the changes (Yılmaz 2016). Here, it is worthy to note that the EU has been promoting gender equality since the 1990s through hard law and soft policy instruments, and candidate countries are required to respect this (Walby 2004). In such a context, gender equality stands as a changing policy area due to the changing significations attributed to gender and gender equality by policy-makers (Aybars et al. 2019). Here it is noteworthy to remind that gender equality is a contested concept (Verloo & Lombardo 2007). As
gender is related to the social roles given by the patriarchal society, neutral equality cannot be set out without considering the unequal nature of these roles (Uygur 2016). In this article, I use this term as a matter of achieving (expecting to achieve) political, social, and economic equality by transforming the unequal nature of gender roles in social and political spheres.

In this sense, the former government initiated domestic changes such as the amendment of Article 41 of the constitution made in 2001, which established equality between spouses, and the preparation of the new Civil Code (Yilmaz 2016). After coming to power, AKP showed its commitment to the ongoing relations with the EU concerning gender politics. The then State Minister Responsible for Women, Cubukcu, and the then Prime Minister Erdogan underlined the importance of the EU accession process for gender equality and resolving women’s problems (Durukan 2006; Hurriyet 2006). However, explaining this period only by EU conditionality would be inadequate. As Toksoz (2016, p. 114) puts it, the demands of the rapidly strengthening feminist movement in post-1980 Turkey also had a huge impact on progressive gender politics of this period. This phase has witnessed several projects carried out for gender equality with EU and UN funds, along with the changes for gender mainstreaming in longstanding laws such as the Constitution and Turkish Penal Code.

Social Policies. Turkey Reproductive Health Program was launched in 2003. The project was financed by the EU. It does not only include subjects on safe motherhood and family planning, but also sexually transmitted diseases, and it addresses both married and single women (Ministry of Health 2004). Another amendment was about the Law on the Establishment, Duties and Trial Procedures of Family Courts. A remarkable article in the law was that family court judges were obliged to encourage the couples by getting help from experts, when necessary, to solve problems peacefully (Official Gazette 2003). While the first amendment mentioned above was a step forward for safe and healthy sexual freedom and women are not necessarily defined within the family, the second one prioritizes the family institution over individuals.
This shows that AKP has been prioritizing the family from the very beginning. Having a neoliberal agenda, it seems that AKP has envisaged the family as an institution like an ally to the state. Later, the family would have important duties as neoliberal policies were easing the burden of the state. Despite good progress towards gender equality, it is not possible to affirm that AKP was a gender-sensitive party. This becomes manifest when it comes to the neoliberal politics followed by AKP to the detriment of women since coming to power. Launched in 2003, Conditional Cash Transfer Program (Republic of Turkey & UNICEF 2003) envisaged a payment, which would be mainly used in education and health services, to the 'mother'; as a result, a part of social security was shifted from the state to the family. A similar policy was seen in 2007. With an amendment, disabled care services were transferred from the state’s responsibility to family (Official Gazette 2007). With this change, caregivers in the family would be given emolument in return for their care-work, but they cannot benefit from social security as this money is considered as a social help instead of a real salary. Here, it is noteworthy to underline that most of the caregivers are women.

These policies address women as caregivers. This system is based on rewarding care-work and encouraging women to stay home. Cancian and Oliker (2000) describe these types of systems as support policies for caregiver citizens. In this system, caregivers are rewarded through public services and the aforementioned measures. While this system discourages women from participating in the labor force, it reinforces the specialization of men in waged-labor and specialization of women in unpaid care jobs, thus blocking the possibility of reaching real gender equality. According to Delphy, this system renders motherhood a profession, offering women the option to either have a low-paid job and burden double responsibility at home while working or be a full-time mother and depend on men (Acar-Savran 2003).

Regulations on Gender Equality and Violence against Women. Within the framework of the EU accession process, Article 10 of the Constitution, which
regulates the principle of equality before the law, was changed by underlining the fact that women and men have equal rights, and the state is obliged to ensure that this equality is implemented (Hurriyet 2004). The equality of sexes had already existed in the second and third constitutions (1961, 1982). But this was the first time that the Constitution gave the state the responsibility of ensuring this equality. In this period, the idea of equality was also reflected in the changes made in various fields, including the establishment of an advisory board including women’s organizations in Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) (Official Gazette 2005), the removal of sexist items from textbooks (Official Gazette 2004a), the regulations on women’s rights, maternity and breast-feeding leaves (Official Gazette 2005). Thus, a series of progress has been made to overcome gender inequality.

Another important progress in women’s rights seen in this period was the Turkish Penal Code (TCK) amendment. With a successful campaign and lobbying activities of women, 30 of the 35 articles proposed by TCK Women’s Platform were included (Bianet 2003) in the new Penal Code, which came into force in April 2005 (Official Gazette 2004c). Thus, revolutionary steps have been taken to ensure the sexual and physical rights of women. Some of the additional important changes can be listed as follows (KIHYCD 2019): first of all, in the former Penal Code, the body and sexuality of the woman were considered to be a property of her husband, family, and society. Therefore, sexual crimes were defined as ‘behaviors that harm social and family order and general morality’. With the new law, sexual crimes were defined as crimes against individuals, not against society, and regulated under the section of crimes against bodily integrity. Secondly, marital rape was defined as a crime. Thirdly, virginity checks started to also be considered as a crime. Lastly, the possibility of remission in case of honor crimes was withdrawn.

Several arrangements have also been realized to ensure gender equality in employment. One of the most important regulations in that field was regarding the working conditions, an important discussion topic among feminist legal theorists (Caglar-Gurgey 2014). In June 2004, menstruation leave was issued for five days in a month (Official Gazette 2004b). However, this right was taken back step by step
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over time, and finally, the regulation was completely withdrawn in 2012 (Official Gazette 2012c).

