fected by disaster, estimate material and human losses and compare their estimations with that given by officials and its media.

The civil rescuers revealed which IT instruments more applicable for a particular cases. For example, internet-forums turned out the most multi-functional device, especially efficient for rendering targeted aid and information exchange between victims and their relatives and friends outside the zone of disaster. Whilst twitter has been used for urgent dissemination information about new hotbeds of defeat. But there is a problem: New information is usually embedded in habitual frames. ‘Humans have a strong tendency to make new information conform to existing views’ (Keen, 2008: 150). For example, if we believe that a fire is always a bad thing, it means that we are psychologically predisposed to estimate all its consequences as ‘bad’. Language is encourages this one-sided estimations, because it tend to direct our comprehension of fires in particular direction. That is, humans tend to embed this information into their habitual frames (worldviews).

More general conclusion is that in the future the civil society organizations including effective assistance of local administration, being armed with IT and having relevant resources, will be capable to cope with a disaster much faster and with less losses than the State emergency organizations did it. The explanation of this fact is rather simple: the former used networks for multi-sided contacts to mobilize all possible resources across the country, whereas the latter – first of all for their own needs. In other words, there are two kinds of mobilization: by free will and ex officio.

Finally, the internet helps to promote what is usually labeled as alternative public sphere that offer a new, empowering sense to lay people of what does it means to be a civil activist.

6. Revitalization of civil society (positive effects)

Since our project targeted to embrace all social phases of the fire disaster (from its predicting to final rehabilitation of affected zones) I would like to present here preliminary the most obvious positive results and effects of the civil mobilization under consideration.

(1) the map of disposition of forces and timing of the run of catastrophe has been revealed and fixed;
(2) consolidation, self-organization of a large part of Russian civil society under the above critical conditions, more tight ties between local communities and gaining new local knowledge by them. Local programmers and switchers of information flows are emerged;

(3) better mutual understanding and coordination of actions between rescuers and local residents has been reached. We observed the rise of self-esteem of all involved in the fire extinguishing, because they realized that they saved forest and people who lived in or nearby as well;

(4) all involved acquired new experience. More than that, their participation in this dangerous and multisided enterprise was actually a new step in their socialization. All involved, including the scholars and scientists, acquired better understanding of interrelationships between social order (habit of everyday life) and nature’s dynamics;

(5) activists became not only more armed with models of decision-making under critical conditions, but more socially and culturally sophisticated as well;

(6) the catastrophe initiated the mobilization of social capital of many people far beyond the zone of fires. The constituency of civil rescuers is no doubt had expanded. In particular, social capital of professional ecologists and local residents has been activated, because they felt that their knowledge and practical experience had been claimed;

(7) new civil centers of resource mobilization and complex analyses of social consequences of the disaster both within and beyond the SMOs had been emerged. For Russia the emergence new initiative groups using IT in remote provinces is critically important. A social memory of local residents (aboriginals) being mobilized became an additional resource because aboriginals knew how local people fought against the same disasters in the past.

(8) The disaster raised the sensitivity to risk of local population again because the recent permanent state of ‘usual’ emergency make people get accustomed to it. As Murphy put it: ‘When extreme weather triggers a disaster…the population and key leaders attempt to make sense of the new situation’. It is needed because ‘there is a decay curve of sensitivity to risks and hazards by which the increasing time after normality has returned tends to lead to the fading away of the acknowledged risk. A major challenge of lea-
leadership consist of preventing this decline from occurring’ (Murphy, 2010: 243).

(9) The disaster favored various forms of self-organization. Activists were forced to act regardless official instructions, sometimes coming into collision with strict instructions of federal forces, that is, of the state rescuers and local administration.

(10) it is indicative that during the struggle with fire and then rendering assistance to injured or psychologically depressed there were no one conflict between people of different nationalities. All involved, be it volunteers or local residents, worked (and suffered) equally.

(11) their motivation and at the same time mobilizing frame was ‘we are needed!’ , that is, their activity was claiming and necessary for others. In other words, their collective efforts aimed at the protection of a common good were again claimed by the society.

(12) the most important result of this hot Russian summer was the exposition of absolutely useless of the new Forestry Code adopted in 2005 and some other laws related to forestry and forestry business in particular.

(13) looking more widely, we agree with our western partners that ‘the internet is an efficient tool in terms of the diffusion of protest (Della Porta et al., 1999) and the consistency of protest, in order to achieve a ‘consensual mobilization’ (Oltrault, 2001: 124, quotation from: Win de Donk et al., 2004: 171).

7. Political and scientific and institutions

Surprisingly, but the critical situation under review had for a long time no any response from the part of central, regional and local authorities. Fires quickly expanded, smog covered Moscow, its residents suffocated, but it seemed that politicians of all levels and ranks have heard nothing about all this including the President’s administration and former Moscow mayor. No measures were taken in order to alleviate the sufferings of sick and old. The situation were worse than in New Orleans. Nevertheless, official media reported that ‘All under control’. There are some explanations of this alienation, but the key of them meant that it was one more confirmation that power incapsulated and did not want to show its interest to lay people’s fatigue.