Inadequate performance of the labour institution and its derivates (trade unions, technical safety services) is to a great extent accountable for the accumulation of social unrest and psychological tension. The growing number of accidents and disasters, non-motivated acts of violence and murders, large-scale adulteration of foodstuffs and drugs, and, what is most important, the endless chain of fraud and extortion cases in financial and other spheres – all this taken together means that no safe places have been left in the everyday life space; there remain only more or less dangerous places.

Finally, two sociopsychological factors of dissatisfaction should be mentioned. The former is that the gestalt of the ‘favourite leader’ shattered and even those who loved it got bored with it (Radzichovsky, 2012). Taking into consideration the age-old Russian tradition to sacralise supreme authority, its delegitimisation is a very serious destabilising factor. The latter is mistrust again. The government simply stopped paying attention to it. ‘...So many stillborn empty slogan-like campaigns have been engineered by the rulers over the past decade: “modernisation”, “commercialisation”, “transformation”, “intellectualisation”, “nano-technolisation” (Gurevich, 2011: 16). But How will all this improve people’s sociopsychological well-being had not been addressed at all.

4. Accumulation of a critical mass of protest

An illusion persisted in Russia that if something had not been shown on central TV, it not happened at all. Two events put a stop to wishful thinking: forest and peat fires in Central Russia which TV could not keep silent about, and arrangement of aid to victims via the Internet, which boosted the potency of networking and, what is even more important, imparted a new quality to it (Yanitsky, 2011a). The internet has made public the government’s incapacity and reluctance to perform its functions.

And so the protest movement started to expand steadily beginning in 2010. At first, there emerged small seats of protest, then protestors began to unite into regional and local coalitions and, finally, series of mass protest meetings combusted in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other large cities [3]. The general trend: transformation of social, environmental and others civic protests into political ones [4]. Another feature: their network affiliation, to which the traditional Russian power vertical had been absolutely unprepared.
Surprisingly, the ruling party United Russia (*Yedinaya Rossiya*) practically disappeared from the arena of public politics all of a sudden. The feeling of a mass of people exclusion was multiply enhanced by the public statement concerning exchange of chairs that had been made in advance by the ‘ruling tandem’: V.Putin will be president and D.Medvedev will be prime minister (what is really happened in May 2012). The people called this deal ‘tiny castling’.

An All-Russian Popular Front was urgently set up in parallel with, or rather in substitution of, the ruling top that had been moved aside by the rulers themselves. Putin, the acknowledged political leader of the country and its new president, headed it and delegated guidance of the ruling party to the ex-president D. Medvedev. And the longer the government was irresponsive to protestors’ demands, the more explicit and persistent the latter’s political demands became. The people came to understand that the state machine had fully alienated itself from civil society and lived by its own laws.

Then, the idea of modernization in Russia had ‘suddenly’ faded away somehow and vanished from the front pages of newspapers and TV news programmes. The key figures of the Institute of Modern Development that had been specially set up to translate this idea into concrete programmes and projects of modernization likewise left the public arena. And judging from Putin’s pre-election promises what might be expected is just a conservative project of Russia’s modernization (Yanitsky, 2011b). Eventually, elections to the VI State Duma (the parliament) held in December 2010, which civic organizations appraised as being falsified, topped off formation of the critical mass of protest [5; 6].

5. **Models of the mass protest movement**

My further considerations are based on recent work of the US sociologist K. Ash (2011) who analyzed models of protest movements in post-communist countries. Ash states that in these countries civil society took on the role of a challenger to the power of the state and of an imperative for the functioning of a democracy. By creating non-state associations civic organizations created the capability to confront and repel the forces of an intrusive state. Organizations evolved and built networks with one another, which then retained the capability of mobilizing and challenging the policies of a