In addition to these important improvements, various projects and campaigns were carried out to prevent violence against women and raise public awareness in combating violence (GDSW 2007). The Ministry of State Responsible for Women and Family and the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DIB) collaborated to raise awareness for the elimination of domestic violence by reaching 15 million men every week with Friday sermons. I argue that this cooperation was quite controversial. From 2007 onwards, this religious institution would intervene more and more in family issues (DIB 2010). Later, it would keep a record of the information of women who consult them and, moreover, through religious discourses, would try to prevent women from divorcing (Cumhuriyet 2013). Another important regulation on the prevention of violence has been in the field of women’s shelters, which are especially important in ensuring the life safety of women and children who are exposed to violence. According to Municipality Law No. 5393 (2005), all the municipalities with more than fifty thousand inhabitants must open a women’s shelter. Although this was a very significant step in terms of recognizing domestic violence as a political issue, the government was incapable of enforcing the law.

3.2. Phase 2

In this period, AKP’s gender policies have remained quite close to its first period. While neoliberal policies have been pursued, important projects and researches (GDSW 2009) on gender equality and prevention of violence against women have been conducted (GDSW 2008) by the General Directorate on the Status of Women (GDSW) with the cooperation of NGOs and academics working on women. However, towards the end of this period, conservative and neoliberal policies have been deepened.
One of the important regulations of this period was regarding the headscarf ban, which was one of the most instrumentalized issues during AKP campaigns since 2002. With a series of changes between 2008 and 2010 (Official Gazette 2008a; Hurriyet 2010), which abolished the headscarf ban in universities, religious women and men have had equal chances of access to public resources. This change was presented as a democratic initiative for women to take their place in public space. But when considered within the context determined by neoliberalism and conservatism, the limits of democracy have been achieved fast (Yukselbaba 2013, p. 71). As Yukselbaba (2013, p. 71) affirms, when religious women attained their public visibility, the democratic initiatives of the government for women ended, and women were placed in a conservative context, in which women’s primary role was accepted naturally as mother and wife (Cosar & Yegenoglu 2011, p. 565).

The neoliberal policies followed during this period caused an illusion of the visibility of women in the field of social policy (Ozates-Gelmez 2015). Deprived of social security and retirement rights, women providing care services for their relatives received modest financial support. Far from improving the rights of women, this regulation has deepened women’s role as caregivers. In this period, neoliberal policies on women’s employment started to accelerate. In this context, the Regulation on Private Employment Agencies (PEA) (Official Gazette 2008b) and National Employment Strategy prepared in 2011 proposed flexible work for women. Referring to part-time work, temporary work, working as an employee of PEA, when the temporary work ends, the worker would wait without receiving wages and would be deprived of social security until s/he is considered for a new job (Keig 2016). As a result, the field of employment was reorganized as flexible, deregulated, and precarious. With this new form of employment, it seems that women are expected to maintain their roles at home as it should be according to patriarchal ideology. The regulation of paternity-leave as 10 days in the public sector and 5 days in the private sector (Haber Turk 2020) shows that the improvements of women’s rights were not effective when it comes to de facto inequalities and gender equality was far from being reached.
The egalitarian regulations in the Constitution and laws haven't been reflected in the real lives of women due to the conservative mentality of the government. Even the then prime minister Erdogan stated in a speech that he does not believe in the equality of women and men (Haber Sol 2010). Although the reforms continued selectively in this period, AKP’s policies changed towards a de-Europeanization path (Yilmaz 2016). This coincides with the transition from an egalitarian discourse to a conservative one. The neoliberal policies have been accompanied by a rhetoric of the importance of family and the role of the women within the family that I will focus on while analyzing the following period. As Toksoz (2016, p. 117) remarks, the most concrete example of this shift is the establishment of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies (ASPB) in 2011 instead of the Ministry of State Responsible for Women and Family, removing “women” from the name.

3.3. Phase 3

I consider this period as the most complex and chaotic term of AKP governments regarding the party identity and the politics pursued in various fields. One of the important political issues of this period was the Solution Process, which officially started in April 2013 and became complicated in 2015. The tension between the HDP and Erdogan reached a peak when HDP (a popular party among citizens of Turkey of Kurdish origin) announced that the party was clearly against the presidential system proposed by Erdogan. After a successful rally, HDP entered parliament on June 7, 2015. Thus, for the first time since its first appearance on the political scene, AKP lost its majority in the parliament. It was largely due to the success of HDP. In such a complicated period, adopting a nationalist discourse, AKP allied with MHP and emphasized its nationalist references by using ‘one flag and one nation’ discourse (Yarar 2018:42) for the next general election, which was going to be held on November 1, 2015, as a result of the failure of the parties to form a government following the June 7, 2015 elections.
During this term, AKP left its discourses on democracy and clearly adopted conservative, patriarchal, and populist discourses by claiming that only AKP can represent the people (Haber 2014). As of this period, the party politics have become increasingly authoritarian (Yarar 2018). AKP presented itself as the defender of the Islamic and nationalist values and marked public and political opposition as Others. Here what constitutes the infrastructure that Islamic values are based on are the elements of the neoliberal economy such as deregulation and privatization (Yukselbaba 2013, p. 71). Claiming to adopt both Islamic and neoliberal worldview, family has an important place in AKP’s authoritarian shift. Presented within the family, women became clearly disadvantaged in society, and they are expected to participate in public life within the boundaries of traditional gender roles.

Violence against Women. At the beginning of this period, cooperating with the women’s organizations, the government provided significant support in the preparation of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (aka Istanbul Convention). When the convention was opened for signature in Istanbul, Turkey became its first signatory (KIHYCD 2019, p. 10) and ratified it without any reservations in 2011. The preparation of this important document, with the impact of the conclusion of the Opuz vs. Turkey case (ECHR 2009), showed an evident commitment for developing existing policies conforming with international standards to combat violence against women (Acar & Altunok 2013, p. 17).

After the ratification of Istanbul Convention, a need for establishing a more effective law than Law No. 4320 on the Protection of the Family, which was failing to meet the standards of the Istanbul Convention, emerged. Therefore, Law No. 6284 on the Protection of Family and Prevention of Violence Against Women was prepared with the cooperation of the ASPB and women’s organizations and ratified in 2012 (KIHYCD 2019, p. 25). This cooperation was crucial for making a comprehensive and decent law by addressing women’s real problems. This new law establishes protective and preventive measures for women and other family
members exposed to domestic violence, and it extends the legal definition of violence following the Istanbul Convention by including physical, sexual, psychological, and economic violence and the threats of such acts (KIHYCD 2019, p. 26). Although all of these developments are crucial for preventing gender-based violence and empowering women, there are serious problems in their implementation.

Despite a significant number of regulations regarding shelters since the beginning of the decade, the number of shelters could not reach the desired level. Beyond this fact, a significant regression occurred with the amendment of the Municipality Law No. 5393. According to the amendment, all the municipalities with more than one hundred thousand inhabitants must open a women’s shelter (Official Gazette 2012b). Since even the former law wasn’t completely respected by municipalities, this regulation must be considered as a significant decline at the legal level.

*Family and Social Policies.* Starting from this period, the policies followed on women’s issues located women within the familial sphere. Thereafter, women were no longer considered as political subjects concerning social, political, and economic issues (Kaya 2016). Most of the policies that limit women’s existence within the family had a sexist nature conforming to patriarchal ideology and AKP’s conservatism. The fact that women could only benefit from social aid due to their roles in the family was an important example of this. For example, according to the decision of the Fund Board for the Promotion of Social Assistance and Solidarity, widowed women would receive financial aid, but the aid would be cut if women live with men even if they are not married (*Milliyet* 2012). This shows that even after the death of their spouse, women have to continue to adhere to the traditional patriarchal family structure. Similarly, the costs faced by women who were burdened with the extra care of their relatives in exchange for social aids - as discussed in phase two - has also been seen in this period. According to the data of the ASPB (2013), the number of people benefiting from home care services has
increased 13 times since 2007. As a result, women spend more time at home, and they have neither time nor opportunity to have a waged job. Thus, they are destitute of social security and become dependent on their families.

Pronatalist policies, which were followed during this phase, would be decisive for women’s conditions during the next phase. Even though pronatalist discourse was used by government officials in the previous phases, in this phase, pronatalist policies became the government’s official policy concerning women (Dayi & Eylem 2018) as Erdogan asked women to give birth to at least three children (Milliyet 2013). In this period, discourses on women’s sexuality have proliferated at an unprecedented level in the history of Turkey as a result of the rising authoritarian politics (Cindoglu & Unal 2017). Accordingly, the abortion right that women have had since 1983 (Kaya 2016, p. 51) was brought into the discussion by government members (Memurlar.net 2013; Bianet 2013). This abortion rhetoric is a point of failure of the conservative-democrat discourse and confirms that conservative politics cannot be consistent and empowering for women (Ertürk 2015). These discourses can be seen as a tool of biopolitics regarding the control of population, body, and sexuality. However, in patriarchal societies where women cannot have control over their own bodies and lives, and where women burden childbearing and care-work in extremely unequal conditions, abortion should be a natural right (Ozkazanc 2019, p. 255).

All these regulations show the direct relations between social policies and family. In the context of contemporary Turkey, as an ideological institution (Rosenfelt & Stacy 1987, p. 78) which raises future generations conforming to the dominant ideologies, the family is instrumentalized to reinforce traditional gender roles, to consolidate the patriarchal regime, and to intensify neoliberal capitalism. AKP contrastingly transformed the situation of the family and women with both the neoliberal policies it pursued in its first two periods and the conservative politics which prioritized the family afterward. While AKP undermines the family with its neoliberal policies, it tries to re-establish the patriarchal bargain (Kandiyoti 1988) through conservatization (Ozkazanc 2019, p. 243).
Employment. AKP’s neoliberal and conservative policies have added a new obstacle to the existing structural and cultural ones for equal employment opportunities. In this period, while working women were also defined as mothers, the government disburdened its task to open nurseries and transferred this duty to the private sector (Official Gazette 2013a). Concerning such a serious social issue, the state does not propose an egalitarian social policy, and employers do not want to fulfill its obligations (Keig 2013). These policies imply an impossibility for women to participate in the labor market. Statistics show that the employment rates of men and women aged 29-49 with a child under age 3 are dramatically different. While the employment rate of men varied between 89.2% and 90.4%, that of women varied between 27.4% and 24.3% between 2014 and 2018. As for families without children, the men’s employment rate was still higher than the women’s employment rate, which varies between 48.7% and 53.4% (TurkStat 2019). This shows that the unequal distribution of care-work is a serious obstacle for women’s employment. Following these policies, it is naturalized that women give birth to many children, take care of them for long periods and work in flexible conditions to fulfill their responsibilities. As Cosar & Yegenoglu (2011) argue, the consolidation of the gendered division of labor, which considers women responsible for home and family, and the aim to provide the cheap labor required by the neoliberal economic system are behind these policies. The gendered division of labor, which explains the secondary position of women in the labor market, causes women’s financial dependence on men, even if women have a waged-work (Hartmann 1992, p. 155). Thus, once again, the compromise of patriarchy and neoliberalism is achieved.

These policies cause the ‘feminization of poverty’. The concept has been proposed by Pearce (1978) to draw attention to the economic deterioration of women between 1950-1970 in the U.S. despite the increase in their numbers in the workforce over time. In the 2010s, there is a similar tendency in Turkey. Women’s participation in the workforce has increased from 14.6 (GDSW 2014) to 29.4
(Turkstat 2020) during AKP rule. The number of women who work in the informal sector and have flexible works also increased (Toksoz 2018) as well as their impoverishment due to insecure work conditions. Women are burdened by poverty, care-work, and the lack of decent jobs.

**Education.** One of the most important changes that marked this period regarding gender politics was the elaboration of the 4+4+4 Intermittent Compulsory Education System (Official Gazette 2012a). According to the law, 4 years of elementary education is followed by middle and high school education. For the second and third steps, students can choose to study at a general school or Imam Hatip school (religious vocational school), which was banned after the military memorandum in 1997 and has been reopened with this amendment. In this system, formal education after primary school is not obligatory, unlike the previous system; instead, students can have an open education. Having no scientific basis and some problems in practice, this system has caused serious controversies, especially regarding its possible negative effects on the schooling rate of girls, child labor, and 'child brides'. There had previously been a significant drop in numbers of ‘child brides’ and ‘teenage mothers’ as a result of 8-year compulsory schooling (Altinkurt & Aysel 2016, p. 27).

The Statistics of Ministry of National Education (MEB) (MEB 2014) shows that those risks in question have been concretized, and the proportion of women among those attending open education middle school and high school organized for people of all ages was declared as 63.4% and 44.8%, respectively. With a new regulation on secondary education, if school children get married, they were allowed to continue their education at an open secondary school (Official Gazette 2013b), whereas marriage had been a reason for exmatriculation before this regulation. Thus, MEB paved the way for early marriages, especially for minor girls, who are neither mentally nor physically prepared for marriage. Here it is important to indicate that most deaths of young girls between 15-19 are caused by health problems associated with pregnancy and birth (Turkyilmaz & Cavlin 2014). According to MEB, 97.4% of children who cannot continue to formal education
due to early marriage were schoolgirls (Turkyilmaz & Cavlin 2014). These regulations constitute important obstacles for women’s emancipation from early ages. When approached from an intersectional perspective, they also create the particular ways that women experience poverty. As a result, mostly daughters of lower-income/lower-class families suffer from this change. I will continue to reveal the political meaning of this regression in contemporary sociopolitical conditions in Phase 4.

3.4. Phase 4

The gender policies of this period were shaped by the political and military upheavals. In 2015 and 2016, Turkey had a chaotic political and social atmosphere because of the coup attempt staged by Gulenist soldiers. Following the failed coup, Turkey declared a state of emergency on July 20, 2016 and pursued rigid politics in each field. Under the two years of the state of emergency, a great regression was seen regarding gender politics. After the end of the Solution Process, especially in eastern regions densely populated with Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin, several women’s organizations, shelters, and solidarity centers closed down (Kivilcim 2018, p. 93). As a result, in these regions, women became deprived of the possibility of organized solidarity as well as security against violence.

The policies followed after the failed coup can be used to discover patriarchal policies against women in Turkey in favor of reconsolidation of patriarchy, masculine privilege, and neoliberalism. During the state of emergency, conservative gender policies revised male privileges concerning the new needs of neoliberal capitalism and continued to accelerate at a national level as it was seen in the fields of employment and education.

Employment. During this period, AKP’s neoliberal policies, which encourage women to give birth and fulfill their traditional roles at home, continued to fragilize conditions of women’s employment. The results of the TurkStat (2015) Time Using Survey shows that women spent more time at home and less time at work
compared to men. This means that women work more part-time and flexibly in the labor market as a result of the previous employment politics.

In 2016, a new law regarding temporary employment through PEA was brought to the agenda with a discourse of flexicurity for women. Thus, women were offered two months, four months, and six months of part-time work for the first, second, and third child, respectively, after maternity leave. Part-time work was also envisaged for each child for five years. Thus, traditional gender norms were reinforced and women’s roles as caregivers were officially approved. In such a condition, women risked losing their right to retirement as well as their opportunity to find decent work (Keig 2016).

According to Toksoz (2017), the main aim of these policies was to increase the fertility rate. However, under the current socio-economic conditions, and without egalitarian gender policies, it is possible only for the upper-middle-class conservative families (Ozkazanc 2019, p. 22). In such a context, AKP’s conservative, patriarchal, and neoliberal ideologies prevent women from being secured in the labor market and having equal responsibilities at home as men. The precarious works offered to lower class women do not give them any opportunities to be economically and socially independent.

Education. The regression in the field of education regarding gender equality can be traced in policies pursued in the previous phase. According to MEB’s statistics (2016) while the number of public schools decreased, the number of private schools increased remarkably. This data is significant to show the effect of neoliberalization on education. The number of Imam Hatip High Schools, all of which are public schools, also increased. Thus, lower-income families’ children cannot make a choice and if they cannot succeed to attend a prestigious high school or find a vacancy to enroll at a general public high school, they are obliged to attend an Imam Hatip High School, which cannot offer a good level of education in global standards (Ayata 2018). Thus, inequality between children starts at a very early age.

In this context, it is not surprising that according to UNICEF report on equality of opportunities among children, Turkey is ranked last among 41 OECD
countries (Eğitim-Sen 2018). MEB’s statistics (2016) also showed that the number of students studying in open high schools increased by 63% with the new education system. Most of these children are likely to be victims of early marriages as a result of the changes elaborated in the previous phase. According to a report by Girls Not Brides (2018) Turkey has the highest rate of forced child marriages in Europe.

3.5. Phase 5

This period consists mainly of the post-state-of-emergency period and is marked by the shift from the parliamentary system to a presidential system, where the president of the republic is also the head of the government. In this period, Erdogan became stronger and less controllable with a weaker civil society and opposition as well as weaker separation of powers. During this period, the regression of women’s rights in Turkey was seriously criticized in GREVIO (Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women) report (2018).

The emphasis on family was increased both in discourses and in policies. As it is seen in the 2019 Annual Presidency Program (Presidency of Turkish Republic. 2018.), the section of Family and Law mainly focused on strengthening the family and reducing divorce. Besides, the alimony system was brought into question and the state did not take women’s organizations as interlocutors in such a social and political context. However, alimony is important regarding the unpaid labor of women during marriage. As argued by Delphy, divorce reveals how men appropriate the labor of women during the marriage and the alimony, which is received mostly by women, is a sort of confession of this confiscation (Acar-Savran 2003). Under the given conditions of Turkey, discussions on the abolition of the right to alimony can be considered as a tool to prevent women from divorcing. The anti-alimony groups have intensely been lobbying since 2018 (Seker 2018) and they are accepted as the principal interlocutors of this subject. This shows that gender inequality is deepening by the state’s approval. If this change materializes, women with low (or no) income, who have been excluded from equal opportunities for
education and employment and who burden the care-work will get stuck in unhappy marriages.

I think here the main concern should be answering the following question: Why do women need alimony at the end of a marriage? According to ungendered law, the partner who gets poorer after divorce has the right to alimony (KIHYCD 2019, p. 16). So why is it mostly women who get poorer? If there is a real need for change considering alimony, before anything else, the government must show a political determination to eliminate the structural and political inequalities, which fix women in disadvantaged social and economic positions. Otherwise, women will be exposed to economic violence through law. These anti-alimony demands must be considered with the oppositions against Law No. 6284 and the Istanbul Convention. These oppositions aim to leave women without any legal protection against all forms of violence and discrimination in the name of family integrity.

Two other negative events of this period were realized during the Covid-19 pandemic. Under the conditions of curfew and social isolation, the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors suspended Law No. 6284 by making it impracticable due to the pandemic (Evrensel 2020). Subsequently, with the amendment on the law on the execution of sentences, the authors of violence against women (among many others) were released from prisons (Hurriyet 2020). Although the government affirms that the crimes against women are out of the scope of the amendment, this discourse does not reflect the truth since there is no such article in the Penal Code. Although the crimes against sexual and bodily integrity such as rape, harassment and child abuse are excluded from the amendment, the majority of violence against women derived from crimes such as blackmail, threats, injuries, assaults, insults, violation of immunity of domicile are not. However, this negative change may conduct women’s organizations to propose a new article on crimes against women in the Penal Code.
4. In lieu of Conclusion

In this article, as a feminist scholar, I aimed to shed light on Turkey’s gender politics throughout the 2000s by examining the legal changes that affect women’s conditions and provide a reference guide for researchers working on the gender politics of Turkey. I tried to fill the gap in the existing literature by providing an overview of the impact of AKP’s changing political identities on changing gender policies followed in various fields in the last two decades. This chronological analysis is not only important to see the change of political attitude in time but also to understand the existence of similar democratic reforms or similar patriarchal, neoliberal, and conservative tendencies in each field.

In the first two phases, AKP followed a policy that adopted the EU’s warnings during the accession process and made progress on a significant number of subjects to reach gender equality. Women’s organizations’ efforts also had an important role in this progress. But starting from the third phase, AKP has cut off dialogue with women’s organizations and started to follow policies that suit better its conservative and neoliberal identities, which it combines with Islam. Nonetheless, despite having a rhetoric traceable in Islam, AKP leaders never affirm it explicitly (Acar & Altunok 2013). According to Acar & Altunok (2013, p. 15) this shows that instrumentalizing the basis of morals for its arguments, AKP conforms to a readily identifiable parameter of conservatism and prioritizes economic issues due to neoliberal politics.

In its third phase, the shift of gender politics was concretized by the establishment of the ASPB. The importance given to the family was not new in the history of Turkey in determining the political sphere and reconstructing the society. However, it was particularly functional and essential for AKP for several reasons. Weakened due to the neoliberal policies followed by AKP, the state’s social security services are largely compensated by family. All emancipatory discussions on issues such as abortion, homosexuality, sexuality have been seen as challenges to the patriarchal family structure (Acar & Altunok 2013, p. 20). While making women
invisible in the political sphere, the policies pursued fixed women into traditional
gender roles in this patriarchal institution. As Delphy (1998) puts it, patriarchy
establishes the domination of the “father” over the members of the family, and
women experience and learn the forms of oppression in the family before
experiencing them anywhere else. It seems that the politics that deepen gender
inequality were mainly reconstructed in phase three. However, I must emphasize
that to understand these politics and women’s social positions, the role of the
neoliberal political economy must be considered.

In addition to care-work that is burdened by women due to neoliberal
policies, the gendered division of labor models the forms of work and employment
and, reciprocally, flexibilization of work can reinforce the stereotypical forms of
gender relations (Kergoat 2000, p. 42). Therefore, women’s employment policies
followed for almost two decades can be considered as a result of the overlap of
AKP’s idiosyncratic conservatism and the need of capitalism for the flexibility of
women’s labor. For this reason, the policies on the flexibilization of women’s
employment were propagated by a conservative discourse on gender norms. This
shows that women’s employment is not systematically positive if integrated into the
labor market in precarious, insecure, unequal conditions.

The existing gender regime in Turkey reinforces the idea that most of the
inequalities between genders are natural and inevitable (Sancar 2016, p. 305). This
falls with Erdogan, who argued that women and men are different in nature (BBC
2014). Conforming this view, education was an important issue in AKP’s political
agenda for diffusing its official ideology throughout society. Schoolgirls remained
disadvantaged, and the policies followed in this field constitute an obstacle for
women’s emancipation. Although AKP followed some policies for women’s rights
and to prevent violence against women, they remained extremely weak as a result of
implementation problems and conservative discourses. This shows that any politics
that does not envisage women’s economic, social, political, and cultural
empowerment continues to suppress women. Far from empowering women, it
seems that there occurs an antifeminist backlash since phase three. Similar to what
Aslı Telseren, Changing Gender Politics in Turkey throughout the 2000s: A Feminist Analysis of Gender Policies Pursued by Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) Governments

has been discussed by Faludi (1991), it has been set off by the growing possibility of women’s achievement of real and concrete equality. Women know that without ensuring full equality, the problems in their lives will remain unsolved.
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Aslı Telseren, Changing Gender Politics in Turkey throughout the 2000s: A Feminist Analysis of Gender Policies Pursued by Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) Governments


BOOK REVIEWS


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Turkey's transformation under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the last two decades has put the country in a new direction paving the way for the “New Turkey”. Since the AKP came in power in 2002 a prosperous economy, a stable political environment, and a pro-European orientation were considered successes in Erdogan's first years in office; nevertheless, the current state of affairs could threaten that legacy. Erdogan has presided over Turkish politics for almost 20 years either as a Prime Minister or President, having established a self-centered regime that has failed to move towards democratization despite a promising start.

The New Turkey and its Discontents by Simon Waldman and Emre Caliskan outlines the AKP and Erdogan's political journey in consolidating their power. The book offers a well-documented chronological depiction of the AKP policies in both domestic and foreign levels as initiated from 2002 till shortly after the failed 2016 coup d’etat. Waldman and Caliskan’s main argument is that Turkey has moved to a post-military period with a concentration of power in the hands of the AKP. The book consists of seven chapters alongside the introduction and conclusion. The book
offers detailed documentation of the demise of the military's power as a detachment from the Kemalist legacy. The authors described the military's undoing as a result of domestic and foreign pressures and plots. The new era that succeeded this transformation started with the AKP's rise to power and its early successes in different areas mainly on the economy, public health, and transportation - and was perceived as a step in the right direction for the country's democratisation. Despite the pro-European stance of Erdogan's first term in power, the gradual promotion of political Islam and the growing central role of religion in Turkish politics has gradually moved Turkey away from European ideals and the EU's normative nature. This newly Islam-nationalism was employed as a cover of the party's authoritarian practices and Erdogan's assertive rhetoric. While highlighting the Islamist tendency of AKP ruling, the authors nonetheless miss a more in-depth theoretical evaluation on how it defines Erdogan's domestic and foreign policies and how the public responds to it.

An essential element of Turkish political culture is presented in chapter three with a rich and chronological overview of the predominance of "One-man rule" since the origins of the Turkish Republic. Historically, political leaders have concentrated power in their hands. Thus, there has not been a clear separation of powers, and authoritarian tendencies are part of the political system while the public at large seems to approve this rather strong patriarchal way of governance.

The book's main contribution is to outline the discontents of "New Turkey": namely, control of media and judiciary, urban politics' corruption, the conflict surrounding the "Kurdish question," and a foreign policy that looks to the East and aspires for a dominant regional position. The authors emphasize how the already weak political institutions of the country, such as the judiciary and media are deprived of their role in checking the AKP and Erdogan's growing power. In particular press censorship, the demise of independent media, and the constant violations of freedom
of speech and press freedom as described in chapter four, constitute one of the most defining factors of Turkey's democratic deficit and inability to expose the so-called “deep state”. The deep state is another essential concept that has been used widely in academic literature to describe Turkish domestic politics. It is generally attributed as “the very idea that elements within the state can act with impunity and engage in illegal activities such as extrajudicial killings are indicative of a lack of transparency and the rule of law.” (p.9). However, the authors do not agree with the term and prescribe Turkey as a “weak state” mainly due to the discontents that define the Turkish political system under the AKP.

Urban development and the involvement of government officials in corruption scandals are scrutinised in Chapter five. The Gezi Park protest depicts the interrelation that binds together the AKP, big corporations but also the residents of more impoverished neighbourhoods. It also helps in understanding the nature of the gecekondu (squatter) and how they have established a clientelist political system.

The authors also develop, to a lesser degree, the discontents of Turkish foreign policy. Under the AKP’s rule, the country’s foreign policy abandoned its Western-looking policies halting the EU accession process due to severe divergence with EU normative dimension and ideals while the relationship with the neighbours of the country has risen to tensed relations. Admittedly there is a limited reference of Turkey's relations with other actors and particularly Russia, the USA, and Iran and how these bilateral relations have impacted Erdogan's course of action. In Chapter seven, former prime minister Davutoglu’s foreign policy doctrine and its aspirations of a new Ottoman empire are analysed. The core of the doctrine is a turn to the East with a focus on the Middle East and to secure Turkey’s regional hegemony. However, since the book does not account for the latest developments, it cannot explain how
Davutoglu’s resignation impacted the consequent design of the country’s foreign policy. In this chapter, a theoretical framework could provide a more nuanced in-depth explanation of Turkish foreign policy decisions. An elaboration of the offensive realist approach could explain the assertive role of Turkey at the regional level and its involvement in the war of Syria, the provocations towards Greece and Cyprus for the drilling in the Mediterranean, the war in Libya, etc. Still, the importance and central role of national interests in the design of the Turkish foreign policy is evident, especially after 2011, that could also be analysed under the prism of neoclassical realism.

In conclusion, the authors stress that the country risks becoming a weak and fragile state following Erdogan’s polarising rhetoric and its authoritarian turn. The constitutional reform of 2016 and the 2018 transformation from a parliamentary to a presidential system widened the power of the presidency and consolidated more power on Erdogan. Even though Waldman and Caliskan place their hopes on the “vibrant civil society and intelligent, well-educated population”, in advancing democracy in Turkey, Erdogan’s ruling in the post-coup era indicated a further annihilation of personal and civil freedoms.

The book offers rich insights into AKP’s gradual consolidation to power as well as its successes and failures along the way. When discussing the country’s domestic and foreign policy decisions, there is a clear emphasis on the “first unit of analysis”, namely the individual. In particular, on Erdogan’s presence in all aspects of Turkish politics. However, one of the shortcomings of the book is the lack of theoretical underpinnings on the factors that have allowed and advanced Erdogan’s authoritarian turn or the goals it seeks to achieve in terms of foreign policy.

Overall, the book is a useful tool for anyone interested in Turkish politics but also in the discipline of international relations offering an understanding of the hist-
historical developments of the AKP governance over the last twenty years and Erdogan's orchestrated efforts to remain in power at all costs. A wide variety of readers, from policymakers to academics, and students will find Waldman and Caliskan's book as a useful road map in Turkish politics.

Papageorgiou Maria (Mary)
BOOK REVIEWS


Jonathan Parker
University of Sussex

Turkish political parties present interesting cases for analysis for many reasons. Their memberships continue to expand after decades where western European parties have seen their contract dramatically, and they have a long history of dictatorial and personalistic structures. Most notably the development of the Turkish party system has been repeatedly, and (perhaps most uniquely) briefly, interrupted by military coups which have attempted to ‘re-set’ party politics at various points in the second half of the twentieth century. As Musil and Demirkol point out in the introduction, because of this Turkey’s party system doesn’t slot neatly into the models of any of the standard ‘waves’ of democracy.

For these reasons and more Turkey is an odd fit for much of the existing literature of party politics, and perhaps because of this, it has often been treated in isolation by scholars. This book offers a welcome counterweight to that trend, analysing party politics in Turkey in comparison with other European cases. The collection aptly demonstrates both the commonalities with other European democracies both old and new, as well as the Turkish system's many unique features. And the
range of topics brought together in the volume is impressive. The book easily fulfills its goal to study “Turkish political parties from the perspective of contemporary party theories” (pg. 1) and forge a better understanding of both the theories themselves (when applied to a new context) and of Turkish party politics. And nor are the authors blind to contributions of previous scholars, and the first chapter, by Sabri Sayari, provides an exhaustive overview of the major developments in the study of party politics in Turkey.

The book is divided into three sections, the first being ‘the professionalisation of political parties,’ which essentially extends the applicability of Katz and Mair’s (1995) cartel party theory to Turkish parties. This is aptly interrogated through an analysis on party membership contributed by Tosun, Tosun, and Gökmen (chapter 2) was particularly interesting given the peculiarity of Turkish parties in this regard in the international context as their unusually high memberships. Using extensive survey data of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Republican People’s Party (CHP), and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) the authors conclude that Turkey’s high rates of party membership can partly be explained through greater clientelism but also by the country’s deep social divisions which prompt members to join in greater numbers for ideological reasons. The theme is continued through a compressive survey of the development of campaign and media strategies by Wuthrich (chapter 3), which highlights the increasing concerns around the governing AKP dominance of a media environment which was already becoming segmented by ideology.

Following on from this, Gençkaya’s chapter four on party financing also explores the ‘cartelisation’ of political parties- who he demonstrates has become increasingly professionalised as they come to rely more and more on state funding- while also considering how the AKP has used this system to consolidate their in-
creasingly authoritarian rule. Also in this first section of the volume, Chapter five by Musil offers a direct examination of the applicability of Cartel theory to Turkey in a comparative context, using a cross-sectional analysis to assess the level of cartelisation in each party. The chapter also interestingly demonstrates the extent to which the CHP and the MHP have often co-operated with the AKP to reduce the competitiveness of the system in order to share in state benefits.

The second section of the book, entitled ‘Intra-party politics and political competition,’ deals with the internal structures of Turkish political parties. The section returns to a common theme of the volume - the extent of clientelism in Turkish parties. Chapter six by Özhan Demirkol provides an excellent historical analysis of factionalism and party splits in Turkey, concluding that the perception of public demand for new parties to fill certain ideological and electoral niches is the key driver in the creation of splinter parties. In addition, chapter 7 by Kemahlioğlu and Özdemir details the AKP’s use of the metropolitan municipalities it runs to expand its clientelistic network and gain votes, while Gülnur Kocapinar’s contribution on local party elites highlights the high degree of localism in leadership roles across both major parties, even extending to the largest cities. The third and final section, ‘Inter-party relations and the party system,’ also contains several significant chapters. Firstly, there is Kumbaracıbaşı’s work on coalition formation (chapter 9). The chapter acknowledges that “Turkey’s experience with coalition government has been marked by political instability and crisis” (pg. 157), and takes an in-depth look at the subject from a historical and comparative perspective. It aptly demonstrates how the dynamics of Turkish coalition formation - especially the attempts following the 2015 legislative election - fit into the wider theory of coalition formation, particularly in terms of the wide ideological gulf’s between the opposition parties, and their misgivings about the potential costs involved with coalition governments.
Moreover, this section does good work interrogating Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage theory and its applicability in the Turkish case, something that has been long debated in the literature. The authors find that in general the secular versus Islamic cleavage and an economic left-right cleavage are highly relevant to Turkey and the parties frequently align on both these dimensions. They find little support, however, for previous studies, that have alleged the outsized importance of the center-periphery cleavage to Turkish party politics.

Bilgin’s chapter ten uses an agency perspective to historically examine cleavages in the Turkish party system, concluding “Turkish parties can be aligned in terms of their differences in the relation between the state and Islam” (p. 193). Moreover, she demonstrates that this division crucially overlaps with their socio-economic positions with “Islamic” oriented parties typically supporting more free-market policies and secular parties more interventionist solutions. This is followed by Ecevit and Celep’s work (chapter 11), which uses survey data to establish the current state of the cleavages, finding a highly polarised environment both between left and right blocs and within the blocs, especially between the parties of the left (i.e. the CHP and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP)). The section, and the book, is capped off with the chapter by Yardimci-Geyikçi, which highlights that the extreme polarisation of these cleavages makes the party system’s “institutionalisation” difficult.

The functioning of party politics in Turkey has come under immense strain in recent years as the slide towards authoritarianism continues unchecked. While a first glance at the contents of the book would suggest that the volume overlooks the fact that Turkey’s party system now operates under non-democratic conditions, this is in fact threaded throughout the volume. Moreover, several chapters do indeed focus on how the AKP has consolidated its power. This is evident in the
studies of clientelism - with Kemahlıoğlu and Özdemir’s chapter being a notable example - but also in the party’s use of state funding (Gençkaya), collaboration with the other parliamentary parties to reduce competitiveness (Musil), and dominance of the media (Wuthrich). The change to a Presidential system following the 2018 elections also means an uncertain future for the party system as currently constituted. Although the volume does not take into account this aspect - and with the caveat that it was written before these changes took effect – some preliminary insights on it would have been interesting.

Ultimately, the book constitutes an excellent contribution to the field - providing a much needed comparative focus to the study of Turkish party politics. Moreover, this work addresses the under-explored study of pro-Kurdish parties in Turkey - and also the overemphasis on the CHP and AKP by examining all four major contemporary parties in great depth. While the rapidly changing nature of Turkish party politics - most notably including the switch to the presidential system and the arrival of major new parties such as the İyi Party (a centrist breakaway from the MHP) - will necessitate an update to these studies in the near future, the book remains a much needed and comprehensive examination of party politics in Turkey.

Jonathan Parker
BOOK REVIEWS

Authoritarianism and Resistance in Turkey: Conversations on Democratic and Social Challenges, by Esra Ozyurek, Gaye Ozpinar and Emrah Altindis (Eds.). Cham: Springer, 2019, pp. 290.

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Authoritarianism and Resistance in Turkey is a timely new collection of interviews from different sections of Turkish society. Unlike many other works that largely focus on the methods used by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to consolidate authoritarian rule since 2002, this book traces the decline of Turkish democracy back to the military coup in 1980. In addition, many different interviews stress the older roots of authoritarianism in the country, even back to the early decades of the Turkish Republic.

The volume first reconstructs the roots of authoritarianism in the country’s political and economic history. For instance, Baskin Oran’s chapter on Kemalism is fascinating as it links the contemporary weakness of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the main opposition party, to that period. Similarly, Sungur Savran’s examination of the Gezi Park protests of 2013 does a brilliant job in relating the current trends of resistance to historical antecedents that stretch back
to the Late Ottoman Empire. The historical background in this section complements the second section, which largely explores the rise of neoliberalism in Turkey and its intersection with authoritarianism. This part of the book examines how both the military and the AKP promoted neoliberal economics since the 1980 coup and demonstrates how economic policies have been used to stifle dissent.

Part III instead digs deep into the development of political Islam in Turkey, looking at the AKP and the Gülen movement. The interview with Yuksel Taskin demonstrates that the AKP reminds both previous Islamist and non-Islamist center-right formations in their predatory attitudes towards democracy in an extremely majoritarian fashion. It also discusses AKP’s undemocratic internal structures and how these are reflective of its national governance either. Ahmet Sik’s interviews describe the attempts by the Gülen movement to integrate with state institutions to influence policy rather than through electoral means. These interviews are complemented by an overview of Turkish Islamic movements by the interview of an academic Hayri Kirbasoglu. He describes the corruption of the Islamist movement through its relationship with political power, which he sees as a move from attempting to influence policy to seek to gain hegemonic power.

Part IV delves into the history of Turkish social movements, and highlights their resistance to the AKP’s socially conservative and neoliberal policies after traditional and formal avenues of opposition were robbed of their power. Once again the variety of contributions is impressive: from the Gezi protests to new ‘spontaneous’ forms of resistance, to feminist, environmental and LGBTI+ movements. Common to these interviews is the growing sense of solidarity
across the various movements in the face of the new regime, and increasing awareness of the intersectionality of their claims.

Part V dealings with Turkey’s minorities is the most compelling and cohesive in the volume, demonstrating how minority ethnic and religious groups have resisted some form of authoritarianism throughout modern Turkish history, even in periods considered relatively democratic for the majority of the population. This section explores how minority groups have preserved their cultural autonomy against the state, and particularly their psychological resistance against the imposition of Turkishness. For example, the chapter on the Kurdish community – the country’s largest minority group – stands out. The interview with academic Nazan Ustundag interrogates the methods and ideology of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the backbone of the Kurdish liberation movement, and illustrates its dialogue and alliances with leftists groups, other ethnic minorities, and ecologist organisations. Equally interesting is the chapter on the Armenian minority, including their experience of Genocide. The interview with Lerna Ekmekcioglu underlines the unique situation in which Armenians find themselves in living within the society that committed genocide against them while forcing their ‘Turkicization’, as for the names. ed to adopt parts of that society’s identity (e.g. Turkicised surnames). Lastly, a thorough understanding of Alevism is provided in the interview with academic Besim Can Zirh, wherein he describes a main act of resistance against official denial.

Human rights and their deterioration since 2016 are the common themes of Part VI which explores how authoritarianism has been consolidated through the legal system, and how its subservient and chaotic nature has prevented it from being a bulwark against authoritarian tendencies. Likewise, the stunted
growth of press freedom hindered resistance against the regime. Furthermore, an interview with editor Tanil Bora discusses right-wing vigilante violence and lynching in Turkey, and how successive governments have used it to underpin authoritarian governance and deter resistance. While the section contains several interesting interviews, there seems to be a lot missing here: for example, none of the chapters address the crackdown on social media and the internet in the past decade. A discussion on the restrictions in the sphere of political rights is also curiously absent.

Lastly, Part VII demonstrates why democracy has failed to be successful in Turkey and why authoritarianism has returned repeatedly. A particularly fascinating chapter by Cem Kaptanoglu delves into the psychological impact of the history of the Republic of Turkey, showing how the strong corporatist and fascist elements of early Kemalism have had a lasting impact and prevented the growth of durable democracy in Turkey.

The book is commendable for giving way to the voices of progressive thinkers and activists in Turkey during the consolidation of authoritarianism while exploring how their experiences reflect the changes in Turkey since 1980. Furthermore, the interviews meritoriously link economic analyses to the study of authoritarianism and offer the readers the possibility to approach the issue of resistance to authoritarianism from various perspectives.

However, it is unclear how well the volume works on its thesis on Turkish authoritarianism. In the introduction, the editors lay out their aims - firstly to comment on authoritarianism in the Turkish context and secondly also to provide a voice to progressive intellectuals in Turkey (p.7). I would argue that the second objective is full-filled, but the readers should be aware that this is a fairly loose
collection of interviews (albeit very interesting ones) that lacks a concluding section that could have tied the various insights from each of them together.

Indeed, this volume is impressive in many ways, especially for the calibre of interviewees, many of whom are currently incarcerated for their views. The high quality of most of these interviews is also to be commended. While I am not sure that all of the interviews or sections talk to each other - with the volume possibly addressing too many different aspects at once -, they undoubtedly remain a very interesting read.

Balki Begumhan Bayhan
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